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It has become common, over the last decade or so, to plead for more
"civility" and "respect" in American daily life. Some of this has come
from politicians. Mayor Giuliani of New York, in particular, has been
pushing the idea that more everyday civility can lower the urban crime
rate.' Newspapers and T.V. newsmagazines have suggested the same thing.2
At the same time, civility has become a favorite subject for academics, with
books and articles written by philosophers,3 sociologists,4 historians,5
linguists,6 and lawyers.' Two special topics have particularly engaged the
attention of law professors: hate speech and sexual harassment. More
"civility" and "respect" have been proposed as a solution to the problems
of both.8 All in all, ideas that used to seem a little schoolmarmish in the
wake of the 1960s-ideas about the enforcement of decent behavior-have
come to seem respectable again, both politically and intellectually.
It is hard not to feel, though, that there is something utopian about
much of this literature. America is a place where interpersonal relations
have always been a bit rough by comparison with many other parts of the
world.9 Introducing civil behavior into America-especially into places like
New York City-means trying to root out what really seem like deep-
seated tendencies in American society. Maybe this can be done. But it is not
easy to feel confident, especially since most of our literature is weak when
I. See Crime in America: Defeating the Bad Guys, THE ECONOMIST (American ed.), Oct. 3,
1998, at 35; Crime in the Subways Declines Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1999, at B3; New York
City Mayor Giuliani Talks About His Efforts To Increase Civic Virtue, IOWA ST. DAILY, Nov. 16,
1998, at 1. On other aspects of the civility campaign, including the "civility retreat" for members
of Congress, see generally Bayou Schools May Mix Math with Manners, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 21, 1999, at 1. For Louisiana legislation requiring "good manners" in schools
(for example, addressing teachers and school administrators "by using the respectful terms 'Yes,
Ma'am' and 'No, Ma'am' or 'Yes, Sir' and 'No, Sir"') in part as a response to the Columbine
High School shootings, see Schools Look Hard at Lockers, Shirts, Bags, and Manners, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1999, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Crossfire: Giuliani Declares Civil War on Incivility (CNN television broadcast,
Feb. 27, 1998).
3. See, e.g., AViSHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996);
Sarah Buss, Appearing Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners, 109 ETHICS 795 (1999).
4. See, e.g., EDWARD SHILS, THE VIRTUE OF CIVILITY (Steven Grosberg ed., 1997).
5. See, e.g., Kenneth Cmiel, The Politics of Civility, in THE SIXTIES 263-90 (David Farber
ed., 1994).
6. See, e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND (1990).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH (1998); STEPHEN
CARTER, CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY (1998); ROBERT
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691 (1986).
8. See ABEL, supra note 7, at 262-63; Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with
Respect. I ll HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997); Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a
Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999) (emphasizing the
dignitary harm of sexual harassment).
9. See KENNETH CMIEL, DEMOCRATIC ELOQUENCE: THE FIGHT OVER POPULAR SPEECH IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 69-70 (1990); JOHN F. KASSON, RUDENESS AND CIVILITY:
MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY URBAN AMERICA 64, 138 (1990); ROBERT WIEBE, SELF-
RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 45-47, 49-50 (1995).
1280 [Vol. 109: 1279
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1280 1999-2000
Enforcing Civility and Respect
it comes to explaining the deep workings of the sociology of civility. What,
after all, is really involved in introducing "civility" into a given society?
Why do some societies manage to do it, while ours fails?
It is with these questions in mind that I want to try, in this Article, to
bring some comparative law to bear on the civility problem. Within our
swelling civility literature there has not been much in the way of careful
comparative law. To be sure, a kind of pop comparativism has been a minor
motif in the literature. In particular, writers concerned with the problems of
hate-speech regulation like to mention that other countries find it easier
than ours does to regulate "uncivil" hate speech, and they have produced a
variety of lists of the countries that do so.' Other, more vague, comparative
claims have also been made. France in particular, we have been told, with
its patterns of courtesy and respect, is a more "mature" or more "civilized"
place than the United States.'
But it has to be said that these comparative observations have been
made in a naYve way. Authors generally summarize the cold black letter of
foreign "hate-speech" laws without saying much about how those laws are
applied in practice. Moreover-and more importantly-they make no effort
to explain how or why the regulation of civility appears in some societies
and not in others.' 2 It is all well and good to remark that foreigners regulate
hate speech. Before we cite foreign statutes in any discussion of American
law, though, we really need to know more. We need to know how hate-
speech regulation, which seems so objectionable in the United States, came
to seem acceptable elsewhere. We need to know, more generally, how the
very idea that the law can regulate ordinary interpersonal relations could
establish itself in some societies, but not in others.
10. See, e.g., POST, supra note 7, at 9 (citing Canada and listing authors who have compared
the United States to other countries); Bradley Appleman. Hate Speech: A Comparison of the
Approaches Taken by the United States and Germany, 14 WIS. INT'L LJ. 422 (1996); Sionaidh
Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech, 7 WM. & MARY BtLL RTs. J. 305 (1999)
(U.K., France, Germany); Credence Fogo-Schensul, More than a River in Egypt, 33 GO,z L.
REV. 241, 267-69 (1997) (Canada, Germany); F. Haiman. Words That May Injure, 28 FREE
SPEECH Y.B. 8 (1990) (France); Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech, 23 DUQ. L
REV. 77, 88-89 (1984) (Sweden); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, 87 MiCH.
L. REV. 2320, 2346-48 (1989) (U.K., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden): Mayo Moran,
Talking About Hate Speech, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1425 (Canada); Stephen J. Roth. The Legal Fight
Against Anti-Semitism-Survey of Developments in 1993 and 1994, 25 IsRAEL Y.B. HUt. RTS.
349 (1995).
11. See Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 1. 9 n.4
(1998) (describing France, in contrast to the "regressed" United States, as a "postadolescent
civilization").
12. For articles that try to penetrate a little deeper, though from a point of view very different
from mine, and focusing on Canada, see Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and
Canada, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1992, at 5; Kathleen Mahoney, The Canadian
Constitutional Approach to Freedom of Expression in Hate Propaganda and Pornography, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1992, at 77; and Moran, supra note 10.
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Hence the problem that I tackle in this Article. My focus is on the
contrast between two highly "civil" Continental traditions-those of
France and Germany-and the notoriously "uncivil" tradition of the United
States. Both France and Germany are countries that are cited, admiringly,
for their hate-speech regulation. France in particular is often noted for the
high development of its norms of politeness. These countries are cultural
near-neighbors of the United States whose social and political systems are
in many ways not all that different from our own. They offer themselves
naturally for an in-depth comparison. How did these countries, which in
many ways closely resemble the United States, come to differ from us in
matters of "civility" ?
The effort to answer that question plunges us into a sea of complex
problems in comparative sociology and history. Part of what I want to show
is that European hate-speech regulation, in Germany in particular, is less
far-reaching than American authors sometimes like to imagine. But my
main interest is in tracing larger patterns in civility regulation than hate
speech alone. The relative willingness of the Germans and the French to
regulate hate speech is only a part of a more wide-ranging tradition of
civility regulation in both countries. In neither France nor Germany is it
right to view hate-speech regulation in isolation from other patterns of
behavior, for in both countries, the regulation of hate speech is only one
aspect of a more complex cultural pattern of the maintenance of respectful
interpersonal relations. "Respect" matters over the whole landscape of law
and society in Germany and France. In Germany, as we shall see, it may
even be a criminal offense to call somebody a "jerk" or to give somebody
"the finger": Germany has not only hate-speech regulation, but also civility
law of a more far-reaching kind. France, for its part, is rich in widely
accepted and carefully inculcated civility norms. The great challenge, in the
effort to understand the comparative civility of the "civil" civil societies of
France and Germany, is to understand how the values of "respect" and
"civility" came to have this much more sweeping importance than they
have ever attained in American law.
In addressing that challenge, this Article touches on a range of difficult
questions in the sociology of law. But it focuses upon one thing in
particular-something that will seem quite strange to most Americans: the
idea of the protection of personal honor. In both Germany and France,
"honor" is a protectable legal interest; 13 and in both of those countries the
maintenance of norms of civility is closely linked to the maintenance of a
general right to what German scholars sometimes call "a minimum of
13. On France, see, for example, BERNARD BEIGNIER, L'HONNEUR ET LE DROIT (1995): and
ANDRt ViTU, TRAITf- DE DROIT CRIMINEL: DROIT PENAL SPtCIAL 1577-78 (1982).
1282 [Vol. 109:i1279
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1282 1999-2000
Enforcing Civility and Respect
honor"' 4 or "a certain minimum standard of personal respect."' 5 Rude
behavior is regarded in both countries as an assault on the personal honor of
its target, in a way that Americans would find difficult to comprehend. It is
the German and French legal cultures of honor that present the mystery that
is my principal topic in this Article: How did it come to pass that honor, a
concept regarded by most Americans as almost laughable, has survived in
the large industrial democracies of Continental Europe?
Explaining that survival, it turns out, is not entirely easy to do. There is,
to be sure, a literature on European honor and dignity. In particular,
commentators frequently point to the European commitment to generalized
personal honor as part of a larger reaction against the horrors of the Fascist
period. This is particularly true of accounts of the German hate-speech
regime. As Eric Stein, for example, describes it:
In the Federal Republic of Germany ... the Basic Law
(Grundgesetz) guarantees freedom of opinion and speech but makes
it expressly subject to limitations defined in "the general laws, the
provision of law for the protection of youth, and by the right to
inviolability of personal honour." The experience with the abuse of
freedoms that contributed to the demise of the Weimar Republic
and the suppression of these freedoms by the National Socialist
regime left a deep imprint upon the Basic Law and subsequent
legislation .... [As a consequence of that experience,] free speech
claims must be weighed against the values of human dignity and
personal honor that are grounded in the Basic Law itself.'6
Reading this passage, and many comparable ones," one might think of the
European attachment to dignity and honor as the work of the postwar
period. Europeans, one might suppose, try to enforce "respectful"
14. RALF STARK, EHRENSCHUTZ IN DEUTSCHLAND 26 (1996).
15. RUDOLPH MACKEPRANG, EHRENSCHUTZ IM VERFASSUNGSSTAAT 268 (1990).
16. Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: German Laus in European and American
Perspective, in VERFASSUNGSRECHT UND VOLKERRECHr. GEDACHTNIsscHRIFT FOR WILHELM
KARL GECK 831-32 (Wilfried Fiedler & Georg Ress eds., 1989) (footnotes omitted). An earlier
version of this article appeared in 85 MICH. L. REv. 277 (1986). Cf. Friedrich KUbler. How Much
Freedomfor Racist Speech?, 27 HOFsTRA L. REV. 335. 336 (1998) (- Specific laws against racist
hate speech are largely a product of the second half of the twentieth century. In part, their origins
are shaped by the specific national experience. This is particularly obvious in Germany. where its
approach is primarily dictated by the trauma of the Holocaust.").
17. Many post-1945 constitutions included provisions guaranteeing -social dignity" or
"human dignity" that were clearly intended to mark the end of the Fascist era. See infra note 354
and accompanying text. Human rights lawyers similarly explain and justify the campaign for
human rights that is so vigorously prosecuted in the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg as the product of the horrific experience of Fascism. Even the new French law on
bioethics has been presented to the world as a safeguard against Fascism. See Richard Saltus,
France Weighs Restrictive Biomedical Science Law, BOSTON GLOBE. Oct. 23. 1993. at 6 (stating
that Justice Lenoir, a top French jurist, ascribes the restrictiveness of French bioethics law to
"memories of Nazi racial and genetic practices").
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interpersonal relations because Europe went through a hell of human
indignity in the 1930s and 1940s that America escaped. Correspondingly,
one might suppose that the European law of honor and dignity had to do
with great issues of human rights. One might draw the same conclusions
from some of the commentaries on European law that present the idea of
dignity as a realization of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and of the
ideals of the Christian tradition; 8 European lawyers, one might guess, have
been horrified by the Nazi experience and have felt compelled to turn to
high moral philosophy.
Yet, as I argue in this Article, no such account of the rise of European
dignitary law can be more than partially correct. First of all, the European
law of honor is by no means exclusively about great issues of human rights.
To the contrary, the European culture of honor and dignity reaches very
deep into everyday social life, covering what to us seem astoundingly trivial
matters of civility. Germany and France are not just countries with law on
politically charged matters like hate speech. They are countries where ideas
of honor and respect govern a striking range of human interaction. They are
countries with cultures of respect that form the deep sociological context of
their law of respect.
Moreover, they are countries whose cultures of respect are palpably
much older than 1945, and whose laws of respect rest on some very un-
Kantian values. Indeed, as this Article argues, the honor-laden civility
environments of both France and Germany must be traced back principally
to the aristocratic cultures of the eighteenth, and to some extent the
nineteenth, centuries. The honor associated with civil behavior was, in
earlier periods, a characteristically aristocratic value; and when people in
both countries behave "civilly" today, they do so, in large part, by adopting
patterns of behavior that were once characteristically aristocratic patterns.
The post-Fascist period is a latecomer in the making of law safeguarding
European dignity. Indeed, the role of Fascism itself in the making of the
European culture of honor is, I suggest, complex and ambivalent: The
Nazis, in point of fact, far from hindering the generalization of honor in
German society, were largely responsible for establishing that all Germans
(though of course not all persons; and of course only those "Germans" who
matched the Nazi definition) had a legally cognizable share of social honor.
As for Kantianism and Christianity, while they have certainly exercised a
postwar influence on European dignitary law, it is an influence, as I try to
show, that has often failed to reach terribly deep.
The notion that the culture of legal dignity is simply a post-Fascist
development in Europe, straightforwardly drawn from the traditions of high
moral philosophy, thus will not do. Explaining French and German respect
18. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
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requires us to reach deeper into everyday life, and deeper into the European
past, than that.
Reaching into everyday life and the European past is accordingly what
this Article undertakes to do. This Article describes the dignitary cultures of
civility that reign in both France and Germany today and traces the sources
of those cultures to old traditions of social hierarchy: The "personal honor"
that is now the possession of every European, I will show, is modeled on
what was once aristocratic honor. Even European hate-speech regulation is
a product of this history, for hate-speech regulation in both countries grows,
strangely enough, out of a tradition of dueling law, which historically aimed
to guarantee the honor of the aristocratic classes, as well as out of a
tradition of law of deference, or law obliging social inferiors to show
respect to their betters. When Jews and other outsiders receive the
protection of the laws in France and Germany, they are, in effect, being
treated as honorary aristocrats. The same is also true, I suggest, of
developing European sexual harassment law: The tendency in Europe has
been to build a dignitary law of sexual harassment that is quite different in
spirit from what we have here. In the heritage of the laws of dueling and
deference, and in other aspects of French and German dignitary law as well,
we see the continuing strength of an aristocratic tradition that is simply
missing in the United States. To echo a famous claim of Louis Hartz, the
United States is a place where, in contrast to Continental Europe, the
"feudal ethos" has not exercised a formative influence, 9 and that has made
a profound difference.
This difference is one that I try to capture in a large sociological
generalization: France and Germany, I argue, have witnessed, each in its
own way, leveling up. In both societies, the cultural memory of an age of
social hierarchy is strong, and the commitment to modem egalitarianism
has been a commitment to the proposition that all persons should stand on
the highest rung of the social hierarchy. Egalitarianism in France and
Germany is an egalitarianism that proclaims we are all aristocrats now; and
in practice this has been an egalitarianism of widely generalized norms of
civil respect. American egalitarianism, by contrast, is, I suggest, an
egalitarianism of leveling down, which proclaims, in effect, that there are
no more aristocrats-that we all stand together on the lowest rung of the
social ladder. One consequence is that this egalitarianism of the lowest rung
has often proven to be an egalitarianism of lack of respect.
This is, I want to emphasize at the outset, a somewhat disheartening
conclusion for those who would like to see more civility in the United
States. Germans and French show respect for others now, I argue,
principally because they continue to profit from a tradition of social
19. See Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADmON IN AMERICA 4 (1955).
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hierarchy. We in the United States do not have, and generally do not want,
any such hierarchical tradition, and that makes the prospects for more
civility here a bit dimmer.
A few further introductory words about the aims of this Article are in
order. Civility is a topic that straddles the realms of "law" and "society,"
and inevitably much of this Article will consist of detailed discussion of the
interrelationship between "legal" and "social" regulation in both Germany
and France. Indeed, it is part of my goal to show that law and society
interpenetrate in complex ways in both of those countries. With regard
to Germany, I show that the technically defined law of civility has
stimulated and informed a wide-ranging "legal culture" of civility, whose
prescriptions go well beyond the provisions of the law itself. With regard to
France, I show that, while the technically defined law of civility has largely
vanished, the social norms of politeness that govern French society are
nevertheless largely modeled on the law, making heavy and revealing use
of legal terminology and concepts. In tracing all of this, I hope to give us a
deeper grasp of the abidingly difficult problem of the social impact of
narrowly legal ideas.
I also hope to make something of a contribution to the theoretical
sociological literature, and, especially in the closing analytic sections of this
Article, I measure my argument against the ideas of some of our leading
sociological authorities on interpersonal interaction-in particular, Erving
Goffman, Norbert Elias, Hume, and Tocqueville. I also address one
paradoxical issue that grows out of our standard literature on "honor
cultures": the issue of violence. Most of our accounts of honor cultures
assume that a strong attachment to honor brings with it high rates of social
violence. Yet the opposite is the case in Continental Europe. I make, in a
brief Part, some effort to explain why.
Part I of this Article briefly makes some preliminary analytic
distinctions: between civility and decency; between civility rules requiring
an outward show of respect and civility rules requiring a sincere
acknowledgment of the equality of others; and between the legal protection
of reputation and the legal protection of honor. Part II describes the
remarkable German legal culture of insult, under which disrespectful
expressions like "jerk" can be criminally penalized and hate speech is
regulated. This Part also touches on something called the law of "sexual
insult," which theoretically guarantees respect for women in Germany. As
this Part shows, Germans participate in a kind of popular legal culture of
"insult" that extends well beyond the technical coverage of the law. Part III
traces the roots of the contemporary German law of insult to their sources
in the law of dueling and deference. Part III also discusses something
disturbing: the importance of the Nazi period in the critical generalization
of norms of civil respect in Germany. Part IV discusses the current state of
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German law, in which old values of personal honor continue to haunt
efforts to build a new jurisprudence of "human dignity."
Parts V and VI turn to France. In Part V, I describe the decline of the
French law of insult after the eighteenth century. France has today a merely
vestigial law of insult, which serves as the basis for French hate-speech
regulation, but which has not produced anything like the German legal
culture of insult described in Part II. France does, however, have a lively
and vigorous culture of politesse, or norms of politeness. In Part VI, I
describe that culture of politesse, showing that it too has roots in aristocratic
tradition and in the terminology and conceptual repertoire of the old law of
insult. Part VI also emphasizes that while France has only a vestigial law of
insult, it has a vigorous tradition of teaching civility in the schools: In
France, education does some of the work that law does in Germany. In Part
VII, I briefly describe the absence of a law of civility in the United States.
The final three Parts of this Article present my conclusions. Part VIII
makes a broad argument for the decisive importance of aristocratic tradition
in the making of the respect-oriented cultures of Germany and France,
invoking some of the classic social-scientific claims of figures like Hume
and Elias. Part IX tackles some of the difficult problems raised by the
relationship between honor and violence. Part X, finally, assesses the
impact of this research for our thinking about civility regulation here in the
United States.
Making my case will require some dense historical detail, including a
foray deep into the Nazi period. The reader will, I hope, be patient. By the
end of the Article, I hope to have convinced the reader of the importance of
these different traditions of egalitarianism for the making of relations of
civility. One thing I am not able to offer is any clear answer on the
advisability or the prospects of a law of civility in the United States. But I
do mean to offer, by the end of the Article, a clearer sense of just what is at
stake in any campaign to introduce civility regulation into the United States.
I. PROLEGOMENA
Everyday American life can seem extremely abrasive, and the yearning
for more "civility" in America is easy to understand. So is the desire to
make the law somehow a tool for "civilizing" American society. It is
entirely natural to look abroad for models for any American civility
program. When we look abroad, though, what do we see?
We might expect to see no law of civility at all. There is a tradition, as
old as Aristotle, that holds that matters of civility are never a proper field
for legal regulation. It was Aristotle's view (at least in one famous passage)
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that people who "say mean things out of cussedness" are not any concern
of the theory of justice, narrowly and properly understood.2" This tradition,
holding that rudeness is no concern of the law, has been especially strong
since the eighteenth century, 2' and it remains strong today. It is a tradition
that is, of course, particularly strong in the United States, where the
assumption that "mere rudeness" cannot be legally regulated pervades our
discussions of both hate speech and sexual harassment. Nor is it Americans
alone who imagine that rudeness is just plain unregulable: The legal
literatures of all major Western countries declare that there is a category of
behavior that is "merely rude"-behavior that, though it may be
objectionable and nasty, gives rise to no legal liability.22 Such behavior may
run afoul of the rules of civility, but those rules are social rules and not
legal ones.
This is such a widespread notion that it may seem surprising that
anything that could be called a law of civility should be accepted in the
democratic West, or indeed in any part of the world. Yet in point of fact,
there is plenty of what can fairly be called law of civility. Indeed, Aristotle
himself (writing in other, less famous, passages) had no doubt that some
kinds of disrespectful statements ought to be penalized.23 Even in the
modem Western democracies, one can find law that penalizes what to
Americans seem stunningly trivial instances of rudeness.
Here it is important to begin, though, by making three often-neglected
analytic distinctions. The first is the distinction between two aspects of
"good manners"-what I will call civility and decency. By civility, in this
20. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA 98 (1130a) (Franciscus Susemihl ed., Tcubner 3d ed.
1912). A person KaKC4<W ehrclv &b. aXOer6rqr'r- is not a concern for justice because doing so does not
involve taking more than one's share. This hardly means that Aristotle thought "honor" was not a
good that should be correctly distributed in society, of course. See id. It means only that, in this
passage at least, he doubted that mere harsh words counted enough to be a subject of concern. For
a survey of later literature on this topic through the 17th century, see Manfred Beetz, Ein
neuentdeckter Lehrer der Conduite: Thomasius in der Geschichte der Gesellschaftsethik, in
CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS 1655-1728, at 199, 209 n.60 (Werner Schneiders ed.. 1989).
21. On the particularly important contribution of Christian Thomasius, who distinguished
among three types of good, the "justum," the "decorum," and the "honestum," where decorum
served to characterize rules of civility that stood outside the reach both of the law and of morality
properly understood, see Frederick M. Barnard, Rightful Decorum and Rational Accountability: A
Forgotten Theory of Civil Life, in CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS 1655-1728, supra note 20, at 187;
Beetz, supra note 20, at 199; and Hinrich Rilping, Theorie und Praxis bei Christian Thomasius, in
CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS 1655-1728, supra note 20, at 137, 139. The classic statement of the
modem view is to be found in Rousseau, Lettre a d'Alembert sur les spectacles, discussed in
James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1086
& n.142 (1998).
22. See, e.g., EMILE WORMS, LES ATTENTATS A L'HONNEUR 169 (n.p., Perrin 1890) (" II va
de soi ... que de simples impolitesses, des faits de discourtoisie ne constituent pas, mais en raison
seulement de leur insignifiance, des offenses qui peuvent 8tre dvoqudes par le droit."). For
Germany and the United States, see infra notes 66, 327, 330 and accompanying text.
23. See N.R.E. FISHER, HYBRIS: A STUDY IN THE VALUES OF HONOR AND SHAME IN
ANCIENT GREECE 7-35 (1992); DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS
130 (1978).
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Article, I mean strictly the practices that involve showing respect to others.
These practices include forms of address (the use of "Sir" and "Madam,"
vous and Sie), forms of deportment (bowing, shaking hands), and other
forms of deference such as yielding to another on the street; they also
include refraining respectfully from telling ethnic jokes or indulging in
ethnic slurs. By decency, in contrast, I mean practices that aim to avoid
giving offense or calling attention to gross or bestial aspects of life. The
practices of decency include such things as the maintenance of delicacy in
table manners, restraint from exposing one's nudity, and refusal to use
obscene expressions in public. Civility and decency are routinely lumped
together under the heading of "good manners," 21 yet they involve two
fundamentally different aspects of social life. As a moment's reflection will
show, the psychological drives that underlie civility and decency differ The
urge to show or demand respect is importantly different from the urge to
cover one's nakedness or to cover one's mouth when eating or yawning.
Civility and decency are, moreover, addressed to very different audiences.
As Rudolf von Jhering pointed out more than a century ago, the practices of
civility are always directed at some particular person or persons considered
as having a particular defined status: We always show respect for
somebody. The practices of decency, by contrast, are never directed
at anybody in particular. They restrain our behavior vis-ai-vis an
undifferentiated public.' Not least, civility and decency presuppose
different underlying problems of social structure. Rules of civility speak, as
a general matter, to problems in the maintenance of hierarchical social order
among human beings; rules of decency speak, as a general matter, to
problems in differentiating the human from the bestial. Civility and decency
are of course related. When one wants to show disrespect, for example, one
24. The failure to distinguish between the two is a fault that infects even. and especially, the
leading work on the subject of civility, Norbert Elias's The Civilizing Process. Elias's argument,
summarized infra note 381 and accompanying text, purports to analyze the history of "good
manners." See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVIL1ZING PRocEsS 42-178 (1994). In fact. Elias addresses
almost exclusively questions of decency, not questions of civility.
Something of the same fault also weakens William Miller's superb exploration of the realm
of decency, The Anatomy of Disgust. The least persuasive chapter in Miller's book aims to link
the experience of disgust with social contempt for inferiors. See WILLAM 1AN MI.LER, THE
ANATOMY OF DISGUST 206-34 (1997). That sort of social contempt is something that I show here
is more closely linked with norms of civility than with norms of decency. Miller has expressed his
own doubts about the relation between contempt and disgust. See id. at 218. In saying this, I do
not mean to deny that decency and civility should ultimately be analyzed together. I mean only to
say that much more care in argument is required before disrespect and disgust can be shown to
reduce to the same social-psychological force.
25. See 2 RUDOLPH VON JHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT 281-83 (Hildesheim 4th ed.
1970) (1905) (distinguishing Hflichkeit, Anstand, and Takt, which may, in the context of his
discussion, be translated as civility, decency, and tact); id. at 288-89 (distinguishing decency from
Hdflichkeir); id. at 379 (observing that civility, unlike decency, always involves some contact with
another individual).
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often uses indecent expressions. 2' Nevertheless, it is critically important to
keep the two distinct, especially when speaking of the law. There is law of
civility and there is law of decency. The two have different purposes and
appear in different societies in different measures.
Within the category civility, moreover, it is important to make a further
distinction, between rules that require what can be called the outward show
of respect and rules that call for the sincere acknowledgment of the equality
of others. The outward show of respect is the form of "civil" interaction
that is invariably discussed in our philosophical and sociological literature
on good manners. The stuff of the outward show of respect is direct
interaction between two individuals, the deployment of polite forms of
address (such as "Sir," "Madam," "Your Grace," or "Your Majesty"),
polite inquiries (such as "How are you?" and "How are [various members
of your family]?"), polite formulas attached to the exchange of goods or
services ("Thank you," "much obliged," or "your servant"), and polite
deportment. The little drama of the show of respect is something that has
fascinated a number of philosophers, who have analyzed it as a highly
unusual form of ethical interaction-a form in which truth-telling carries no
positive value.
The show of respect is, indeed, a realm of socially sanctioned lying:
One is being most polite when one disguises one's actual lack of respect for
another. As Hume put it, in analyzing "the rules of GOOD MANNERS OF
POLITENESS" as part of his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals: "Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is affected:
Contempt of others disguised: Authority concealed: Attention given to
each in his turn: And an easy stream of conversation maintained,
without ... eagerness for victory, and without any airs of superiority."27 To
Jhering, similarly, the forms of civility, which give the lie to the affectation
that goodness always involves truth-telling, are a species of dolus bonus, or
"good deceit," where deceit would otherwise be a form of illegality.28 Most
recently, Sarah Buss has revived the same line of thought in an article
pointedly titled Appearing Respectful.29 To all of these authors, the world of
civility is a remarkable arena of mere appearances-and of routinely false
appearances. This oddly positive valuation of a species of hypocrisy
manifests itself, moreover, in the kind of remedy that we demand when the
rules of the outward show of respect are violated: We demand a ritualistic
apology. In demanding an apology, though, we do not imagine that
26. See CHARLES P. FLYNN, INSULT AND SOCIETY: PATTERNS OF COMPARATIVu.
INTERACTION 16-20 (1977) (surveying the evidence).
27. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 139 (Tom L.
Beauchamp ed., 1998) (1751).
28. See 2 JHERING, supra note 25, at 449-50, 455.
29. See Buss, supra note 3.
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apologies are always sincerely meant; apologies too can be hypocritical.
This does not trouble us, however, because the realm of the outward show
of respect is a realm of form and not of inner conviction, a realm of purely
ritual self-abasement. The world of the show of respect, in Erving
Goffman's terminology, is a world purely of ceremony, not of substance.3
The use of the apology as a remedy also reflects the character of the
outward show of respect as involving interaction between two individuals.
Because the victim of a failure to show respect has been insulted by one
person, the wound to that victim's subjective sense of dignity can ordinarily
be salved by an individual apology.
Civility has thus been routinely treated by philosophers as a form of
individual interaction in a world of masks, or mere appearances. Yet,
everyday experience tells us that there are forms of civility that we perceive
precisely as reactions against the cheerful hypocrisy of the outward show
.of respect-forms of civility that, in a kind of dialectical opposition to
ordinary politesse, call for ostentatious sincerity. In particular, Americans
are all familiar with civility rules requiring the sincere acknowledgment of
the equality of others. By these rules (which do not figure in the literature
on good manners, but which matter immensely for our analysis of the
problem of hate speech), I have in mind rules of a particular kind of
respectful decorum-rules that generally forbid us to glory in the social
inferiority of particular classes of persons. Such rules typically prohibit the
use of ugly racial epithets and nasty ethnic jokes.
Unlike rules guaranteeing the outward show of respect, rules requiring
the sincere acknowledgment of the equality of others do not necessarily
involve direct interaction between individuals at all. On the contrary, it is a
striking fact that it may violate those rules to tell an ethnic joke even when
no individual who is a target of the joke is present at all. There is a reason
for this: While the outward show of respect aims to create or affirm a
ritual relationship of respect between two individuals, the sincere
acknowledgment of the equality of others aims to create or affirm a deeper
dignitary structure for society at large. This contrast is manifested in the
sort of remedy called for by a breach of rules requiring the sincere
acknowledgment of the equality of others. Because the victim of an ethnic
slur has been confronted by a larger social pattern of disrespect, an
individual apology will typically do little to restore his or her subjective
sense of dignity. It is small comfort to the victim to hear what may seem a
"merely polite" or hypocritical disavowal of prejudiced views. On the
contrary, the victim tends to wish that the joke-teller would undergo some
sort of transformation of inner state of mind-some experience of
30. See ERvING GOFFMAN, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INrERACTrON
RrUAL 47, 53 (1967).
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conversion or reeducation. This highlights a revealing, and very large,
contrast between these two kinds of rules. While a kind of hypocrisy is in
the spirit of the outward show of respect, the drive of rules requiring the
sincere acknowledgment of the equality of others is precisely to root out
hypocrisy. Substance, and not ceremony, does matter here. Indeed, one of
the most deeply felt injuries of those who complain about the absence of a
social commitment to dignity equality is the injury occasioned by
hypocritical shows of tolerance. (This suggests that advocates of the
apology as a remedy for offensive hate speech, such as Richard Abel,31
have not fully considered the underlying phenomenology of the kind of
disrespect involved.)
This distinction, between rules requiring the outward show of respect
and contrary rules requiring the sincere acknowledgment of the equality of
others, has been neglected in our secondary literature. Yet it deserves some
careful emphasis. In particular, I am going to suggest in this Article that the
law of civility that we find in Continental Europe tends to embody rules
guaranteeing the show of respect. This has some dramatic consequences.
Because this outward show of respect model of civil relations dominates in
German law, for example, German jurists, as we shall see, may discern no
violation of norms of respect in the posting of a sign that reads "No Turks
Allowed," or even in the act of a German man who grabs the breasts of a
woman passing in the street.
Alongside these distinctions in the nature of good manners, we must,
finally, distinguish between two legal interests: the legally protectable
interest in reputation and the legally protectable interest in honor. The
interest in reputation is an interest in making sure that shameful or
discreditable things about us do not become public knowledge. The interest
in honor is an interest in making sure that other people show us respect, not
only in the public sphere, but also in private settings. These two are quite
different. The difference between them can be extremely difficult for
American lawyers to grasp, however, because in the United States, we
generally protect only reputation. Thus, our strong tendency is to protect
individuals against nasty statements only through our law of defamation:
We tend to penalize such statements only if they injure reputation, which
means that they must normally reach the ears or eyes of someone other than
the person defamed. Correspondingly, our tendency, in discussing hate
speech, is to imagine a law of group "libel" or group "defamation." 32
31. See ABEL, supra note 7, at 265.
32. See Lasson, supra note 10; David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of
Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727 (1942); David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair
Game and Fair Comment !, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1942). This is the approach to be found in
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), as well. Some confusion, arising from a failure to
understand the logic of honor, is also to be seen in DAVID GARRIOCH, NEIGHBORHOOD AND
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Continental European law and the law of many other parts of the world that
protect honor differ in ways that lead them to imagine different kinds of
law. The difference shows itself most dramatically in the existence of what
German and French lawyers call the "law of insult" -a species of law that
the United States fundamentally lacks.3 The law of insult does not concern
injuries to reputation. What it involves, instead, is shows of disrespect. The
law of insult is pure law of civility in the sense in which I just defined it: It
penalizes disrespectful words, gestures, and the like. In the countries in
which it exists, the law of insult is regarded as concerning injuries not
primarily to reputation, but to personal honor or dignity. Accordingly, there
is no requirement that legally cognizable insults ever reach the ears or eyes
of any third party; it is a sufficient assault on a person's dignity to have
been addressed in a disrespectful or contemptuous manner, regardless of
whether any third party has witnessed the event.' Moreover, since
disrespect and contempt are at stake in the law of insult, legally insulting
statements or gestures, unlike defamations, do not typically include any
allegation of fact. Most legal "insults" simply involve expressions of
contempt, such as "you swine" or "you jerk," or gestures of contempt,
such as "the finger." Such words and gestures of contempt cannot be said
to include imputations of fact in any meaningful way.35 The existence of a
law of insult is, moreover, only the most dramatic example of the way in
which legal systems that protect honor can differ from legal systems that
protect reputation. France and Germany also differ from the United States
COMMUNITY IN PARIS, 1740-1790, at 40 (1986). Garrioch understands insults to affect reputation
and puzzles over what harm many cases of insult could have occasioned.
33. The difference goes strikingly unnoted even in the European literature, in which law of
Beleidigung is routinely translated as "law of defamation" without discussion of the deep-seated
differences that are my topic in this Article. See, e.g., GEORG NOLTE, BELFIDIGt)NGSSCHUTZ IN
DER FRBIHEITLICHEN DEMOKRATIE 3 (1992).
34. For an example of the failure of even the very finest American imagination to see that
there can be a law of honor that does not require publication to a third party, see Post. supra note
7, at 710-11.
35. The difference between the law of defamation and the law of insult can be usefully
illustrated with an example from the world of American hate speech. If a white American. out of
the hearing of third parties, calls a black American "nigger." there is no legal defamation.
Because the white American has expressed personal contempt for the black American, however,
there might be a legal insult under German law.
It is also possible to draw another valuable distinction, though it is not one that I pursue in
this Article. This is the distinction between the law of insult, narrowly understood, and the law of
deference. The law of deference is also concerned with maintaining respect. But the object of the
law of deference is to guarantee the maintenance of social hierarchy in a society in which a well-
defined social hierarchy exists. Typical law of deference, of the kind we find in many premodern
societies, may require, for example, that social inferiors always yield to social superiors on the
street. An example is the law of medieval Islam, which required members of tolerated minority
religious groups to yield to Muslims in just that way. See, e.g., JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN
INTRODUCTION To ISLAMIc LAW 131 (1964). Law of deference is exclusively concerned with
relations between persons who are not status-equals: All law of deference involves relations
between lower-status persons and higher-status persons. This distinguishes the law of deference
from the law of insult, which typically involves relations between status-equals.
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in their law of defamation. For in both France and Germany, defamation
law is regarded as protecting both reputation and honor." As we shall see,
this has some very important consequences for the analysis of defamatory
statements in both France and Germany.
Understanding the distinction between honor and reputation is critical
for the analysis of the law of civility. Both law protecting honor and law
protecting reputation can be thought of as regulating "rude" behavior in
some sense. Nevertheless, it is really law protecting honor that matters most
for the establishment of a law of civility. When American authors complain
that we lack law of civility, they do not mean that we lack law protecting
reputation. We do have such law. They are complaining that we lack law
protecting honor-law that aims specifically to protect individual dignity
by maintaining forms of respect. When I speak of the "law of civility,"
accordingly, I mean law protecting honor-law whose purpose is to
guarantee respectful interaction.
With these distinctions made, we can say that law of civility does exist.
Despite the widespread notion that rudeness can never be legally regulated,
the law of civility is, in fact, found in many parts of the world; Aristotle's
"people who say mean things" are penalized in many places. 7 Some of
this is informal and therefore hard to detect. We shall see, for example, that
in France some civility norms have historically been enforced through
discretionary police action, whose exact contours may be difficult to
identify. Some civility regulation also probably goes on informally in the
litigation process: It is fair to guess that litigants who act in "polite" ways
sometimes receive more favorable treatment than litigants who do not."
But there is also civility regulation that consists of formal legal rules of the
ordinary kind. Formal legal rules of civility are particularly common in
legal systems founded on hierarchical principles. Confucian systems, for
example, include elaborate regulation of polite interaction between persons
of different statuses; societies that set great store by maintaining formal
hierarchical relations typically have a great deal of law regulating
deference.39
36. See Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & Brandeis Tort
Is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1219, 1236 (1994) (discussing the
law of defamation in France); Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German
Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 297-98 (1989) (discussing the German law of
defamation).
37. For some (unfortunately unsystematically gathered) anthropological data, see FLYNN,
supra note 26, at 69-76.
38. Presumably, for example, litigants in defamation cases both in the United States and
abroad receive better treatment, and perhaps are subjected to lower damage awards, if they
apologize or otherwise present themselves as "civil" persons.
39. See, e.g., GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 100-86
(1996). For (again unsystematic) observations from a variety of world cultures on the connection
between rules of insult and social hierarchy, see FLYNN, supra note 26, at 34-36, 39-53. For the
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But formal legal regulation also exists in the egalitarian West. While
every Western system declares that "mere rudeness" is not sanctionable at
law, the fact is that Western systems define "rudeness" in quite various
ways. The consequence is that it is often possible to point to law, in a given
country, that from the outsider's point of view can only be said to regulate
"rudeness."
II. THE GERMAN CULTURE OF INSULT
One remarkable example of such rudeness regulation is the German law
of Beleidigung, or "insult," and it is with the German law of insult, and
more broadly with the German legal culture of civility, that I would like to
begin.
40
Americans are aware that Germany has one of those more "civil"
Continental societies against which we might want to measure our own.
Much of what makes German society seem so "civil" is a matter of easily
observed social regulation. Linguistic forms play an especially prominent
role. Everyday rituals of linguistic respect-the use of forms of address like
Herr and Frau, for example-are perhaps not as common in Germany as
they are in France, but they are certainly more common than they are in the
United States. Germans are indeed famous for their affection for complex
honorifics such as Herr Professor Doktor. One intricate set of German
civility problems is completely unfamiliar in America: the constellation of
sociolinguistic problems surrounding the use of the formal Sie-" you" -
rather than the informal du-" thou." These problems play a large role in
everyday interaction in Germany.' Germans are also, as foreign visitors to
Germany often remark, more apt than are either Americans or the French to
express loud and vocal disapproval of those who violate community norms.
The cry of unverschunzt!-" what shameless behavior!" -is familiar to all
savvy travelers as a part of the local civility climate in Germany
2
focus on deference in American slave codes, see BERTRAM WYA'TI-BROWN. SOUTHERN HONOR:
ETHIcs AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 363 (1982).
40. There is some terminological confusion that should be dealt with immediately.
Beleidigung in German law is used in two senses: as the general term for law not only of insult
strictly understood, see § 185 STRAFGESETZBUCH IStGBJ [criminal code] (F.R.G.). but also of
defamation, slander, and certain other crimes, see id. § 186 (defamation); id. § 187 (slander); id.
§ 187a (political defamation); id. § 189 (abuse of the memory of deceased persons). Here, for
clarity's sake, I use "insult" only in its strict sense, as applied to § 185 StGB.
41. The ordinary German rule is that the status-superior "offers the du"; that is to say, the
status-superior has the option of inviting the status-inferior to enter a relationship in which the two
parties address each other as du. This rule can of course run up against difficulties where it is
unclear which of the two is the status-superior. In certain settings, especially among students.
saying du is normal. For a typical etiquette-book discussion. see INGE FALKEN. KLEINES
LEXIKON DER MODERNEN UMGANGSFORMEN: VON ABENDANZUG BIS ZUHOREN 35-36 (1998).
42. As nicely observed at the opening of Dutch author Cees Nooteboom's Berlijnse Notities,
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Where German society differs most strikingly from both French and
American, though, is in the degree of its legal regulation of civility
behaviors. It is of course a famous fact that hate speech-racial "insult," in
German legal analysis 43-has been subject to dramatic legal regulation
since the collapse of the Nazi regime.' What goes unremarked, though, is
that the law of insult reaches far beyond the problem of hate speech. The
general law of insult penalizes a whole range of behaviors that seem to
foreigners much less naturally "illegal" than hate speech does. Indeed, it
distorts the German law of insult to speak as though it were just about hate
speech. That law establishes something much grander: a kind of general law
of interpersonal respect.
Respect is indeed the critical operative concept. The German law of
insult criminalizes words, gestures, or behavior that show Mif3achtung oder
Nichtachtung, "disrespect or lack of respect" for another. Most famously,
in German everyday culture, the law of insult criminalizes a gesture called
"the bird": the tapping of the index finger on the forehead. "The bird" is a
gesture used by one car driver to indicate that another is mentally
defective.45 In my experience, every German knows that it is illegal to make
"the bird." In fact, every German knows that anybody who is the target of
any such gesture-for example, "the finger" or "the fig" 46-has the right
Als ik voor de deur van mijn nieuwe huis aangekomen ben krijg ik een
herhalingsoefening. Ik heb de auto nog niet neergezet om mijn bagage en mijn boeken
voor het komende halfjaar uit te laden of er gaat een raam open en van bovenaf begint
een oude man te schreeuwen over unverschdmt. 1k ben thuis.
As I arrive at the door of my new house I get a lesson. Before I have finished pulling
my car over to unload my bags and books for the coming half year a window opens
above me and an old man starts to carry on about unverschlamt. I'm home.
CEES NOOTEBoOM, BERLUNSE NorIrEs 8 (1990).
43. German hate-speech regulation also includes the crime of Volksverhetzung, which I will
explore below.
44. For a description of the German law of insult in the context of the politically charged
questions of hate speech, see Quint, supra note 36, at 319, which discusses hate speech, and
Mathias Reimann, Prurient Interest and Human Dignity: Pornography Regulation in West
Germany and the United States, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 201, 233 (1988), which discusses
insult directed toward women as a group. These discussions do not touch on the deeper culture of
insult that is my topic here. See also Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary
Germany, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 797, 862 (1997) (briefly mentioning the law of insult).
45. On "the bird," see HANs-GEORG DOERING, BELEIDIGUNG UND PRIVATKLAGE 23, 38
n.2 (1971); on "the bird" and "the double bird," see ANDREAS HOHNEL, "DOPPELVOGEL"
UND ANDERE BELEIDIGUNGEN 25-26, 28 (1997). I am most grateful to Dr. Hohnel, who
provided me with a copy of this book. For another view, see HAMBURGER ABENDBLATr.,
Feb. 19, 1999, available in <http://www.abendblatt.de/contents/ha/newslokales/html/l90299/
1702RARE2.HTM>, excerpted infra note 52. Surprisingly, Doering found that traffic was
actually rare as the setting for insults. The most frequent setting, during the 1957-1965 period
studied in his monograph, was the common area of an apartment building. See DOERING, supra, at
15.
46. On "the finger" -nicely known as the Stinkefinger in German-see HOHNEL, supra note
45, at 26. "The fig" falls under the same jurisprudence, described infra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text.
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to call the cops. I have more than once had conversations with Germans
along the following lines:
American: You mean it's illegal to make a gesture like that in
Germany?
German: You mean it's not illegal in America?
4 7
Nor is it gestures alone that are criminalized by the German law of
insult. Words fall under the same set of prohibitions: It can be a criminal
offense in Germany to call another person a "jerk," or even to use the
informal du, or "thou." ' Clearly enough, there are differences, and indeed
chasms of difference, between Americans and Germans.
But to understand what those differences are, and how deep they run,
we have to read carefully in the literature of German law. We have to read
carefully, in particular, because the problem is not just what the law of
insult says, but what ordinary German people think the law of insult says.
The German law of insult belongs, as I want to show, to a much larger
German culture of insult, a culture in which the law encourages and
reinforces popular values that often differ from the values enshrined in the
law itself. This means that we must read our texts with scrupulous care,
looking for evidence that takes us beyond the words of the text itself.
Going beyond the words of the text itself is in any case unavoidable,
since the text of the criminal provision on insult is remarkably un-self-
explanatory. The German provision on insult appears in the criminal code
next to the provisions on defamation and slander.4 It is unlike almost any
47. I cite, as one example among many, my conversation with Professor Reinhard
Zimmermann, of the Universitit Regensburg, in New York City (Mar. 21. 1998). For an example
of American surprise at German practices, see FLYNN. supra note 26, at 79, describing a traffic
citation for "the bird."
48. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
49. As noted supra note 40, there is terminological confusion in the use of Beleidigung; in
particular, some statistical reporting lumps them together, especially §§ 185-187 StGB. While this
gives rise to some analytical difficulties, it is important to note that § 185 actions dwarf others in
the case law. See Klaus Geppert, Straftaten gegen die Ehre, 10 JURA 530 (1983). Also relevant to
the general law of Beleidigung is § 213 StGB, which provides for lesser penalties for offenders
whose homicides have been "provoked" by an insult. For recent cases, see Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Supreme Court], Oct. 22, 1997, 3 StR 394/97, JURIS ref. no. KORE535709800 (F.R.G.);
BGH [Supreme Court], Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJNV], 40 (1987). 3143 (F.R.G.).
Civil actions axe also possible. In particular, and of very long standing, are demands for
Unterlassung (an injunction forbidding the defendant to repeat the insult) and lWidernif (a court
order of retraction, not expressly permitted under the Code but employed by the courts anyway).
For a discussion with references, see Friedrich Ktlbler, Offentlichkeit als Tribunal, 39 JURISTEN
ZE TrNG [JZ] 541, 542 (1984). For comparable American "retraction" statutes, see MARC A.
FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAw AND ALTERNATIVES
940-41 (3d ed. 1983). More broadly, the increased availability of civil damages under postwar
jurisprudence, see infra note 174 and accompanying text, has presumably removed some litigants
from the criminal docket to the civil. See, e.g., MACKEPRANG, supra note 15, at 251-52
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other provision of German criminal law in its opacity, criminalizing insults
without making any effort at defining them:
StGB § 185: Insult is punished by imprisonment for a term of up to
one year or by a fine, and, where the insult is made by means of
physical assault [mittels einer Tditlichkeit], by a term of up to two
years or by a fine.
This provision, which might well be deemed unconstitutionally vague
in the United States,5" has to be read in Germany against the background of
a large body of scholarly commentary. It also has to be "read," as it were,
against a body of social practice; for it is clear, even in the case law, that
popular ideas about the import of § 185 StGB differ from scholarly ones.
And popular ideas can matter in the German law of insult in a very
direct procedural way. Insult is one of a class of mostly minor offenses that
give rise to a Privatklage, or a private criminal prosecution.' This means
that criminal prosecutions of insult are typically brought by the insulted
private parties themselves.5 The consequence is that the aspects of German
(suggesting that one of the most important developments in honor-protection law since the
enactment of the Basic Law may be the transfer of disputes from the criminal to the civil arena).
50. Some German scholars have indeed suggested that the statute is the equivalent of
voidably vague-in violation of the principle nulla poena sine lege as established by
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] Art. 103 Abs. 2 (F.R.G.). See STARK, supra note 14. at 139 &
nn.30-3 1.
51. Section 374 Strafprozeordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedurel (F.R.G.) makes a
Privatklage available, without any requirement of a prior involvement of the state's attorney, in
cases involving (I) trespass into the home; (2) insult; (3) bodily harm; (4) threats; (5)
corruptibility or actual corruption in commercial affairs; (6) damage to goods; (7) unfair
competition; and (8) a variety of matters of infringement of intellectual property.
52. Under § 376 StPO, the state's attorney may also bring actions in insult cases that affect
the public interest. Complainants, it should be noted, may also have a civil action under the
German law of the protection of personality. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
For a guide for the public on how to bring private prosecutions, see Justiz Beh6ide Hamburg
[Hamburg Justice Authority], Hamburgischer Rechtswegweiser (visited Dec. 3, 1999) <http:H
www.hamburg.de/Behoerden/JB/hhrecht/strat2.html>. For a newspaper article presenting the law
to the public, see HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT, supra note 45:
Teure Beleidigungen
Was kostet die "Blade Kuh "?
Gerade wochentags setzen sich viele Autofahrer gestregt hinter das Lenknid.
"BloB nicht zu spit kommen", denken sie. Aber Hindernisse wie Mtlllwagen,
Baufahrzeuge oder Unfallwagen lassen in Hamburg oft schnell einen Stau entstehen.
Dann wird gehupt, gedringelt, uiberholt und geflucht. Aber aufgepaBt: Beleidigungen
kdnnen teuer werden! Wer Anzeige erstattet, weil er sich durch Gesten oder
Schimpfwbrter beleidigt f'uhlt, kann Erfolg haben. Nicht strafbar ist der
"Doppelvogel", wenn man mit zwei Fingem an die Schlfife tippt. Richter haben aber
Autofahrer zu 2200 Mark Strafe verurteilt, weil sie den "Stinkefinger" gezeigt haben.
Auch ftir die Ausdrticke "Blhde Kuh", "Schlampe" oder "Brillenschlange" mutiten
schon 150 Mark bezahlt werden.
Teurer ist es, Polizisten zu beleidigen. Wer sie als "Holzkopf" oder "Trottel in
Uniform" beschimpft, kann zu Strafen von 1500 bis 3000 Mark verurteilt werden
Diese Vergehen wirken harmlos gegeniiber Angriffen anderer Art. Da wurde
schon mit Schreckschul3pistolen und Gasrevolvern geschossen, es kam zu Priigelcien
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life that I began by describing as part of the social civility culture also
belong to a culture of German criminal litigation. A glance at a standard
commentary on German criminal law gives a sense of the odd range of
actions that can end up in court. Particularly interesting are actions brought
in cases in which one person has called another du-the familiar "thou" -
rather than Sie-the formal "you." 53 Such actions sometimes (but only
sometimes!) fail, but the very fact that they are brought suggests that the
popular conception of what counts as legally sanctionable lack of respect or
disrespect goes far. Failed actions have also been brought in cases in which
one person has declined to address another as Herr or subjected another to
rude jokes; in cases in which one neighbor has thrown pebbles against the
window of another; in which one person has watched two others exchange
und Messerstechereien zwischen Autofahrem. Dann versuchen Gerichic, der
Aggression Einhalt zu gebieten, indem sie den Fihrerschein entzichen und Fahrverbote
aussprechen. Verkehrspsychologen raten. sich von aggressivcn Autofahrem nicht
provozieren zu lassen.
Expensive Insults
What Does "Stupid Cow" Cost?
Especially on weekdays, many drivers get behind the wheel, and get stressed.
"Just get there on time," they think. But obstacles like garbage trucks, construction
vehicles, and emergency vehicles often produce an abrupt traffic tie-up in Hamburg.
That's when people start honking, shoving, passing each other, and cursing. But better
watch out: Insults can get expensive! People who file a complaint with the police,
because they feel that they've been insulted through gestures or nasty language. can
have success. "The double bird"--tapping on your temples with two fingers-is not
subject to punishment. But judges have fined drivers 2200 DM [S 11501 for giving -the
finger." Expressions like "stupid cow," "slut," or "Mrs. Four-Eyes" have had to be
paid for with 150 DM [$80].
It's expensive to insult police officers. Anybody who calls them "blockhead" or
"idiot with a badge" can be sentenced to fines of 1500 to 3000 DM [$790-S 15801.
These minor offenses seem harmless when compared to other sorts of attacks.
There have been shootings with warning pistols and tear-gas guns: encounters betwe-en
drivers have escalated into fist-fights and knife-fights. In these cases, courts try to put a
stop to the aggression by suspending driver's licenses and banning drivers from the
road. Traffic psychologists advise that you not let yourself get provoked by aggressive
drivers.
53. See R. Keller, Zur Frage unter welchen Uinstlinden der Gebrauch des Wortes 'Du' bzw
'Dich' als Beleidigung des anderen anzusehen ist, in Oberlandesgericht [OLG] (Court of Appeals
for Dusseldrf], Juristische Rundschau [JR], (1990), 345 (F.R.G.). These cases, which have such
cultural resonance, show up in labor law as well. For a recent case, see Arbeitsgericht [ArbG1
Rheine [Labor Court for Rheine], Jan. 10, 1998, JURIS ref. no. KARE522820536 (F.R.G.). In this
case, an employee at a clothing retailer that required all employees to say du brought an
unsuccessful action demanding to be addressed as Sie. For others. see Bundesverwaltungsgericht
[BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court], Neue Zeitschrift ftr Verwaltungsrecht [NVwZ1, 18
(1999), 659 (659-63) (F.R.G.) (abuse of female soldiers by a superior, including addressing them
as du); BVerwG [Federal Administrative Court] 1. Disziplinarsenat. July 9. 1991. I D 72/89,
JURIS ref. no. WBRE310452302 (F.R.G.) (same); and BverwG [Federal Administrative Court].
OcL 23, 1974, JJRIS ref. no. WBRE002558400 (F.R.G.) (inappropriate use of du by a workplace
superior). For an older example, see, for example, HOHNEL, supra note 45. at 7-8, discussing a
case in which a Duala tribesman brought suit in 1915 for having been addressed as du; the case
was at first dismissed by the lower court on grounds that black Africans have no expectation of
being addressed as Sie. It was then reversed on appeal. Surprisingly, there were only two such
cases in Doering's sample. See DOERING. supra note 45, at 26.
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affectionate gestures in public; and more.' The phenomenon of these
unsuccessful actions, all involving what to us seem rudenesses of an
uncommonly mild kind, suggests something noteworthy about the German
law of insult: Like the American law of sexual harassment, it leads a
shadow life in the popular mind. To understand the reach of both types of
rudeness regulation, we must accordingly track their impact in the world of
popular belief about the law-in the world of ordinary people like so many
of my German acquaintances who think they know that obscene gestures
are illegal;55 in the world of ordinary people like the many Americans who
are sure that any workplace flirtation may count as sexual harassment.
It would be a mistake, however, to focus only on unsuccessful private
actions for insult; the successful ones can be pretty striking too. The
German legal profession does have a much narrower definition of "insult"
than the general population seems to have. In fact, legal officials, both state
prosecutors and judges, as well as scholars, make vigorous efforts to limit
the actual reach of the law of insult. The law of German criminal procedure
is designed to make the bringing of private criminal prosecutions for insult
burdensome, which undoubtedly cuts down on the number of cases that get
to court. 6 Indeed, while many insult complaints are filed, the number of
cases actually litigated to judgment in Germany is exceedingly small; 7
under pressure from the legal profession, insult has become a species of law
with a far richer life in the popular mind than in the courts.5 In the
54. See Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht [BayObLG] [Bavarian Court of Appeals]. JR
(1963), 468 (F.R.G.) (throwing stones at windows); BayObLG [Bavarian Court of Appeals], JR
(1980), 1969 (F.R.G.) (observation of affectionate gestures); Reichsgericht [RG] [Imperial
Supreme Court], Juristische Wochenschrift [JW], (1936), 2997 (2998) (F.R.G.) (practical joke);
RG [Imperial Supreme Court], Leipziger Zeitschrift fiur deutsches Recht, (1915), 446 (F.R.G.)
(failing to say Herr). These are the examples given in SCHONKE-SCHRODER STRAFGESETZBUCH
§ 185, at 1386 (Theodor Lenckner et al. eds., 25th ed. 1999) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter SCHONKE-
SCHRODER].
55. Of course, the causes of action brought in court can represent only a fraction of the cases
that Germans believe are "illegal." See infra note 58.
56. For a discussion of the difficulties, see Geppert, supra note 49, at 530-3 1. Complainants
are obliged to post a bond for the costs of the trial. See § 379 StPO. More importantly, they may
be subjected to an award of the costs and fees of the other party. See id. § 383, Abs. 2 (permitting
dismissal); id. § 470, Abs. 3, Ziff. 2 (permitting an award of costs and fees). Doering nevertheless
found that courts almost always split costs and fees equally between the parties pursuant to § 47 1.
Abs. 3, Ziff. 2 StPO. See DOERING, supra note 45, at 86.
Litigants are, finally, obliged to submit to mediation before bringing their claims. See § 380
StPO. For a full discussion, see LOWE-ROSENBERG, GROBKOMMENTAR STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG
72-77 (Peter RieB et al. eds., 25th ed. 11 th Supp. 1999) [hereinafter LOWE-ROSENBERG]. For the
Ehrenerklrung, the formal apology typically delivered at the end of a German mediation, see
DOERING, supra note 45, at 108.
57. For figures and discussion, see LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 56, at 15.
58. In the city of Berlin, for example, the number of complaints and citations has grown
substantially over the last decade, even as the efforts of the legal profession have kept all but a
fraction of those cases from being litigated to judgment. Unfortunately, the categories used in
reporting insult cases are irregular and shifting. Nevertheless, some information can be gleaned
from the reported data. The city of Berlin has reported cases of Beleidigung under two different
headings since 1989: polizeilich bekanntgewordene Straftaten (criminal acts that have come to the
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substance of the law of insult, too, the scholarly literature asserts insistently
that the law of insult does not extend to "mere rudeness" -bloie
attention of the police-all complaints and citations) and convictions, reported for the years 1989-
1992. These figures do not distinguish among the various types of Beleidigung in §§ 185-189. See
supra note 40 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, historically it is § 185 cases that have
overwhelmingly predominated. See DOERING, supra note 45, at 69; see also GUnter Bierbrauer et
al., Conflict and Its Settlement: An Interdisciplinary Study Concerning the Legal Basis. Function
and Performance of the Institution of the Schiedsmann, in 2:1 ACCESS TO JuSTICE 66, 67 (Mauro
Cappelletti & John Weisner eds., 1978) (discussing the prevalence of Beleidigung cases).
Nevertheless, both the figures for complaints and citations and the figures for convictions are
revealing. The figures for all reported complaints and citations show a remarkable and steady
increase since 1991, the first year for which there are consolidated figures for the unified city of
Berlin:











Sources: Statistisches Landesant Berlin; Statistisches
Jahrbuch Berlin; 1990-1998.
This represents a 75% increase in insult citations and complaints during the first seven years after
reunification. (The population of Berlin in this period held roughly constant, declining slightly
from 3,447,695 in 1990 to 3,425,759 in 1997, with a high of 3,475,392 in 1993.) It is hard to
know how to interpret this. Could it be a consequence of conflicts between former Easterners and
Westerners? At any rate, it certainly shows that Beleidigung remains alive and well in Berlin legal
culture.
The figures for convictions in Berlin, for the years in which they are reported, also show a
steady upward path:







Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch Berlin.
Most interesting about the figures for conviction, though, is the fact that they are dwarfed by
the figures for complaints and citations. In 1992, only eight percent of complaints and citations
resulted in a conviction. This corresponds exactly with the figure found by Doering in his
empirical study of three German jurisdictions from 1957 to 1965. See DOERING, supra note 45, at
12. For the dates of his study, see id. at 3. The contrast with almost any other area of criminal
enforcement is striking. Insult cases, these figures unmistakably show, belong more to the popular
culture of insult than to the court system. For further discussion, see Bierbrauer et al.. supra, at
49-51.
Needless to say, many cases of perceived Beleidigung must go unreported. For what it is
worth, ROBERT HEINDL, DER BERUFsVERBRECHER 220 (7th ed. 1928), suggested that one out of
every 100 cases is reported. This estimate, cited approvingly by DOERING. supra note 45, at 10, is
at least evidence of a German conviction that there is a great deal of "criminal" insult going on.
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Unhdflichkeiten. 9 Jurists also argue against the very idea that criminal law
should be routinely used to protect piddling matters of "honor." German
honor can also be vindicated through the law of "personality," a body of
civil law that largely grew out of the law of insult6' and that permits money
damages.6 Many commentators argue that insulted Germans should seek
satisfaction in the law of personality, not in the strange species of criminal
action represented by the law of insult.62
Yet the very tenacity with which jurists insist on setting limits to the
law of insult testifies to the strength of the popular misconception that they
are trying to combat. In both procedure and substance, the German law of
insult presents the spectacle of the legal profession trying to ride herd on
the general public, in order to corral strong popular beliefs about the
existence of rights-and rights of such importance that they should be
vindicated through the criminal law.
That is not to say, though, that professional German jurists are in
principle unbendingly hostile to the law of insult. Even the small number of
prosecutions that are allowed to proceed can seem pretty strange to the
American reader. It is well to quote a current commentary at length in order
to give a sense of the strangeness of even restrictive German juristic
thought. The difficulty in interpreting the law of insult begins, for the
commentator, in explaining what insult is. That must be done by reference
to a concept of "honor" and of words and acts that "sully the honor," that
are ehrenriihrig:
The objective fact pattern justifying application of the statute
requires an "insult." "Insult," which is not precisely described in
the section... is to be understood as an attack on the honor of
another person ... through expressions of lack of respect, low
respect, or disrespect. Sections 186, 187 [that is, the law of
defamation and slander] punish factual assertions, sullying the
honor, which are communicated to third parties, and which
therefore make it possible that their target will suffer the disrespect
of third parties. Section 185, by contrast, covers the expression of
the offender's own lack of respect for the victim, [and accordingly
there need not be a communication of the "insult" to third
parties] .... Such an expression of disrespect is possible in three
different ways: (1) through the expression of an insulting judgment
59. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
60. See DIETER LEUZE, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER PERSONLICHKEITSRECIT IM 19.
JAHRHUNDERT 75-80 (1962) (tracing carefully the limited influence of Roman actio injuriarum
and limitations on its law of damages).
61. Money damages, however, have only been permitted since the 1950s. See infra note 174
and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Geppert, supra note 49, at 531.
1302 [Vol. 109: 1279
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1302 1999-2000
Enforcing Civility and Respect
of value made to the victim; (2) through the expression of such an
insulting judgment of value made to a third party; and (3) through
an assertion of fact, sullying the honor, made to the victim
himself. ...
In practical terms, the matter turns on the ways in which one person can
show lack of respect or disrespect for another. This principle serves to limit
the reach of the law:
It is necessary that the offender express disrespect or lack of
respect in the specific sense that the moral, personal, or social
valuation or worth [Geltungswert] of the victim is wholly or
partially denied through the ascription of negative qualities. In
other words, there must be a claim that the victim is of lesser value
or is inadequate under one of those three aspects [that is, moral,
personal, or social valuation or worth].... It is thus an insult if the
victim is reproached with immoral or illegal behavior, or if it is
insinuated that the victim could engage in such behavior-though
to be sure, only if the offender thereby expresses the view that the
victim is to be valued as a person who is capable of such
behavior--or if the victim's moral integrity is denied either
generally or in regard to some specific tendency (for example,
through the epithets "blackguard" [Lump], "thief," attempt at
bribery). It is further an insult to reproach another person, despite
that person's status as an intelligent being, with being inadequate in
elementary aspects of humanity (for example, calling another
person "idiot" ... ). Finally, it is an insult touching the social
valuation and worth of the victim to refuse to acknowledge, in
whole or in part, the victim's capacity to perform in his profession
or in other social tasks that fall to him (for example,
characterization of a doctor as a "bungler" ... ); it is, however, not
an insult to deny that such a person deserves credit for particular
achievements or services. '
In particular, the requirement of an expression of disrespect serves to
limit the application of the law of insult in cases involving foreigners. Here
and elsewhere we discover that the German law of hate speech does not go
quite as far as its foreign admirers sometimes imply:
The mere rejection of another person is not an insult. For this
reason, with regard to expressions of hostility to ethnic non-
Germans [ausldinderfeindlichen Auflerungen], it is a question of
63. OLG [Court of Appeals for Selected Matters], NJW. 38 (1985). 1720 (F.R.G.).
64. Id
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interpretation whether there has also been an intent to express the
view that the targeted person is of lesser value... ; the same is true
for refusals to admit certain groups of persons to bars, etc., which
qualify as an insult only if they are to be understood as meaning
that the owner of the establishment regards the targeted persons as
unworthy of being served by him ([as is] the case, for example, in
the exclusion of U.S. soldiers from a discotheque, where [those
soldiers] saw through the pretense [that the establishment was filled
to capacity].... In general, such refusals to admit are permissible
only where they are made with a view to the needs of other clients,
who otherwise threaten to stay away .... Refusals to admit Turks
need not be regarded as an insult per se).65
At all events, "mere rudeness" is excluded from the coverage of the
statute:
Not sufficient for purposes of § 185 are mere rudenesses and
tactlessnesses, insofar as they do not take the form of a particularly
coarse expression of disrespect. Petty harassment, inappropriate
jokes, gags, and the like are insults only if they are accompanied by
particular circumstances that express a view of the lesser value and
worth of the affected party.'
All of this certainly must do a great deal to prevent claims of insult
from succeeding. Yet the actions that the German legal profession endorses,
under the standards of this and other literature, are still pretty remarkable
from the American point of view. The popular German belief that obscene
and derisive gestures-even mildly derisive gestures-are subject, in
principle, to criminal prosecution is perfectly correct. In Hamburg, for
example, people who give "the finger" routinely receive a fine of roughly
$1 150.67 Many of the sorts of derogatory epithets that are heard all the time
in the streets of New York (or, for that matter, any southern Italian city) are
similarly subject to prosecution: for example, "asshole," 68 "jerk," "quack"
(when used of a doctor),69 and "idiot." The list goes on and on, into
65. SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 54, § 185, at 1385-86. It is important to observe,
however, that although the refusal to admit Turks to a bar is not necessarily insulting hate speech
under German law, it may nevertheless constitute impermissible discrimination, as it would in the
United States. For a fuller description and critique, see Volker Lohse, "Tilrken ist der Zutrin
verboten "- Volksverhetzung durch Zugangsverweigerung, 29 NJW 1677 (1985).
66. SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 54, at 1385-86.
67. See supra note 52.
68. See HOHNEL, supra note 45, at 24 (mentioning Arschloch (" asshole") and Wichser (or, as
the British put it, "wanker" )).
69. Cf. Amtsgericht [AG] Tiergarten [Local Court for Tiergartenl, June 2, 1989, JURIS ref.
no. KORE561279011 (holding that it is an insult to call an attorney a Mochtegern-Anwalt
("lawyer wannabe")).
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Rabelaisian dimensions." All in all, it is something of a paradise for fans of
Mayor Giuliani. Prosecutions are brought in circumstances that can only
70. The list of insults in Doering's sample is as follows:
Altes Aas [" old rotting carcass"], Ausbeuter [" exploiter (of the working classes)-]
zugelaufener Auslinder ["foreigner on the run to Germany" ], Affe [" monkey",
elender Asiat ["miserable Oriental"], scheeler August ["cross-eyed clown"],
Arbeiterverrater ["traitor to the working class"], Bastard ["bastard"], Butzcmann
["bogeyman"], alter Bock ["old goat"], Biest ["beast"], aus den Nihten platzcnde
Bardame ["barmaid bursting out of her seams"], Brillenheini [" four cyes"-insulting
term used of man wearing glasses; contrast "Brillenschlange," supra note 52],
Brechmittel [" vomit-inducer"], schwuler Bruder ["faggot"], Dreckskerl ["filthy
jerk" ], Drecksau [" filthy sow" ], Dreckschwein [" filthy swine" ], Drecksbagage [" pack
of filth"], Denunziant [" police informant"], Dussel ["twit"], Ehebrecher
[" adulterer"], Erbschleicher [" born hypocrite" ]. Faulenzer [" lazy good-for-nothing" ],
dummes Frauenzimmer ["dumb broad"], Fltlchtlingslumpenpack ["lousy pack of
refugees"], Flintenweib ["gun-toting woman"], Flegel ["ill-mannered boor"], Fose
["cunt; prostitute"], Ganove ["thief"], verhinderte Grdfin ["would-be countess"],
Giftnudel ["poisonous noodle" ---roughly "shrew"], Gesocks ["riff-raff" 1' dumme
Gans ["dumb goose"], Gangster ["gangster"], alte Hexe ["old witch"].
Hundertfiinfundsiebziger ["hundred-and-seventy-fiver"-a reference to the now-
repealed § 175 of the Criminal Code, which criminalized homosexuality],
Hafenkneipenweib ["harbor joint girl" ], Hure [" whore" ], Hurentochter [" daughter of
a whore"], Hurensohn ["son of a whore"], Hurenbalg [" whoreskin"], Hurenbulle
["whore cop"], Hurenbock [" whore goat"], Hernmtreiberin ["tramp"], Hampelmann
["nebbish"], Halsabschneider ["cutthroat"], dummer Hund ["dumb dog"], Halunke
["scoundrel"], falscher Hase ["meat loaf"], halber Hund ["half dog"], Hinterlader
[" faggot"], Idiot ["idiot"], Irrer [" lunatic"], grilner Junge ("greenhorn"], Judenbengel
["Jew-brat"], Knallkopp ["fathead"], Kiuchenbruder ["jailbird"]. deutscher
Kartoffelbauch ["German potato belly"], Kupplerin ["female pimp"], Kuppelmutter
["female pimp in incarnation as mother-figure" ], Kommunist ["communist"], Lauer
["lurker"], schlibiger Kerl ["shabby bastard"]. dumme Kuh ("dumb cow"], groles
Kalb ["big calf"], Kamel ["camel"], elender Krilppel ["miserable cripple"],
Knastologe ["jailbird"], alte Krahe ["old crow"], Klinkenputzcr ["beggar"], Luder
["dits"], Ltignerin ["liar" (female)], Lausebengel ["brat"], Lump ["scoundrel.
blackguard"], Ltlgenschnauze ["trap full of lies"], Louis ["pimp; homosexual"], Lude
[" pimp" ], kleines Licht [" dim bulb" ], Miststilck [" piece of dung" ]. schlechter Mensch
["bad person" ], Mongolenweib [" mongol-woman" 1, Mensch zweiter Klasse [" second-
class human being" ], Mifgeburt [" deformed creature" 1. Mistvieh [" dung animal" 1,
Nutte ["hooker"], Nebelkrahe ["hooded crow"], Nitribitt ["whore"]. Nazischwein
["Nazi pig"], Nachtwichter ["dope"], Ochse ["ox"]. Offentliche ["whore"),
Ostzonenschwein ["Soviet-zone-of-occupation pig"], Prolet ["proletarian"], Pimpf
[" member of Hitler Youth"], Pdbel [" canaille"], Puffaltsche ["female overseer in a
brothel"], gemeiner Polack ["common Polack"], Rotznase ["snot-nose"],
Sozialempfdnger-Jule ["woman dependent on welfare" ], Saubesen ["old sow" 1, Satan
[" Satan" ], unkameradschaftliches Schwein (" pig-who-does-not-act-like-a-comrade" ],
altes, fettes Schwein ["old, greasy pig"], Schweinehund ["swine"], alte Schachtel
["old box"], Schthrzenjiger ["skirt-chaser"], eingebildete Schneegans ["conceited
goose"], Schwanzzeiger [" penis-shower" ], Scheikollege [" fucking coworker" ], Sau
["sow"], Saustiick ["piece of sow"], Saukerl ["sow-bastard"]. Spitzbub
["scoundrel"], Schuft ["cad"], Schubbejack ["shabby, low-class person"], Strolch
["rogue"], Strichdame ["streetwalker"], Schnt3sel ["snot"], Sitteastrolch [" violator of
good morals"], Schurke ["rogue"], Schlampe ["slut"], Schreckschraube ["old battle-
axe"], erotischer Schmutzfink [" dirty old man"], Schandtier [" disgraceful animal"],
dreckiges StUck ["piece of shit"], Sonntagsjdlger [" Sunday hunter"], Teufel ["devil"].
alte Tucke [nasty word for a woman], Trampel ["oaf'], Torfkopf ["peat-head"].
Totengriiber [" gravedigger"], Verbrecher [" criminal"]. Vollidiot [" complete idiot"],
Vogelscheuche [" scarecrow" ], Wildsau [" wild sow" 1. Witwenausntltzer [" exploiter of
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astound Americans: So strong is the culture of respect in Germany, for
example, that prison inmates have brought prosecutions against guards who
addressed them disrespectfully. 7' Even political expressions that, in the
United States, would clearly constitute protected free speech may be
prosecuted as "insults" in Germany. The commentary I have quoted, like
others, says only that the standards for prosecuting a political utterance
must permit a "more robust use of speech" than is otherwise the case.
These somewhat stiffer standards have not prevented politicians from being
prosecuted for such faults as calling their opponents "liars." 73 Such private
prosecutions often succeed in the lower courts only to fail on appeal, 74 and a
bitter constitutional debate may-may-auger their demise. 75 Nevertheless,
Americans will see an incomprehensible insensitivity to the value of free
speech in the very fact that these actions are brought at all and succeed on
any level. Some deep-seated cultural differences are at work here: Ordinary
widows"], kleines Wfirstchen ["tiny little sausage"], Waschlappen ["sissy"),
verkommenes Weib ["decayed broad"], Weihnachtsmann ["clown" -literally "Santa
Claus"], Zigeunerbengel [" gypsy brat"], Zigeunerlottchen [" slovenly gypsy woman" J.
Zuchthausler ["convict"], alte Ziege ["old nanny-goat"], alte Zicke ["old nanny-
goat" ].
DOERING, supra note 45, at 26-27 n.l. Many more examples are given in greater detail in
HoHNEL, supra note 45.
71. One noteworthy recent case, involving a question of constitutional law but reflecting the
general German culture of insult, involved a transsexual inmate who sued successfully after being
addressed by prison guards as "Herr" despite having undergone a sex-change operation. See
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], NJW, 50 (1997), 1632 (1633)
(F.R.G.). Two other prison-related cases are described in DOERING, supra note 45, at 15. cases in
which prison inmates initiated complaints pursuant to § 185 StGB against guards, in one case
because the guard called the prisoner a "dumb beast." This is a wonderful study that shows.
among other things, where cases of Beleidigung most often arise (in the common hallways of
apartment buildings, see id.), when they most often arise (in the month of August when warmer
weather is conducive to more frequent social interaction, see id. at 16; and between the hours of ,4
P.M. and 8 P.M. when the pent-up frustrations of the day are finally released, see id. at 17); see also
the data and discussion in Bierbrauer et al., supra note 58, at 65-78. Somewhat drier, but also rich
in data, is RUDIGER KOEWIUS, DIE RECHTSWIRKLICHKEIT DER PRIVATKLAGE 64-95 (1974),
which portrays modem Beleidigung as a result of modernization, urbanization, tenements, close
quarters, and auto traffic.
72. SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 54, § 185, at 1391 (noting also the constitutional
limitations of GG Art. 5 (F.R.G.)).
73. See Landgericht [LG] Frankfurt/M. [Trial Court of Frankfurt am Main], NJW, 27 (1974),
2244 (F.R.G.), reprinted in part in HOHNEL, supra note 45, at 8-9. In this 1974 case, a local
chairman of the Social Democratic Party was prosecuted privately for declaring that a Christian
Democratic chairman had engaged in a "shameless lie" (unverschdimte Liige). See also the cases
of political insult described in Kuibler, supra note 49, at 547 & n.95.
74. See Kfibler, supra note 49. For a successful recent prosecution, see OLG Zweibrilcken
[Court of Appeals for Selected Matters in Zweibriicken], June 9. 1996, JURIS ref. no.
KORE470219600, which reports the conviction of an accused who had called local political
leaders "[d]ie Wahnsinnigen vom 6. Stock des Rathauses," "Rechtsamts-Schreckschrauben," and
"lIcherliche, bisweilen fette, ranzige, unhdfliche und einfach nur noch widerwirtig uniformierte
Befehlsempfanger einer Kommunalpolitik" ["the lunatics on the sixth floor of town hall,"
"official battle axes," and "ridiculous, sometimes greasy, rancid, rude, and just plain repellent
uniformed toadies of town politics" ].
75. For a constitutional critique that draws heavily on the American experience, see Friedrich
Kibler, Ehrenschutz, Seibstbestimnung, und Demokratie, 52 NJW 1281 (1999).
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Germans see the world of politics differently from the way ordinary
Americans do. Americans may have a similarly baffled reaction to the
doctrine of Schmdihkritik, "contemptuous criticism," which allows the
prosecution of the authors of insulting book, theater, movie, and art
reviews."
The German law (and culture) of insult also includes intriguing
subareas. Especially interesting to many Americans will be the law of
"sexual insult." " Sexual behavior can also, from the German point of view,
involve the showing of "lack of respect, or disrespect." So it is that the law
of insult historically underpinned, for example, the German defense of
justification for a cuckolded husband who murdered his wife's adulterous
lover, at least if the adulterous pair had been caught in the act?8 The law of
sexual insult has also historically given an action to cuckolded husbands
against their rivals.79 There is more, too. When men come on to women,
they may, according to German lawyers, do so in a criminally insulting
way.
For, indeed, the Gennan law of insult requires that men show
"respect" to women. This is a doctrine that may sound appealing to some
Americans, especially to feminists who have tried to ground the law of
sexual harassment in some norm of respect. It is all the more important,
then, to observe that, in practice, the law of sexual insult has taken forms
that are likely to seem unsavory to Americans. "Respect" is a more
ambiguous, complex, and socially conditioned concept than most of our
American legal literature admits, and respect for women, in German law, is
understood in a way that does little to prevent even very gross male
behavior. This is true, first and foremost, because showing a woman
respect, as German lawyers have historically viewed the law of sexual
insult, can include treating her as attractive or desirable. This means that
many unwanted sexual advances have presented no problem under the law
of sexual insult: To come on to a woman, as German courts and scholars
have repeatedly observed, could represent nothing other than a show of a
76. For Schmhkritik under the jurisprudence of § 193 StGB, see, for example, the discussion
in SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 54, § 193, at 1414-15. This is a doctrine against which.
again, constitutional doubts have been raised. See Kilbler, supra note 75, at 1286. For the
contrasting American attitude, see POST, supra note 7. at 111, which casually assumes that critics
have the right to speak disrespectfully of a novel.
77. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
78. A husband whose wife had had sexual relations with another man had-and indeed
theoretically still does have-a cause of action for insult against his rival. This has led, however,
to objections from scholars, who argue that the will of the legislator to exempt adultery from legal
sanction should not be frustrated by prosecutors under the insult paragraph. See DOERING. supra
note 45, at 109 n.1; HANS JOACHtM HIRSCH, EHRE UND BELEIDIGUNG 66-67 (1967).
For a nice pair of cases in which a wife's lover was convicted of insult and a husband's lover
was acquitted, see HOHNEI, supra note 45, at 13-14.
79. Though this is probably not true any longer. See SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 54,
§ 185, at 1388.
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distinct kind of respect, an appreciation for her desirability. The sorts of
advances that have been sanctionable under the law of sexual insult are
those that implicitly treated their target as a Dime-as a " wench," or as a
woman of easy virtue.'o Only advances that placed a woman on the lowest
level of social respect, the level that included women who were of easy
virtue, constituted sexual insults-and then, of course, only if they were
directed at women who did not fit that bill. This corresponds, clearly
enough, to a very traditional concept of respect, linked to a very traditional
concept of sexual honor, much like the concept of the right of the cuckolded
husband in this body of law. A recent newspaper report gives the flavor of
the resulting respect-oriented law of sexual relations. In this case, a woman
complainant brought a Privatklage, a private criminal prosecution of the
kind permitted in the law of insult:
Bosom Groping Judicially Recognized as "Personal Need":
Public Prosecutor Discontinues Investigative Proceeding Despite
Evidence. The Groping of One's Bosom Is Not "Intended" as
Insult.
Since mid-September, Frankfurt resident Vera Steiner has had
every reason to doubt her chosen profession. "You know, you
study law yourself, and then this kind of crap happens to you."
The "crap" that the future attorney would not have believed
possible is being served up by the Frankfurt Office of the Public
Prosecutor (Amtsanwaltschaft). It is a decision that cancels an
investigative proceeding for insult initiated by Steiner-one of the
few proceedings for sexual harassment that actually stood a good
chance of leading to a conviction. The good chance of conviction
was due to the fact that Steiner could produce ironclad evidence: A
man groped her bosom-not in private, not in some dark corner,
but rather in broad daylight, in public, in the middle of the crowded
Frankfurt shopping street Senckenberganlage. The man was
walking with his children, and Vera Steiner was with a friend, and
the breast groping was accomplished as they passed one another in
the street. Steiner protested loudly, the man let go and rushed to his
car with his children. Vera Steiner had the presence of mind to note
his license plate number. The law student later reflected that she
wasn't even wearing a miniskirt at the time, but rather a long skirt
with a jacket. It was a vain attempt to lend even a questionable
logic to the sudden attack. Such details did not concern the
Frankfurt Office of the Public Prosecutor. They came to the
decision that "according to the current articulation of the law by the
Federal Supreme Court, a sexual insult of the complainant" did not
occur. The Public Prosecutor (Amtsanwalt) instructed the law
student that the Federal Supreme Court decided "that Paragraph
80. See generally id.; BGH [Federal Supreme Court], NJW, 39 (1986), 2442 (F.R.G.).
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185 Insult (Penal Code) is met only when the perpetrator, through
sexual conduct, expresses [the belief] that the victim has some
personal deficiency that diminishes the victim's dignity or honor."
"The conduct of the accused must exhibit an intentional,
demeaning valuation of the victim." The Public Prosecutor did not
recognize any such demeaning valuation, and therefore he informed
Vera Steiner that "the required motivation on the part of the
accused is not provable in the instant case. There are not sufficient
indicia present to indicate that his conduct was intended to injure
the complainant's right to respect in society." The Public
Prosecutor comes to the compassionate conclusion: "It is possible,
rather, that he was trying to satisfy some personal need, without
demeaning the witness." How a man can do the first without doing
the second remains the secret of the Public Prosecutor. But Berlin
attorney Alexandra Goy rejects the Public Prosecutor's apologetic
assertion that he is in harmony with the "highest judicial
articulation of the law, which is subject to criticism but ultimately
binding." ....
Law student Steiner received a little lesson in practical private
law. She still has the option of filing a [civil] complaint against the
bosom-groper to demand damages for pain and suffering. But then
he would find out where she lives. And, as it was carefully
explained to her, you never know how people like him are likely to
react."'
This case is typical of a longstanding jurisprudence on sexual insult,
much of which will seem astounding to American readers. Instances of
spectacularly aggressive behavior on the part of males have been held not to
constitute insulting behavior." It is also a case that reflects something that
81. Dieter Rulff, Busengrapschen als "persinliches Bedfirfnis" richiterlich anerkannt,
BERLuNR TAGESZErrUNG, Oct. 11, 1995, at 5 (translated by Gabrielle Friedman). While the
exact procedural details of this case are not clear from the newspaper report, presumably the
Public Prosecutor assumed control of the case because it was potentially linked to a case of sexual
assault. On this, see Geppert, supra note 49, at 531. Readers may indeed wonder whether the
assailant here was not guilty of some offense of sexual assault. This raises questions that I leave
for discussion elsewhere. But it should be noted that such sexual assaults have generally been
treated mildly in recent European law, and particularly in German law. See, e.g., SUSANNE BAER,
WORDE ODER GLEtcHHET. ZUR ANGEMESSENE GRUNDRECHTLhCHEN KONZETION VON RECHT
GEGEN DISKRUMINERUNG AM BEiSPtEt. SEXUEiLE BELASTIGUNG AMt ARBErfSPLATZ IN DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND UND DER USA 127, 130-31 (1995). The assailant in this case
would likely have faced a small fine, if any punishment at all. Here we observe a phenomenon of
importance for European sexual harassment law: The general tendency to decriminalize " morals"
offenses and to reduce punishment has tended, in the last decades, to defang the law of sexual
assault in Europe.
82. See, for example, the " Old Age Home" case, in which the proprietor of an old age home,
after attempting to rape a sleeping employee, retreated in the face of the employee's resistance. At
trial, the proprietor was found to have engaged in a "permissible form of courtship." OLG
Zweibrticken [Court of Appeals for Selected Matters in Zweibrilcken], NAW. 39 (1986). 2960
(F.R.G.), reprinted in BAER, supra note 81, at 137. For a selection of decisions, see KLAUS
BERThLSMANN Er AL., HANDBUCH ZUR FRAUENERWERBSTATIGKErr 1993 § P (1996). For
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deserves some emphasis: The law of insult aims to guarantee that no
individual intentionally shows demeaning disrespect for another individual.
That is to say, it focuses on what I earlier called the outward show of
respect. What it does not do is focus on the general climate of dignity for
groups that have traditionally been regarded as socially inferior. What the
law of insult does not aim to do is establish norms that will protect
traditionally inferior groups, such as women, from treatment that is likely to
reinforce their sense of vulnerability, inferiority, or exclusion. It asks only
whether individual women have been the targets of an open and
unambiguous display of personal contempt-of, in the words of our
commentary, "the expression of the offender's own lack of respect for the
victim."83 The question they do not ask is whether the acts or words of an
individual have endangered the general climate of dignity for (in this case)
women.
The same is true, finally, in another subarea of the law of insult: the law
of collective insult. This is the aspect of the German law of insult that forms
the original basis of the German regulation of hate speech-though since
1960 it has also been supplemented by further law on "incitement of
hatred," to which I will return shortly.' The law of collective insult has
some similar limits that have not always been acknowledged. It is indeed
the case that Jews are extensively shielded from "disrespectful" insults
under current German law. Such insults infamously include efforts to deny
the truth of the Holocaust.85 The German commitment to protecting Jewish
sensibilities is in this regard remarkably far-reaching.86 It is important to
recognize, though, that the broader German commitment to respectful
treatment is somewhat less far-reaching. Members of other groups-
notably Turks, the focus of disproportionate hostility in the German public
sphere today-are certainly protected against insults, like all Germans. But
German case law mitigating sexual harassment that actually approached sexual assault on the
grounds that the perpetrator was experiencing "sexual frustration," see BAER. supra note 81. at
67, 132.
83. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], NJW, 47 (1994), 1779 (1780) (F.R.G.)
(holding, in the context of a right-wing meeting featuring revisionist historian David Irving. that
the statement that "there was no persecution of Jews during the Third Reich" is not
constitutionally protected speech because it is a provably false statement, and that the denial of
such persecution is an insult to all Jews presently living in Germany).
86. Even here, however, German juristic sensibilities can differ weirdly from American ones.
The definition of "Jew" for purposes of this body of law is still drawn from Nazi doctrine. See
BGH [Federal Supreme Court], NJW, 33 (1980), 45, (45-48) (F.R.G.) (holding that the plaintiff
had standing to pursue an insult complaint based on a poster claiming that the "murder of six
million Jews" was a "Zionist swindle," because under the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935. the
plaintiff would have been classified as a "Jewish Mongrel of the second degree" [Mischling
zweiten Grades], and therefore subject to Nazi persecution). This would presumably not prove
ideologically possible in the world of American law. Cf. Stein, supra note 16, at 866 (noting the
strangeness of this doctrine in American eyes).
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allegations of anti-Turkish insults, unlike allegations of anti-Jewish ones,
are subjected to the usual juristic analysis, that is, to a factual inquiry as to
whether they display an intentional "lack of respect or disrespect" on the
part of the person delivering the insult. This is why bar-owners who post
signs excluding Turks may not have committed an "insult" under German
law: The operative question, under the law of insult, is again whether the
individual bar-owner has indulged in an open and unambiguous display of
"his own lack of respect for the victim." As in the case of the bosom-
groper, German jurists ask whether there has been an ounvard show of
individual disrespect, not whether the larger climate of equal dignity has
been endangered. In the case of Turks as in the case of women, the aim of
the law of insult is to safeguard individuals against intentional displays of
disrespect, not to eliminate the larger patterns of social exclusiveness that
affirm group inferiority. Indeed, even the term "collective insult" is
misleading: In German doctrinal treatment of groups such as Turks, there
has long been a tendency to resist the idea that most groups as such can
normally be cognizably insulted. The strong tendency has been to hold that,
if there is any insult at all, each individual neinber of the group is insulted
on account of his or her membership. Indeed, a standard commentary holds,
there are so many Turks in Germany that it is impossible that any single
insult could be understood as touching each one of them.7 In this doctrinal
87. See SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 54. § 185. at 1382-83 (contrasting the treatment of
Jews with that of Turks):
Ungeachtet ihrer Zahl wird von der Rspr. die Kollektivbeleidigungsfidhigkeit der in
Deutschland lebenden Juden bejaht... was nur damit zu bcgrtlnden ist, daB sic wegen
des in der Geschichte einmaligen, "'ihnen vom Nazionalsozialismus auferegten
Schicksals in der Ailgemeinheit als eine eng umgrenzte Gruppe erscheincn.- ...
FUr andere, zahlenmig nicht mehr ohne weiteres Olberschaubare ... "Teile der
Bev6lkerung" (§ 130) gilt dies jedoch nicht ... [wiel z.B.... filr pauschale
Beschimpfungen der bei uns lebenden Ttirken ....
Case law has accepted the capacity of the Jews now living in Germany to suffer a
collective insult regardless of their numbers.., which can only be justified by
reference to the fact that they "appear as a narrowly limited group within the general
population on account of the [historically unique] fate to which they were subjected by
the Nazis." ... For other " segments of the population" (§ 130) who are, without more,
numerically not easy to view as a single whole, this is not the case, however... as for
example ... with regard to abusive language aimed at Turks as a whole ....
For the rise of this as dominant postwar doctrine apart from the (always special) case of Jews, see
NIKOLAS ANDOULAKIS, DtE SAMMELBELEIDIGUNG 28-33 (1970). For its role in the" Soldiers are
Murderers" case, see Peter J. Tettinger, Das Recht der pers6nlichen Ehre in der Werrordnung des
Grundgesetzes, 37 JuRiTtsCHE SCHULUNG 769-76 (1997). For its Nazi-era prehistory, see infra
notes 147-148 and accompanying text. This doctrine also is taken to mean that women, since they
constitute too large and ill-defined a collectivity, are not a cognizable group. See BAER, supra
note 81. The sorts of groups that are generally regarded as cognizable under German law will
indeed strike most Americans as belonging much more to the class of the sociopolitical in-groups
than to the class of the excluded: They are such "groups" as the German judiciary, the armed
forces, doctors, patent attorneys, the police, executive officers of large banks, and the like. See
SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 54, § 185, at 1383. The Jews are quite exceptional as a
protected out-group.
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tradition, too, we see that the idea of the individual show of respect still lies
at the heart of German insult law.
All this does not mean that a Turkish complainant can never prevail.8"
What it means is that there is no per se prohibition on hate speech directed
against Turks or other non-Jews in Germany, no matter how much social
hostility they may face. German collective-insult law thus does not do what
some American advocates of hate-speech law would like to see done: It
does not establish structural ground rules for respectful interracial relations
that will operate regardless of the (ever-elusive) subjective intent of the
persons involved. It does not aim to guarantee an atmosphere of dignity.
What it does do is to make Turks, and members of other minorities, full
participants in a cultural system that gives every individual the right to
complain to authorities after being "dissed," or after being shown
disrespect. It gives them as individual members of a group the same rather
mystifying right to honor that all Germans have.
Indeed, the German law of insult will generally be fraught with mystery
for the American reader. This is a body of law that shows, in many of its
doctrines, a numbness to free-speech concerns that will startle any
American. Its law of sexual insult is rooted in what will strike many
Americans as comically antiquated notions of sexual honor and desirability.
As for its law of collective insult, in its emphasis on Jews it has an ad hoc
quality-though to be sure, one that is understandable in historical
perspective. All of this will inevitably lead Americans to wonder whether
such a body of law can survive in a modern democratic society.
Nevertheless, it survives.8 9
88. One interesting 1978 case involved the following facts. A German woman hit a Turkish
woman on the head with a beer glass and called her a "witch" and a "whore." The Turkish
woman's subsequent suit was at first dismissed as trivial. On appeal, however, the suit was
reinstated on the grounds that being called a "witch" (Hexe) is a "grave injury to the reputation of
a Turkish guest worker." The appeals court directed that a specialist in Turkish popular culture be
called to testify. See LG Mannheim [Trial Court of Mannheim], NJW, 32 (1979), 504 (F.R.G.),
cited in HOHNEL, supra note 45, at 6-7.
89. There are certainly respects in which the law of insult has come under attack. The law of
sexual insult in particular is in a state of decline. Unsurprisingly, some German feminists have not
been enthusiasts for this law of sexual insult, and they attacked it during the 1980s. See. e.g.,
Brigitte Sick, Die Rechtsprechung zur Sexualbeleidigung, 46 JZ 330, 330-35 (1991) (arguing that
the outmoded notions of sexual purity underlying the doctrine of sexual insult allow a great many
instances of sexual violence against women to go unpunished). Well before feminists began to
raise their objections, though, other German jurists had begun to do the same, although on other
grounds. In the mid-1960s, there was an influential campaign against the law of sexual insult. This
had, clearly enough, something to do with the revolution in sexual mores of the time. But it took
the form of juristic objections to the practice of using the law of sexual insult as a "residual
category," prosecuting sexual offenses that were not otherwise punishable as insults. See. e.g.,
HIRSCH, supra note 78, at 61-62; Wulf Heinrich Droste, Beleidigung als Sittlichkeitsdelikt: Eine
Untersuchung der Rechtsprechung zur Anwendung des § 185 StGB auf unsittliche Handlungen
und der dabei von ihr angewandten Methode (1972) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Christian-
Albrechts-Universitit (Kiel)) (on file with The Yale Law Journal). For the small number of
sexual-insult cases under this doctrine, see DOERING, supra note 45, at 46. Under fire from both
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IT[. THE ROOTS OF THE LAW OF INSULT IN PREMODERN SOCIAL
HIERARCHY
Strange and at times comical as the German law of insult is, it does
have an appeal that Americans may feel, and may even feel strongly.
"Honor" and "respect" are values that really do pervade German law. The
pervasiveness of these values has provided the basis for a law of hate
speech; and even if the law of sexual insult is not terribly attractive, it may
be that, in the future, Germans will produce a respect-based law of sexual
harassment that many Americans would like to imitate.9 Could we have a
law like this in the United States?
feminists and specialists in criminal law, the law of sexual insult had fallen into decline, or at least
partial eclipse, by the mid-1980s. See BGH [Federal Supreme Court]. NJW, 47 (1989), 3028
(3029) (F.R.G.); BGH [Federal Supreme Court], Neue Zeitschrift fUr Strafrecht [NStZ], 13
(1993), 182 (F.R.G.); Walter Kiehl, Das Ende der "kleinen Sexualdelikte"?. 42 NJW 3003 (1989)
(discussing the restrictiveness of current law). Moreover, its role--to the extent it has one-is
perhaps being taken over by new doctrines on sexual harassment, to which I will turn briefly
below.
If sexual insult is in trouble, though, the rest of the body of law still seems likely to survive.
There are certainly voices in Germany that object to the law of insult, at least as it exists. Some
commentators have argued that the criminal law on insult is so vague as to be unconstitutional.
See STARK, supra note 14, at 139 nn.30-31. There are also German jurists who have rebelled
against the law of insult on free-speech grounds-especially those jurists who have spent time in
the United States. One may cite Kfibler for this proposition, although his principal concern is the
law of defamation. See Kilbler, supra note 49, at 541-42 (discussing American law and its
influence on Germany). Professor Ktlbler is a member of the faculty at Frankfurt am Main who, in
the year of the publication of that article, became a faculty member at the University of
Pennsylvania as well. For what are perhaps more indigenously German views, see, for example,
MACKEPRANG, supra note 15. The influence of another such scholar oriented toward America.
Justice Dieter Grimm, a frequent visitor to the United States, has led to a major current
controversy. But that controversy has not eliminated the law of insult; in fact, it can be said to
demonstrate how deep the general commitment to the law of insult goes, both in the legal
profession and in the popular mind. The controversy in question surrounds the so-called "Soldiers
are Murderers" case. During the Gulf War, a left-leaning social-studies teacher in Bavaria put a
bumper sticker on his car reading "Soldiers are Murderers." He was successfully prosecuted for
insult-for insulting, that is, all German soldiers-in a decision affirmed at every level of the
ordinary court system. In a kind of revolution from above, however, the German Constitutional
Court, led by Justice Grimm, overturned the conviction on grounds that must seem clearly
persuasive to most American readers: The prosecution of the teacher, the court held, violated
norms of free speech. If Americans would tend to see the justice in that decision. Germans very
much did not. The storm in the popular press was extraordinary, as was the outpouring of
scholarly literature, which bitterly condemned the court's decision. An abbreviated translation of
the decision appears in DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 388-95 (2d ed. 1997). For a description of the -Soldiers are
Murderers" case, of Justice Grimm's role in it, and a (distinctly conservative but nevertheless
revealing) account of the resulting storm, see Tettinger, supra note 87, at 776. For reactions, see
id at 772-75. To very many Germans, both professional lawyers and others, it seemed an outrage
that the court should have stood in the way of prosecuting the "insult" of the "Soldiers are
Murderers" bumper sticker. For a much earlier case also involving the phrase Soldaren sind
Mdrder, see RG [Imperial Court], JW, 62 (1933), 972 (F.R.G.). The law of insult thus seems
likely to continue in Germany, at least for a while.
90. See infra notes 357-359 and accompanying text.
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In this Part, I suggest that we could not have such a law. Indeed, I am
going to raise some initial doubts about whether we would want such a law,
even if we could have it. The cultural and historical origins of the law of
insult, I argue, lie in traditions of social hierarchy that we lack, and indeed,
aggressively reject. Principally, those hierarchical traditions are aristocratic
ones. To a certain extent, they are Nazi traditions of a complex kind. They
are, in any case, traditions that have had very little life in the United States.
The broad egalitarian honor culture that we see in Germany today is the
product of many centuries of harsh inequality; to understand the making of
the German law of insult, we must dig into what, to Americans, is likely to
seem a dark past of social hierarchy.
Some readers may already have guessed that the law of insult, as it
exists today, has aristocratic sources. Germans involved in insult litigation
display a kind of touchy sense of their own "honor" that is very much
reminiscent of the aristocratic duelists' world of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.
And indeed, the law of insult, as it exists in modem-day Germany, is a
kind of living fossil, preserving features that date to a premodern era in
which German law was concerned with maintaining elaborate norms of
social hierarchy and deference. The law of insult, which today applies to all
Germans, once upon a time generally applied only to certain high-status
ones. Thus the substance of the contemporary law of insult does indeed
grow, strikingly enough, largely out of old dueling practices; legally
cognizable insults that we see today generally began as insults offered to
dueling aristocrats. More broadly, the doctrines of the contemporary law of
insult, with their focus on showing respect, trace back to a time when the
law was greatly concerned with deference-with compelling low-status
persons to show respect to high-status ones. These roots of the law of insult
in premodern social hierarchy go almost entirely unmentioned in the
standard German literature today,9' but they are of deep importance for
91. Binding was still conscious of dueling as the prime context for the formation of the law of
Beleidigung. See KARL BINDING, DIE EHRE IM RECHTSSINN UND IHRE VERLErLBARKEIT 37-38
(Leipzig, Edelman 1890). So, for that matter, was Max Weber. See MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAI.T
UND GESELLSCHAFT 185, 372 (Studienausgabe 5th ed. 1972) ("ID[er deutsche Richter
[untersuchtl in Beleidigungsprozessen die 'KommentmdBigkeit' der Ablehnung einer Forderung
zum Zweikampf, obwohl doch dieser gesetzlich verboten ist .... ). For the concept of
Kommentmfligkeit, the test of whether members of student societies understand "comment," or
"how" to behave, see UTE FREVERT, EHRENMANNER: DAS DUELL IN DER BORGERLICHEN
GESELLSCHAFT 136 (1991). Among current commentators, Friedrich Kfilbler notes that the section
on Beleidigung was followed by the section on dueling in the Criminal Code until the latter was
abolished. See Kiibler, supra note 49, at 544. Jdrg Tenckhoff also has a few words on the subject.
See JORG TENCKHOFF, DIE BEDEUTUNG DES EHRBEGRIFFS FOR DIE SYSTEMATIK DER
BELEIDIGUNGSTATBESTANDE 20 (1974) (discussing the roots of insult in the law of dueling).
Particularly insightful is KOEWlUS, supra note 71, at 28-32, which discusses how dueling and the
culture of honor reduced the reliance of the upper classes on the judicial system. For the most part,
though, the connection has been forgotten. The historian Ute Frevert, too, in her superb book on
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understanding what it is that sets this striking German legal culture of insult
apart from anything we can find in the United States. The key to
interpreting German insult law as it exists today is to understand how it
made the transition from a world of social hierarchy to a world of formal
equality-from a world of restricted aristocratic honor to a world of general
human dignity.
As we follow the modem-day law of insult back to its beginnings, 150
or 200 years ago, we first discover its deep connection with dueling.
Standard doctrinal accounts of German legal history occasionally tell us
that the law of insult is part of Germany's civil-law tradition, the modem
German version of the ancient Roman law of insult, the actio injuriarum.Y
And indeed, like most of German law, the modem law of insult does have
some doctrinal roots in ancient Roman law. Yet mere doctrinal history
obscures much of what matters most.9" It is really the history not of Roman
doctrine, but of indigenous German social pressures, that formed the law of
insult we see today.
As Roman law spread into Germany from the late Middle Ages on, it
spread to a society in which insults played a part not really contemplated by
the Roman texts, and its character changed fundamentally as a result. The
suppression of aristocratic dueling was a major preoccupation of early
modem monarchies and princedoms, and many German localities had
statutes that aimed to induce "insulted" aristocrats to come into court rather
than duel.' Concerned as they were with duelists, these statutes
contemplated very different sorts of insult from the insults treated in Roman
law. The ancient Roman law of insult was the product of a raucous
Mediterranean society in which persons of immense social prestige walked
the city streets accompanied by retinues of followers and slaves. It was
primarily concerned with safeguarding the sexual honor of high-status
19th-century dueling, writes, "Ein solcher emphatisch aufgeladener Ehrbegiff. wic er minnfichcn
Angehtrigen sozialer Oberschichten noch Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts eigcn war, schcint in
heutigen Lebensverhiiltnissen und Selbstbildern keinen Platz mchr zu haben." "(Sluch an
emphatically charged concept of honor, which still came naturally to male members of the upper
social strata at the end of the 19th century, seems to have no place any longer in the human
relations and self-images of today." FREVERT, supra, at I I (citing the American sociologist Peter
Berger). This is true of the United States, but an undercharacterization of a more complex German
reality.
92. See, e.g., Droste, supra note 89, at 2-8. The history of the supposedly " Roman" law of
insult is an object lesson, indeed, in how incompletely the theory of -transplants," proposed by
Alan Watson as the great motor of world legal development, explains the detailed workings of the
law. The spread of Roman law into Germany, from the late Middle Ages onward, is the most
famous instance of "transplantation" in Western legal history. Yet indigenous social pressures
deeply transformed the Roman law of insult.
93. For a more nuanced description of the sources of the German law. see KO EwUS, supra
note 71, at 33-39.
94. For the consistent connection of these older statutes with the law of insult. see IIEODOR
MAREZOLL, DAS GEMEINE DEUTSCHE CRIMINALRECHT ALS GRUNDLAGE DER NEUEREN
DEUTSCHEN STRAFGESETZGEBUNGEN 426 n. I (Leipzig. Barth 2d ed. 1847).
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women;95 with penalizing certain kinds of camivalesque popular rituals;96
and, to a certain extent, with guaranteeing deference for high-status
persons.97 It often spoke of insults that took the form of a severe physical
thrashing.98 None of the Roman texts treated anything quite like the
problem of affairs of honor between early modem duelists, in which status-
equals, sensitive to a fault, showed themselves ready to die over a slight, or
even a mere touch-over even minor failures to make the outward show of
respect.99 Nor, importantly, did the Roman texts imagine remedies like
those envisaged in early modem dueling culture. Ancient Roman law
awarded the victim of an insult money damages.1°° By contrast, among
early modem aristocrats, especially of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries,"' it was generally regarded as a matter of severe dishonor to
accept money damages in "satisfaction" of an insult. Insults were to be
avenged through violence, not through litigation, and least of all through
money payment. °2 In consequence, early modem German statutes provided
for remedies with an orientation toward the restoration of honor-in
particular, forced apologies and retractions.3
95. See ROMISCHES RECHT 369-70 (Heinrich Honsell et al. eds., 4th ed. 1987).
96. On the convicium, see id. at 369.
97. This phenomenon is particularly prominent in the Institutes of Justinian. See J. INST.
4.4.7-.9.
98. So I interpret the Roman texts-for example, the classic statement of Gaius, adopted also
in the Institutes of Justinian: "Iniuria autem committitur non solum cum quis pugno puta aut fuste
percussus vel etiam verberatus erit, sed etiam si cui convicium factum fucrit .... " Insult is
committed not only by striking a man with the fist or with a stick or by flogging him, but also by
raising a clamor against him .. " G. INST. 3.220. I have lightly altered Zulueta's translation. Cf.
J. INST. 4.4.1. (surveying the Roman law of insult). I take these passages, along with the constant
references to "pulsatio" in the Digest, see, e.g., DIG. 47.10.1.2 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 56)
(pulsatur); DIG. 47.10.9.pr. (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 57) (pulsatio), to presuppose a world in which
jurists did not have in mind anything like the single insulting slap of the world of dueling when
they spoke of physical assaults; they spoke of a world in which more extensive beatings took
place.
99. To be sure, there were some aspects of German society to which the Roman law of insult
applied more comfortably. See, for a wonderful example, [PATRONUS NUPTURIENTIUM], DE
INJURIIS QUAE HAUD RARO NOViS NuPTIs... INFERRI SOLENT (Quedlinburg & Aschersleben,
Strunz 1699), a pamphlet concerned with extending the action of insult to protect newlywed
women against a variety of popular charivari-like rituals questioning their virginity. This fit more
comfortably than much of the dueling problematic under the Roman concept of convicium. My
argument is not that there was nothing in German society to which the Roman law could be
applied, but that the dueling and deference problematics played a disproportionate role in shaping
the German law of insult.
100. See ROMIsCHES RECHT, supra note 95, at 370. When early modem lawyers tried to
argue against this practice from Roman texts, they cited DIG. 9.2.13 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18)
(" dominus membrorum suorum nemo videtur") from which was drawn the adage, " Lib e r homo
non recipit aestimationem."
101. For the growth of dueling in this period, see FREVERT, supra note 91, at 28-29.
102. Frevert also discusses the continuing 19th-century attitude. See id. at 13.
103. See the survey of early modem jurisprudence in 2 CARL AUGUST TITrMANN,
HANDBUCH DER STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFr UND DER DEUTSCHEN STRAFGESETZKUNDE 285-
89 (Halle, Hemmerde & Schwetschke 2d ed. 1822-1824). Legislators could, of course, be of two
minds, as Frevert's citation of Frederick II shows: On the one hand, Frederick insisted, in 1770.
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Such early modem dueling norms mattered immensely for the
formation of modem insult law, because for premodem jurists, the law of
insult was central to the campaign for eliminating the evil of dueling.'"4 If
duelists were to be dissuaded from acts of violence, they had to be offered a
forum in which the insults they had received could be punished. This meant
that the law of insult had to be formulated in such a way that it could
provide a courtroom alternative to the duel. This was true not only in the
early modem period, but also in the nineteenth century, the period when the
law of insult took its modem form. As the modem law of insult began to
develop in the early nineteenth century, it remained closely linked to the
duel. "If we wish to prevent the sad evil of the duel," wrote a prominent
jurist in 1819, "we must be concerned with making effective and well-
tailored statutes against insults." "0 Unavoidably, in this atmosphere, jurists
tended to define legal insults in the way that duelists understood them. Thus
when one important jurist, writing in 1826, hunted for examples of true
insults, he naturally picked (despite his fondness for Roman law) insults
that belonged to the status-conscious world of the dueling aristocracy:
Insults, he said, had to be acts "with a very specific bearing on honor, such
as spitting on a person, or slapping him." ,"6 These uncharming gestures did
that Privatbeleidigungen were a matter for the law; on the other, he acknowledged the necessity of
dueling. See FREVERT, supra note 91, at 34. The establishment of special "courts of honor" was
also a recurring theme. See id at 54. Frevert describes the penetration of the dueling problem into
the Ehrengerichte (honor courts) of the professional associations of doctors and lawyers. See id. at
171-72. For a survey of early modem practice with regard to retractions, apologies, and the like,
see 2 TrrrMANN, supra, at 285-89.
104. See FREVERT. supra note 91, at 54. Jurists pointed "immer wieder auf die
Notwendigkeit, das Injurienstrafrecht... zu verbessem" in order to eliminate duels.
For examples, see CJ.A. Mittermaier, injurien, in 5 RECHTSLEXIKON FOR JURISTEN ALLER
TEUTSCIHEN STAATEN 869, 870 (Julius Weiske ed., Hamburg, Wigant 1844). For the larger early
modem perspective on anti-dueling measures, see FRAN(01S BILLAcOtS. THE DuEL: ITS RISE
AND FALL IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 21-48 (Trista Selous trans., Yale Univ. Press 1990)
(1986).
105. C.J.A. Mittermaier, Bemerkungen Uber Duellgesetze und den Zusammenhang derselben
mit den Gesetzen fiber Ehrenverlerzungen, 3 NEUES ARCHLY DES CRiMtNALREcHT 436, 446
(1819) ("Will man nun dem traurigen Uebel der Duelle vorbeugen, so muB man... for sichere
zweckmgBige Gesetze gegen Beleidigungen Sorge tragen .... ).
106. 2 CARL GEORG WACHTER, LEHRBUCH DES ROMtSCH-TEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS 89
(Stuttgart, Metzler 1826). I do not mean to minimize the extent to which early-19th-century jurists
wished to reframe German law in Roman terms. On the contrary, I have argued elsewhere at great
length that exactly that was the case. See JAMES WHrrMAN. THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE
GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA (1990). For a fine example of an early-19th-century romanizing jurist.
see THEODOR MAREZOLL, UEBER DIE BORGERLICHE EHRE. IHRE GANZLICHE ENT17EHUNG UND
THEILWEISE SCHMALERUNG 326 (Giessen, Meyer 1824). which makes a romanizing attempt to
dismiss hierarchical honor "Manche Rechte gewisser bevorzugter Stinde sind entAeder ganz
aufgehoben, oder, ohne Unterschied des Standes. allen Staatsbtlrgem gleichmdiBig ertheilt worden.
Dadurch hat der Gegensatz der allgemeinen und besonderen btrgerlichen Ehre sehr viel von
seiner friuheren Bedeutung und Wichtigkeit verloren." "Many rights of certain favored social-
status groups have been either completely abolished, or accorded to all citizens equally without
regard to status. In consequence, the contrast between general and particular social honor has lost
very much of its earlier significance and importance."
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not feature prominently in the Roman texts,10 7 but they were common in the
world of dueling."'
If the culture of dueling affected the idea of what counted as a
wounding insult, it also affected, inevitably, the idea of what could salve
the wound. The idea that it was dishonorable to take money compensation
hung on and was indeed endorsed by nearly every major jurist over the
course of the nineteenth century, often in tones that betrayed a kind of
aristocratic contempt for those who could not comprehend the value of
honor.' 09 While there were some brilliant nineteenth-century German jurists
who thought honor should be safeguarded in a new civil law of the
protection of personality,"0 their efforts were essentially doomed by the
deep-rooted hostility to money damages. That hostility culminated,
famously, in the making of the German Civil Code of 1900, whose
draftsmen refused to make any broad provision for money damages to
satisfy injuries to "nonmaterial" interests. The draftsmen defended this
refusal in terms that showed how deeply lodged in German hierarchical
social structure the law remained:
[I]t [would be] repugnant to the dominant opinion among the
population to place nonmaterial values on the same level as
property interests[,] and to make good with money interferes with
nonmaterial interests. The Code... should not ignore this view,
especially prevalent among the better circles of society. Only the
This was very honorable wishful thinking. I do not by any means wish to argue that such
wishful thinking did not exist, only that the fact of hierarchical social relations, and of the duel.
inevitably penetrated most legal analysis regardless of this sort of romanizing.
107. Spitting does not, as far as I can determine, figure in the Roman texts at all. A striking of
the face was, it is true, regarded as an aggravated insult in Roman law. See DIG. 47.10.7.8
(Ulpian, Ad Edictum 55) (os alicui percussum). Nevertheless, the emphasis in the Roman texts is
on the pulsatio, the thrashing; the Roman jurists did not focus on the slap in the way the authors
on dueling did.
108. The slap is the classic dueling insult of the 19th century. See, e.g., LE CTE. DU
CHATAUVILLARD, ESSAI SUR LE DUEL 94 (Paris, Chez Bohaire 1836) (stating that a slap in the
face is the insult "la plus grave de toutes") ("the most serious"). Spitting, for Chatauvillard. is
presumably one of those "offenses graves qui entrainent avec elles la ndcessitd d'une reprsaille
suite," "serious offenses that require an immediate reprisal," rather than a duel. Id. at 11. Is it
possible that slapping played the large role it did in the dueling culture because of the cultural
importance of Christ's injunction to turn the other cheek? See, e.g., Matthew 5:11, 5:39.
The history of the cultural significance of spitting may also betray a Christian influence. A
check of the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae shows a preponderance of Christian authors.
unsurprisingly discussing the Passion of Christ, in the use of such verbs as conspuo. as meaning to
spit on someone in a show of contempt. See 4 THESAURUS LINGUAE LATINAE 503 (1906-09) (s.v.
"conspuo"); 5 id. 752 (1910) (s.v. "despuo"). Even a gesture like spitting-treated as a universal
form of abuse in FLYNN, supra note 26, at 16-can have various fortunes in various cultures. For
a recent German spitting case, see HOHNEL, supra note 45, at 28-29.
109. See LEUZE, supra note 60, at 66-68.
110. See id. at 68-72 (discussing the views of Windscheid, Jhering, and Kohler).
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worst elements [of society] would try to take advantage [of such a
provision]."'
Thus the historical, and very un-Roman, hostility to money damages in
affairs of honor became a part of codified German civil law; indeed, the
limits of the drafters' idea of money damages for "nonmaterial" injuries
can still be read on the face of the Civil Code, which allows money
damages only in cases of bodily harm and what the common law calls
"false imprisonment." "2 The classic cases of insult were excluded. The
hostility to money damages thus hung on; civil actions in cases of insult
were accordingly essentially impossible,'13 and insult law retained the form
of criminal law.
Moreover, as the passage from the drafters of the Civil Code just
quoted suggests, the association of honor with the higher strata of society
also hung on. It remained, throughout the nineteenth century, a prevalent
belief that honor was something that appertained to the upper echelons of
society. Only persons of high rank were, as the dueling literature put it,
Satisfaktionsfdhig,"4 or capable of giving (and correspondingly of getting)
"satisfaction" for a slight to honor." 5 Such persons were no longer
exclusively aristocrats in the nineteenth century. As Ute Frevert has noted,
dueling became a great preoccupation of the higher bourgeoisie as well;" 6
111. B.S. MARKEsiNIs, A COMPARATIvE INTRODUCTION TO THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS
64(1994).
112. See § 847(1) BORGERLICHES GESET-BUCH [BGBI [Civil Code) (F.R.G.). This provision
reads:
im Falle der Verletzung des Korpers oder der Gesundheit sowie im Falle der
Freiheitsentziehung kann der Verletzte auch wegen des Schadcns, der nicht
Vermtgensschaden ist, eine billige Entschidigung in Geld verlangen.
Ein gleicher Anspruch steht einer Frauensperson zu, gegen die ein Verbrechen
oder Vergehen wider die Sittlichkeit begangen oder die dutch Hintedist, dutch
Drohung oder unter Millbrauch eines Abhdngigkcitsverhiltnisses zur Gestaitung der
auerehelichen Beiwohnung bestimmt wird.
In the case of injury to the body or to health as well as in the case of false
imprisonment, the injured party can also demand an equitable reparation in money for
harm that is not monetary.
A similar claim is available to a woman, against whom a crime or a misdemeanor
against good morals has been committed, or who has been led to permit extramarital
sexual relations through trickery, threats, or through misuse of a relationship of
dependency.
113. Under § 188 StGB, until 1974, judges could, however, make a quasi-civil award of
damages to the injured party in an insult action; similar provisions, introduced by the Nazis in
1943, remain the law in §§ 403-406 StPO.
114. For Satisfaltionsfdhigkeir as a " specifically German concept." see FREVERT. supra note
91, at 13, 15. See also KEVIN McALEER, DUELING: THE CULT OF HONOR IN FIN-DE-SIICLE
GERMANY 49 (1994).
115. See FREVERT, supra note 91, at 76-88. 97-98. 179-96. For Enlightenment attacks on
dueling as presupposing that aristocrats had more honor than others (including an attack by
Adolph Freiherr von Knigge, the founder of German etiquette literature), see id. at 41.
116. See id. at 85 (describing "die soziale Ausweitung der satisfaktionsfdlhigen
Gesellschaft") (" the societal expansion of the social class capable of satisfaction").
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in that way, a kind of leveling up took place in the world of dueling.
Nevertheless, the idea that there were higher and lower statuses, and in fact
many grades from very high in honor to very low survived.
Indeed, the idea that there were varying grades of honor in society was
sanctioned by statute. German statutes of the first decades of the nineteenth
century differentiated carefully among the grades of "insultability" of
persons of different social status." 7 In tune with this theme of formal status
inequality, the law of insult in the criminal codes of the various German
states commonly aimed to guarantee that social inferiors would show
proper deference. This brings us to a second function performed by the
premodern law of insult. As I suggested earlier, laws requiring respect and
deference are most commonly found in societies with well-articulated
social hierarchies, like that of Confucian China. Premodern Germany
society included just such articulated social hierarchies; in German law the
doctrines of insult were expected to reinforce and safeguard hierarchical
differences, just as comparable law in traditional China did. A statute of
1840, for example, reads, typically:
[I]nsults... are to be criminally punished in the following cases:
I. If the affront to honor [Ehrenkrdnkung] consists of a coarse
physical assault [groberen Thdtlichkeiten];
II. if the insult is directed at persons to whom the insulter owes
particular respect or deference [Achtung oder Ehrerbietung],
on account of the insulter's social status or his relationship to
the insulted persons .... "'
117. See ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FOR DIE PREUBISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794 IPrussian
General Code], Teil II, tit. 20, §§ 607-636 (noting the elaborate regulation of the varying degrees
of "insultability" of persons of different social standing). This was abrogated by ordinance in
December 1848. See REINHART KOSELLECK, PREUI3EN ZWISCHEN REFORM UND REVOLUTION:
ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT, VERWALTUNG UND SOZIALE BEWEGUNG VON 1791 BIS 1848. at
102-03 (1967); see also Mittermaier, supra note 105, at 442-43 (describing Hannoverian
legislation). For a philosophical defense of status differences in legislation, see LUDWIG
HARSCHER VON ALMENDINGEN, METAPHYSIK DES CIVIL-PROZESSES (Giessen, Maller 1821).
118. Criminalgesetzbuch fir das K6nigreich Hannover [Criminal Code for the Kingdom of
Hannover], v. 8.8.1840 ch. 10, art. 265, reprinted in 2 SAMMLUNG DER DEUTSCHEN
STRAFGESETZBOCHER 140 (M. Stenglein ed., Munich, Keiser 1858). For other examples, see
Strafgesetzbuch fir das K6nigreich Sachsen [Penal Code for the Kingdom of Saxony] 3. v.
13.8.1855, ch. 9, art. 240, reprinted in 3 id. at 111 (shielding those "whose position entitles them"
to dishonor their victim from insult prosecution); and Strafgesetzbuch for das Groi3herzogthum
Hessen [Penal Code for the Grand Duchy of Hesse], v. 17. 9.1841, tit. XXXVII, art. 309.
reprinted in 2 id. at 134 (containing a provision similar to the provision quoted in the main text).
The Hannoverian criminal provisions, which in the case of repeated offenses carned
punishment of up to two years' imprisonment in a workhouse (the worst form of imprisonment),
would presumably not have been applied to any duelists who actually were induced to litigate
rather than duel. Duelists would presumably have been subject to the technically noncriminal, and
therefore less dishonorable, police provisions in Hannover, which provided for fines, and, more
importantly, for the classic honor-oriented remedies of the retraction, apology, and declaration of
honor. The Polizeistrafgesetz is reproduced in 2 id. at 139 n.53.
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It is in these statutes that we find what remains the key analytic term in
the law of insult down to this day: Achtung, "respect." "Respect," in the
German law of insult, thus began as hierarchical respect, long before it
became the egalitarian respect of current law. More generally, the strong
attachment to articulated social hierarchy of the early nineteenth century
fostered a particular attitude toward the nature of insults-a tendency to
understand the insult as an expression of disrespect, visited upon a person
conscious of his right to be shown a polite, even exaggerated, respect at all
times. Thus, early-nineteenth-century jurists found themselves discussing
such problems as when it was an insult, in law, to fail to address a person
according the formal title (for example, "Your Excellency," "Your
Grace," or "Most Well-Born") to which his "rank and social status"
entitled him."9
As for procedure, it was natural, in this honor-conscious culture, that
both duelists and persons entitled to deference (if they went to court at
all) t20 should bring private prosecutions. A man of honor, even when he
made use of the courts, was a man who settled his own disputes.
Accordingly, affairs of honor, whether between duelists or between status-
superiors and status-inferiors, were not matters into which government
magistrates should meddle too directly. The principle that the law of insult
was a law of private prosecutions thus firmly established itself in the first
part of the nineteenth century.
The tale of the making of the modem law of insult is a tale of the death
of this old world of social hierarchy--of the replacement of the touchy
aristocrat by the touchy German. How did that world of social hierarchy
die in insult law? It died only slowly and, distressingly, largely in the midst
of the revolutionary changes of the Nazi period--distressingly, for we
might like to imagine that the end of the hierarchical law of insult in
Germany was the product of the traditions of liberalism and of anti-
119. See 2 T1TrMANN, supra note 103, at 194 & n.i. The art of employing such titles correctly
remained important throughout the late 19th century. For a list and discussion. see 2 JHERING,
supra note 25, at 414-21.
To be sure, references to the problem of dueling as such became less frequent over the
course of the century. While the association of the law of insult with dueling remained fresh for
jurists of the early 19th century, that association faded in the literature as the century wore on.
Nevertheless, dueling itself retained a special status in German law. Unlike French law, which
aimed to lower the status of the "aristocratic" duel by treating duels (to the extent that they were
penalized) under the ordinary law of assault and murder, see ROBERT A. NYE, MASCULINITY AND
MALE CODES OF HONOR IN MODERN FRANCE 134 (1993). German law continued to include
special dueling provisions throughout the 19th century, and indeed, until 1969, see FREVERT.
supra note 91, at 66-76. Penalizing a practice can even enhance its social status. And the values
associated with dueling continued to make their influence felt on the law of insult.
120. Presumably they did so rarely. Presumably the laws on deferential respect were no more
frequently applied than the laws on insult: High-status Germans would ordinarily have thrashed
disrespectful inferiors, not taken them to court-just as they would ordinarily have dueled with
status-equals. My point is not that these statutes were applied as written, but that they established
a doctrinal tradition that has continued into the present.
20001 1321
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1321 1999-2000
The Yale Law Journal
Fascism. Most of all, we might like to imagine that egalitarianism of respect
was the work of Immanuel Kant, a man who unambiguously disfavored the
hierarchical, honor-heavy society of his time. As Kant forthrightly declared
in the late eighteenth century, pursuing his grand theme of the moral
equality of all persons: "To show disrespect for others (contemnere), i.e., to
deny them the respect [Achtung] we owe to each human being as such, is
always a violation of our moral duty: For they are human beings." 121
The influence of Kant and his followers on German law is renowned, 2'
and one might expect that the decline of social hierarchy in German law
represented Kantianism in action. Even if Kant were not the maker of
status-egalitarianism in Germany, we might guess that anti-Fascism was. In
the years after the horrors of the Fascist experience, honor was widely
proclaimed as a universal value. Post-Fascist European law-especially
constitutional law-regularly made a point of insisting that all human
beings were entitled to equal honor; 12 3 and one might suppose that it was
the common postwar revulsion against Fascism that secured honor for all
citizens.
Yet the tale is more complex, and its lessons are more morally
ambiguous. The decline of social hierarchy in the German law of insult
was, in considerable part, not a reaction against the Fascists, but the work of
the Fascists; and if we do not understand that dark fact, I think we will find
it difficult to grasp the deeper sociology, and the richer philosophical
meaning, of "respect."
121. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SITrEN, reprinted in 8 IMMANUEL KANT:
WERKAUSGABE 601 (1993) (1797) ("Andere verachten (contemnere), d. i. ihnen die deIn
Menschen Uiberhaupt schuldige Achtung weigern, ist auf alle Rille pflichtwidrig; denn es sind
Menschen."); cf. IMMANUEL KANT, KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNFT, reprinted in 7
IMMANUEL KANT: WERKAUSGABE, supra, at 197 (" Fontenelle sagt: vor einem Vornehnen biicke
ich mich, aber mein Geist biickt sich nicht. Ich kann hinzu setzen: vor cinem niedrigen.
biirgerlich-gemeinen Mann, an dem ich eine Rechtschaffenheit des Charakters in cinem gewissen
Mage, als ich mir von mir selbst nicht bewugt bin, wahrnehme, biickt sich mein Geist. ich mag
wollen oder nicht, und den Kopf noch so hoch tragen, um ihn meinen Vorrang nicht ibersehen zu
lassen.").
Yet even Kant's most famous follower in German criminal law could not banish social-
hierarchical law from his discussion. See [ANSELM RiTrER VON] FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH DES
GEMEINEN IN DEUTSCHLAND GELTENDEN PEINLICHEN RECHTS 242-43 (Giessen, Heyer 1st ed.
1801). And in still later editions, though with altered wording, see for example, ANSELM RITTER
VON FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH DES GEMEINEN IN DEUTSCHLAND GOLTIGEN PEINLICHEN RECHTS
178-80 (Giessen, Heyer 10th ed. 1828).
122. See, e.g., I BONNER KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ 7-10 (90th Supp. 1999)
(emphasizing both Kantian philosophy and Christianity); William B. Ewald, Comparative
Jurisprudence (l): What Was It Like To Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889, 1997-2004 (1995). I
leave aside the problem of Christianity in this Article. I observe only that Christianity can hardly
account for the shifts of the last century and a half, since it has been present as a force for so much
longer. That is not to say that European egalitarianism is not colored by Christianity. I think it is.
But discussing that Christian coloration would simply be too difficult here.
123. See infra notes 166-168, 254 and accompanying text.
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How did we come, then, to the modem German world of equal honor
for all? Status inequality disappeared from German law only by painful
stages. It was in the 1870s, a good ninety years after Kant's major
philosophical works began to appear, that status inequality finally vanished
from the statute books." With the new Imperial Criminal Code of 1871,
which included the provision on insult still in use today, came formal
egalitarianism.' 5 Yet changing statutes is not the same as changing law,
even in the civil-law world. Post-1871 jurists agreed that the provision on
insult, despite its silence, continued to protect honor. As for the nature of
honor, dominant opinion among the jurists refused to take statutory formal
equality at face value."2 While there were some prominent voices in favor
of egalitarianism in honor,27 dominant nineteenth-century juristic opinion
124. The Kingdom of Prussia formally abolished status differences in its law of insult after
the Revolution of 1848, as did the Kingdom of Bavaria in 1861. These were the largest and most
important states, but they were not all of Germany. In other states, the tradition of mandating
deference was surprisingly long-lived. Only with Bismarck's grand unification of Germany in
1871, and the promulgation of a common criminal code in the same year. did the Prussian
elimination of formal status differences in the law of insult prevail. See STRAFGESETZBUCH FOR
DAS KONIGREICH BAYERN 1861, §§ 261-266; STRAFGESETZBUCH FOR DIE PREUDIfsCHi
STAATEN, §§ 152-163 (both without status distinctions).
125. So egalitarian, in fact, was the Empire's new criminal code that it did not even mention
honor. Earlier statutes had classified insult as an Ehrenkralnk-ug, an affront to honor. The new
Imperial Code dropped all such references. This did not prevent jurists, of course, from
reintroducing honor as the standard term of doctrinal analysis.
126. Already a commentator on the formally egalitarian Bavarian statute of 1861 emphasized
that insultability had to be interpreted according to the "prevailing ideas and customs of the
relevant status and professional circles." 2 DAS STRAFGESETZBUCH FOR DAS KONIGREICH
BAYERN SAMMT DEM GESErzE voM 10. Nov. 1861 ZUR EINFOHRUNG DES STRAFGSE'TZBUCHS
UND DES POUZEISTRAFGESETZBUCHS 104 (Ludwig Weis ed., Ntrdlingcn 1865). Indeed, in one
respect social hierarchy remained even in the Imperial Criminal Code, which included special
provisions protecting the honor of the Kaiser, the Landesherren, and the Btutdesfiirsten in §§ 94-
101 until the establishment of the Weimar Republic. See WiLHELt, HEuLE & FRANZ
SCHIERLINGER, DAS STRAFGESETZBUCH FOR DAS DEUTSCHE REICH IN SEINER GEGENWARTIGEN
GESTALT 101-05 (Munich, Beck 1895). For a discussion of the reinstatement of § 94 at the close
of the Weimar Republic, see infra note 141. A fuller discussion of the enforcement of respect in
Germany would devote considerably more attention than I can here to the important question of
law protecting heads of state, both domestic and foreign. Such law has also played a large role in
popular German legal culture.
127. See, e.g., BINDING, supra note 91, at 24 ("Nach der Ehre bestimmt sich--so will das
Recht--das Mindestmass des im Verkehr von Mensch zu Mensch zu wahrenden Anstandes, weil
das Mindestmass von Achtung, das Jeder dem Andern schuldet:-insbesondere im ganzen
grossen Verkehr mittels der Sprache. Die Ehre ist--richtiger nach ihr bemisst sich--der rechtlich
anerkannte Verkehrskurs eines Menschen.") (" Honor-such is the will of the law-determines
the minimal measure of decent behavior in the intercourse of human beings. because it determines
the minimal measure of respect that each owes to others-in particular in all of the great
intercourse that is carried on by means of speech. Honor is--or rather, provides the measure for-
the legally recognized commercial value in social relations of a human being.-); id. at 25 ( Dank
dem Christentum ist im Gegensatze zur Antike allmhlich in der Geschichte des Rechts der
Grnmdsatz von der Gleichheit aller Menschen als solchen zur Anerkennung gelangt .... Unser
Ehrenrecht heute ist ganz demokratisch .... ") ("'Thanks to Christianity, and in contrast to
Antiquity, the basic principal of the equality of all men as such has gradually achieved recognition
over the course of history .... Today our law of honor is wholly democratic....-). Even
Binding, though, defended dueling between military officers. See id. at 30.
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determined that honor, for legal purposes, had to be understood as external
honor, or honor as measured according to the objective social valuation of a
person.128 As an 1890 decision explained,
Every person has the right to claim a certain degree of respect
[Achtung] from his fellow citizens .... As a general matter, the
concept of the general valuation of persons [Werthschdtzung]
comprises all the types into which honor is customarily divided-
that is to say, honor associated with one's social status [die
bargerliche des Standes], sexual honor, and so on. These types of
honor are specifically mentioned in order to show that the offense
of injury to honor is not always measured according to the same
standard, but differs according to the prevailing norms in the social
circle of the person who has been insulted.
2 9
This was a definition that left little room for those of low status, and
correspondingly little room for meaningful realization of the formal
equality of the statute. 3 ' This was very far indeed from Kant's equal
respect for all persons as human beings.
At the same time that jurists of the new Second Reich resisted equality
in the substance of the law, they also resisted equality in procedure. In
1877, the new Imperial Code of Criminal Procedure appeared. Following
hallowed practice, it ordained that cases of insult should be brought through
private prosecutions.' 3 ' This had never troubled juristic commentators in the
128. An important countercurrent to the dominant school did begin to take shape as early as
the 1840s. "Germanist" jurists-specialists in "German" rather than Roman law-began to press
the claim that all Germans were entitled to a claim to honor. These Germanists remained.
however, a distinctly minority voice in 19th-century juristic thought. The full acceptance of the
idea that persons of all social ranks had enough honor that they could participate in the economy
of insults came only later.
129. 38 ARCHIV FOR STRAFRECHT 434, 435 n.4 (Berlin, Decker 1891).
Jede Person hat das Recht, einen gewissen Grad von Achtung bei seinen Mitbilrgern in
Anspruch zu nehmen .... Im Allgemeinen umfaBt der Begriff der allgemeinen
Werthschdtzung alle verschiedenen Arten, in welche man die Ehre zu theilen
pflegt, ndmlich die btirgerliche des Standes, die Geschlechtsehre u.s.w., Arten, die nur
hervorgehoben werden, um zu zeigen, daB der Thatbestand der Ehrverletzung nicht
Uiberall dem gleichen MaBstab unterliegt, sondern sich nach den Anschauungen richtet,
die in dem gesellschaftlichen Kreise des durch die Beleidigung Betroffenen maBgebend
sind.
Id.
130. For the long-lasting tendency to analyze honor in hierarchical terms, see
Helmut Kohl, Das Lebach-Urteil in privatrechtlicher Sicht, in MEDIENWIRKUNG UND
MEDIENVERANTWORTUNG 57 (Friedrich Kiibler ed., 1975). German jurists brought, it should be
said, plenty of their characteristic subtlety to their discussions. In particular, they rejected the
proposition that social status as such conferred legally cognizable honor. Rather, honor came from
fitness and uprightness in living up to the standards of one's social status. See MARKUS BREZINA,
EHRE UND EHRENSCHUTZ IM NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN RECHT 25 & 217 n. 136 (1987).
131. Here there is a complication: While the Privatklage was regarded as penal in character.
in some German states it was brought before a criminal judge, and in some before a civil judge.
See, e.g., GEORG BESELER, KOMMENTAR OBER DAS STRAFGESETZBUCH FOR DIE PREUIIISCHEN
1324 [Vol. 109: 1279
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1324 1999-2000
Enforcing Civility and Respect
past.'32 But with the establishment of the new, formally egalitarian law of
insult, jurists set up a drumbeat of complaint about private prosecutions."'
Allowing private prosecutions for insult, jurists argued, almost with one
voice, meant opening the courts to a flood of Bagatellsachen, "bagatelle
cases" -trivial disputes that did not merit the attention of the legal system.
This had never been a concern in an era in which the law of insult seemed
to serve manifestly important purposes in the pursuit of properly founded
claims of honor. Now, however, it became a constant refrain in the
literature.M If this juristic campaign against private prosecutions had
succeeded, the law of insult could hardly have taken the form it takes
today-a form in which, of course, ordinary Germans do believe that their
"bagatelles" belong in court.
Before the modem law of insult could develop, in fact, two things had
to happen. There had to be an embracing of the idea that everybody, of all
social ranks, was entitled to a claim to honor, and there had to be a
reaffirmation of the idea that ordinary lay Germans were entitled to their
day in court, even with regard to their most ordinary claims.
Both things happened, and both happened largely in the Nazi period.
Ideas about the broad social extension of honor circulated during the early
twentieth century, and German jurisprudence did begin a slow process of
change before Hitler seized power. During the Weimar era, it became
common to acknowledge that inner honor, honor founded primarily on
one's true moral worth, might occasionally play a role in legal analysis, as
indeed might a general human dignity that applied to all.'1 Nevertheless,
throughout the 1920s, reigning juristic opinion still defined honor as
external honor. 36 At the same time, the sense of crisis over "bagatelle
STAATEN UND DAS EINFOHRUNGSGESETZ VOM 14, April 1851, at 333 (Leipzig, Wcidmann 1851).
The draftsmen of the Code of Criminal Procedure rejected the latter, Prussian, practice, in favor of
purely criminal treatment. See Deutscher Reichstag, II. Legislatur-Periode, 1. Session 1874:
Motive zum Entwurf einer StrafprozeBordnung und zum Entwurf des Einflhningsgesetzes, 231.
The original §§ 414-434 StPO limited private prosecutions fundamentally to cases of insult and
minor bodily harm. See LOwE-RosENBERG, supra note 56, at 7.
132. See, e.g., BESELER, supra note 131. at 333-37.
133. For the history of critique since the first appearance of the statute, see LOWE-
ROSENBERG, supra note 56, at 14-15.
134. This was already the case in the earliest discussions surrounding the Code of Criminal
Procedure. See RODIGER KoEwius, supra note 71, at 28-31 (describing the background in dueling
norms). For this theme in the literature, see Eduard Kern, Der Ehrenschutz im kalnftigen
Strafrecht, in 1 MATERIALIEN ZUR STRAFRECH1SREFO.M 303, 303 (1954).
135. Here jurists followed especially the theory of BINDING, supra note 91. Orthodox opinion
found the idea of inner honor doctrinally difficult to accept, though; if moral worth was all that
mattered, it was difficult to explain why it should count as an insult to ridicule someone's physical
appearance or disabilities. See BREZINA, supra note 130, at 25.
136. See, e.g., LUDWIG F. EBERMAYER ET AL, REICHS-STRAFGEsEZBUcH 579 (3d ed.
1925):
Die einzelnen Begriffsbestimmungen treffen darin Uberein, als sic die Ehre als
Angriffsobjekt bezeichnen (vgl. allerdings Binding... ). und zwar nicht den wegen
seiner Innerlichkeit unverletzlichen, dem Rechtsgebiete nicht angehCrigen inneren
2000] 1325
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1325 1999-2000
The Yale Law Journal
cases" grew.137 So strong, indeed, was this sense of an honor crisis in the
courts that in late 1931, in the depths of the Depression and amidst the
gathering thunder of the collapse of Weimar, the law of private
prosecutions was actually the subject of emergency legislation. In October
of that year, the Weimar government, beset not only by economic crisis but
also by violent Nazi agitation throughout Germany, 3 ' issued an
"Emergency Ordinance for the Guarantee of the Economy and of Finance,
and for the Suppression of Political Rioting and Agitation." 9 This
ordinance, in an era of terrifying disorder, devoted two paragraphs to, of all
things, cutting back on private prosecutions, which were overwhelmingly
Wert, die innere Ehre, sondern die auflere, den Wert, der einem Menschen innerhalb
der menschlichen Gesellschaft kraft seiner Eigenschaften und Leistungen, also nach
dem Mal3e der Erftillung der ihm obliegenden sittlichen, rechtlichen und sozialen
Pflichten zukommt ....
Die den Angriffsgegenstand bei der Beleidigung bildende Ehre im vorerorterten
Sinne kann die allgemein menschliche... ehre sein.
The particular applications of the concept agree in designating honor as the object that
is attacked (though compare Binding ... ), and indeed not the inner value of inner
honor, which because of its inward character cannot be injured, and which does not
belong to the realm of law, but rather outer honor, the value accorded to a person
within human society on account of his qualities and achievements, that is, according to
the measure in which he fulfills his moral, legal, and social duties ....
The "honor" that constitutes the object of the attack in the law of insult, as just
discussed, can be general human honor ....
This debate in German jurisprudence recapitulated debates about the nature of honor that had
been going on since the late Middle Ages. The state of Weimar jurisprudence is nicely
summarized in BREZINA, supra note 130, at 24-25. To be sure, social hierarchy of the old-regime
kind vanished from jurisprudence. See id. at 32. Nevertheless, it remained "ein Phfinomen des
aullerjuristischen Bereichs," id., and as such was necessarily impounded into the "external"
concept of honor.
137. From the time of the drafting of the modem Code of Criminal Procedure in the 1870s.
the prospect of excessive private prosecutions for insult had troubled the drafters, and the Code
accordingly included a special provision requiring that complainants in insult cases submit to
mediation before bringing their claims. This did not prevent the number of cases from growing
steadily. In the years 1921-1924, the requirement of mediation was extended to cover all minor
offenses to privacy, property, and person. For the history, see LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 56,
at 19-20, 66-68. This extension to the present catalogue, fully listed supra note 51, should not be
regarded as taking private prosecutions outside the realm of honor. On the contrary, within the
Hegelian tradition, all "trespasses" on the "personality" of individuals could be regarded as
slights to honor. The modern catalogue of Privatklage offenses fits within this Hegelian concept
of personality.
Who was bringing these cases? Frevert surmises that, as the practice of dueling faded after
World War I, high-status citizens who would once have vindicated their honor through resort to
arms tended to bring actions under the law of insult instead. For a discussion with a comparison to
Poland, see FREVERT, supra note 91, at 255, 335-36. For a once-famous prewar instance of an
unsuccessful effort to bring an insult action by Karl May, the wildly popular author of westerns.
see KARL MAY, MEIN LEBEN UND STREBEN 308-09 (1997); and Gerhard KlUlmeier. Em Wind
niedriger Gesinnung weht durch Deutschland, in JAHRBUCH DER KARL-MAY-GESELLSCHAFT
103 (Claus Roxin et al. eds., 1977).
138. On the crisis atmosphere that month, see GORDON A. CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945, at
557 (1978).
139. Dritte Verordnung des Reichsprtsidenten zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen
und zur Bekampfung politischer Ausschreitungen, v. 6.10.1931 (RGBI. I S.537) (F.R.G.).
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about insult!'4 Clearly enough, there was a powerful sense in the last days
of the German republic that the legal system had not managed to adopt the
right stance toward the honor problem. 4'
The Nazi seizure of power, a few months later, brought to this
atmosphere of crisis and confusion a fundamental reorientation of juristic
thought. This reorientation had to do, first and foremost, with an insistence
on the value of honor that was strongly egalitarian. There was an old line in
German legal thinking, dating back the 1840s, that held that honor, and
especially the gory honor of the teutonic forests, had to be the basis of any
truly "German" law. 4 2 Nazi legal thinkers made this line their own,
declaring that honor would be the foundation of the newly reformed Nazi
law.'43 There was, it hardly needs to be said, nothing about Kant or the
moral worth of all human beings in the Nazi theory of honor. In principal
part, the Nazi idea of honor involved race honor, as "protected" through
legislation criminalizing sexual relations between "Aryans" and "non-
Aryans." " But there was more to Nazi honor law than this famous bit.
Remarkably, the Nazis tried to reintroduce the duel, and to insist that all
Germans, of whatever social station, should be entitled to defend their
honor by dueling.'45 In an effort to safeguard the honor of the entire Aryan
nation, Nazi jurists maintained, contrary to Weimar jurisprudence, that
140. See id. §§ 7-8, at 563-64 (allowing courts to dismiss private prosecutions sua sponte).
Section 8 exempted from coverage of the ordinance cases of unfair competition and infringement
on intellectual property. Thus, the ordinance reached only minor cases of injury to person,
property, and privacy, like insult and kindred offenses: minor cases of uninvited entry into the
home (Hausfriedensbruch), insult, bodily harm, threats, disclosure of secrets of another, and harm
to goods. For the contemporary statute, see LOwE-RosENBERG. supra note 56, at 891-92, which
sets forth § 374 StPO with commentary. Limitations on Bagatellsachen had been proposed by the
Juristentag. For a description of the proposals and the wistful observation that cutting back on
private prosecutions would cost some judges their jobs. see Ernst. Bagatellsachen. in 23
DEUTSCHE RICHTERZErrUNG 288, 290-91 (1931) (for private prosecutions). The emergency
ordinance did meet with some resistance. For the refusal of the courts to apply the ordinance
retroactively, see Boehm, Strafsochen, 60 JW 3578-79 (1931).
141. The year 1931 also saw another emergency ordinance aimed at protecting the honor of
persons in public life, and 1932 saw the introduction of a new subparagraph of the Criminal Code
(§ 94 Abs. 2) specially protecting the honor of the Reichsprlsident. See BREZINA, supra note 130.
at 56. All of this could perhaps be taken as evidence of a grand "honor crisis" at the end of the
Weimar Republic.
142. For further discussion, see James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State:
Supervision of Violence, Mutilation of Bodies, or Setting of Prices?, 71 CHI.-KENT L REV. 41,
61-64 (1995), which discusses Wilda, who emphasizes that honor historically played a large role
in Germanic law.
143. See, e.g., BREZINA, supra note 130, at 95-96; HANS FRANK & RODIGER GRAF VON DER
GOLT, NATioNALSOZIAuLsnscER EHRENSCHUTZ 4-5 (1938). For a dissident. Nazi-cra voice,
see ALEXANDER GRAF ZU DOHNA, NEUE MtTrEL DES EHRENSCHu-zEs 59, 159-66 (1938).
144. See FRANK & GOLT_, supra note 143, at 6 (discussing the law of September 15, 1935,
which was passed "for the protection of German blood and German honor").
145. During the 1930s, the Nazi regime reintroduced the duel for officers and students. See
FREVERT, supra note 91, at 256-63. Not content with this traditional concept of the
"satisfaktionsfihige" classes, though, Nazi thinkers insisted that all Germans were entitled to
resort to the duel to defend their honor. See id.
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group insult was cognizable at law' 46 -though the groups that the Nazis
wished to protect against insult were, in the first instance, the S.A. and the
S.S., the Party's private thug-armies. It is, indeed, an uncomfortable irony
to discover that modern German law on group insult can be partly traced to
a 1934 decision allowing the prosecution of a man who was overheard in a
barber shop expressing the understandable view that the S.A. and the S.S.
were "nothing but scum" 147-a statement, the court held, that was clearly
suited to do serious damage to the honor [Ansehen] "of every member of
these two associations." 148 The Nazis also upgraded honor in criminal law:
Some Nazi jurists even proposed shuffling around the contents of the
criminal statute book, listing offenses against honor ahead of offenses
against the person or property. 49 Finally, and most importantly for my
purposes here, Nazi doctrinal analysis at last accepted the proposition that
Germans of all social statuses participated in German honor, at least to
some extent. Largely abandoning the old dichotomy between external and
internal honor, the Nazis redefined honor as "national" honor-as the
product of committed participation in the Volk-community.'50 This
"nationalization" of honor nicely paralleled a "nationalization" of honor
that took place during the French Revolution,' and it had some of the same
146. See, e.g., RG [Imperial Supreme Court], Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Strafsachen [RGSt], 70 (1937), 140 (141) (F.R.G.); RG [Imperial Supreme Court], RGSt, 68
(1934), 120 (123) (F.R.G.).
147. RG [Imperial Supreme Court], RGSt, 68 (1934), 120 (123) (F.R.G.). I have translated
"lauter Lumpe" as "nothing but scum," since the quaint word "rascals" fails to capture the
impact of" Lumpe."
148. Id. at 123. The court concluded that "[dlie S.A. und S.S. bilden endlich
Personenmehrheiten, die aus der Allgemeinheit so deutlich hervortreten, daB der Kreis der
beleidigten Einzelpersonen scharf umgrenzt ist." Id. at 124. This is the same standard still applied
in determining whether groups such as Turks can be protected under the law of collective insult.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text. I do not mean to claim that the German law of
collective insult is an invention of the Nazis. It does seem important, though, to accent Nazism's
understudied contribution. For a cautious postwar reference, without discussion of this 1934 case,
see Arthur Kauffman, Zur Frage der Beleidigung von Kollektivpersinlichkeiten, 72 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 418, 419-20 (1960), which briefly discusses the
Nazi-era developments. The tendency to accord government agents the special protection of group
insult law continues to this day. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
149. See BREZINA, supra note 130, at 95 (citing DENKSCHRIFr DES PREUIBISCHEN
JUSTIZMINISTERS: NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHES STRAFRECHT 80 (1933)).
150. See id. at 26-28.
151. See Norman Hampson, The French Revolution and the Nationalisation of Honour, in
WAR AND SOCIETY 199, 199-212 (M.R.D. Foot ed., 1973). Hampson writes:
The rule of Napoleon was to show that revolutionary patriotism, shorn of its democratic
and egalitarian aspects and of its dedication to vertu, had assumed some of the
characteristics of aristocratic honour and transferred them from the individual to the
nation-state. The most respected members of society were once again the military men,
but their obligations and rewards were dictated by the Emperor rather than by their own
volition.
Id. at 211-12.
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revolutionary implications: At least potentially, every German was a person
of honor."52
This generalization of honor had its consequences for the law of insult.
Here too, the Nazis, who had something of an attachment to bourgeois good
manners,"' insisted that all Germans should get satisfaction.'" To be sure,
private prosecutions as such did not fit well with the Nazi idea of good
government. Indeed, some Nazi jurists pressed on with the Weimar juristic
campaign against "bagatelle cases," proposing to eliminate the legal right
to bring full-scale private prosecutions. 55 This did not, however, imply that
Nazi jurists were ready to eliminate the law of insult entirely. On the
contrary, it was far too much for Nazi opinion to suggest that ordinary
Germans should have no means of vindicating wounded honor. What Nazi
reform draftsmen of the 1930s proposed instead was a scheme that would
have redefined insult claims as less than fully "legal," subjecting them to
binding arbitration before a judge.'56 Litigants would thus still find their
way into court; they would simply lose the right to full-dress adjudication
of their claims to honor. Even this reform turned out to shock Nazi opinion.
It was overwhelmingly rejected by Nazi commentators," who insisted
that honor was too important to be excluded from the ordinary criminal law;
as one of them nicely put it, the proposed reforms would represent
a concession to "an obsolete materialistic Welanschauung." 15 Honor
counted for too much to give way to the spirit of court reform. Private
prosecutions did decline in numbers, as they had been doing for some
152. This was complicated by Nazi corporatism, which aimed to classify persons according
to profession and to subject each person to a standard of "professional honor." See BREzINA.
supra note 130, at 31-35. This of course involved differential statuses. Nevertheless, two aspects
of Nazi corporatism made it more or less compatible with Nazi universalization of honor. First.
Standesehre, professional honor, primarily imposed duties rather than conferring rights. See id
Second, the definition of status, in corporatist theory, emphasized the commonality of high- and
low-status participants as "producers" in a single industrial enterprise. This was intended to
diminish, not enhance, class differences.
Mussolini attempted to establish egalitarian honor in Fascist Italy by "impos[ing] the
informal voi rather than the more formal Lei." STANLEY G. PAYNE, A HISTORY OF FASCISM,
1914-1945, at 238 (1995).
153. See GEORGE MOSSE, THE FASCIST REVOLUTION 20-21.25 (1999).
154. Notably, Nazi reformers recharacterized the various branches of the law of insult as
covering "Ehrenkrdnkungen," again a term dating to the old dueling culture. See BREZIlNA. supra
note 130, at 96. For "Krdnktng" in dueling terminology, see, for example, FREVERT. supra note
91, at 93. For a lengthy discussion of the problem of insult in the context of Nazi legal thought.
see [Georg] Dahm, Das Feststellungsverfahren zumn Schurze der F/hre. in DER EHRENSCHUTz IM!
NEUEN DEUTSCHEN STRAFvERFAHREN 43 (Franz GUnner ed., 1937). I have not been able to see
another text of the same period, FRIEDRICH BASSENGE, EHRE UND BELEIDIGUNG (1937).
155. See BREZINA, supra note 130, at 131-32.
156. For a description, see id. at 143-49.
157. See id at 149-51.
158. Erwin Noack, Buchbesprechung, 65 JWV 2345, 2346 (1937). quoted in BREZINA. supra
note 130, at 150.
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time.' 59 But the net effect of the Nazi debates was to reaffirm their
importance-to reaffirm the belief that the doors of the courts should
always be open to German claims of honor.
In procedure as in substance, it thus has to be said that the Nazis
advanced the progress of honor in German legal thought; the general social
democratization of honor was a part of the "brown Revolution," the real
social revolution that accompanied Nazi rule' and that was a fundamental
force in the popular success of the Nazis. 6' In a slow process of diffusion
by which honor trickled down through the lower ranks of German society-
a process that began well before 1933 and that has continued after 1945-
the Nazis made a major contribution. Maybe it is even a measure of Nazi-
era change that studies of the postwar years showed that insult actions in
the 1950s were predominantly brought by Germans of the lower social
orders. 6 '
It was thus not so much Kant who was the reigning intellectual light of
the initial successful broad extension of honor throughout German society:
it was Nazi legal thinkers such as Georg Dahm and Hans Frank. This may
159. Interestingly, during World War H, the proposed Nazi reform was instituted for a period.
See Dritte Strafrechtspflegevereinfachungsverordnung, v. 13.8.1942 (RGBI. I S.508) (F.R.G.).
This was abrogated by the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung der Rechtseinheit auf dem Gebiete der
Gerichtsverfassung, der biirgerlichen Rechtspflege, des Strafverfahrens und des Kostenrechts, v.
12.9.1950 (BGBI. I S.455, 506) (F.R.G.). If the Nazi wartime ordinance had been left intact-as
was surely possible-many of the complaints of the modem legal profession would have been
satisfied, since the bringing of private actions would have been made more difficult.
160. See DAVID SCHOENBAUM, HITLER'S SOCIAL REVOLUTION: CLASS AND STATUS IN
NAZI GERMANY, 1933-1939, at 285-86 (1966) (noting that the Nazis created a perception of a
new social equality despite the practical failure of the regime's programs). For an effort from the
left to limit Schoenbaum's conclusions, see DETLEV J.K. PEUKERT, INSIDE NAZI GERMANY:
CONFORMITY, OPPOSITION AND RACISM IN EVERYDAY LIFE 246-47 (1982), which explores
social divisions in Nazi society.
To be sure, the Nazis resisted the idea that money damages could appropriately satisfy the
wounded honor; they preached instead for premodem remedies like the apology and the
retraction. See FRANK & GOLrz, supra note 143, at 10. For Nazi reform efforts to allow proof
of the falsity of insulting claims, see BREZINA, supra note 130, at 104-05, 137-39; to make
allowance for apology and retraction, see id. at 116; to allow publication of the judgment as a
"symbolic pillory," see id. at 117-18, which notes that under current law this is permitted only in
cases that correspond roughly to common-law libel, see § 200 StGB. For a discussion of orienting
judgments more broadly toward "reparation of reputation," see BREZINA, supra note 130, at 133-
34. On Nazi ideas about the pillory, see Whitman, supra note 21, at 1083-84.
161. As George Mosse sharply puts it,
We know that real wages fell in Germany and that the Italian workers and peasants did
not materially benefit from the fascist regime. But it would seem that, to many of them.
this mattered less than the gain in status. Those who have tried to prove otherwise
apparently believe that material interests alone determine men's actions.
MOSSE, supra note 153, at 38-39.
162. See DOERING, supra note 45, at 60-62. Doering also notes that there were generally
acquittals, in his sample, when the accused was of high social standing, especially under
the doctrine of "Wahmehmung berechtigter Interessen," § 193 StGB, normally used in cases
of published defamations. See DOERING, supra note 45, at 61. Manifestly, this represents a
continuation of old hierarchical assumptions.
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seem an uncomfortable paradox. Nevertheless it is important to dwell, for a
moment, on the Nazi episode.
I think the Nazi episode helps us to see something that the current
German law of sexual insult 63 also helps us to see: what a problematic and
troubling concept respect is. The proposition that all persons should have
honor and respect sounds beautiful, and it is beautiful. At the same time, the
roots of honor and respect lie in some coarse and unflattering aspects of
human psychology. As Georg Simmel and Erving Goffman famously
observed, we have a strong instinct to think of honor as differential, to think
that if I am entitled to respect it is because I am better than others 64 This
instinct is so strong that forms of civility tend to have, at their heart, some
vision of hierarchical superiority; and societies that are "respectful"
societies will be, almost inevitably, societies in which the cultural traditions
of social hierarchy are strong. This was the view of Montesquieu, and I
think it is the right view. As he put it in The Spirit of the Laws, it is an error
to imagine that civility has the sort of origins that most American
commentators like to celebrate-origins in the need for people to live
together harmoniously:
Men, born to live together, are also born to please each other, and
he who does not observe the proprieties offends all those with
whom he lives and discredits himself so much that he becomes
unable to do any good thing.
But politeness does not customarily have its origin in such a
pure source. It arises from the desire to distinguish oneself. We are
polite from arrogance; we flatter ourselves that our manners prove
that we are not common and that we have not lived with the sort of
people who have been neglected through the ages.65
German honor, and more narrowly the German law of insult, also have
an impure source. The German law of insult remained, in the 1930s, "polite
from arrogance"; what the Nazi period did was to permit every German the
privilege of arrogance. In that sense, it is no surprise that the generalization
of honor to all "Germans," as the Nazis defined them, should have come at
a time when certain people, "neglected through the ages," were identified
163. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
164. For Simmel, especially for the shape of hierarchical ordering in differentiating societies,
see GEORG SIMMEL, Ober- und Unterordnung, in SOZIOLOGIE: UNTERSUCHUNGEN OBER DIE
FORMEN DER VERGESELLSCHAFrUNG 160. 272-73 (1992). For Goffman. see ERvING GOPFMAN.
The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACTION RrTUAL 47 (1967).
165. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 132
(Anne M. Cohler et al. trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). Montesquieu. I should note,
uses "civility" differently from "politeness." "Civility" is for Montesquieu a set of invariant
rules, the use of which actually inhibits flattery-a virtue he sees at work in Chinese "civility."
See id. at 317. "Politeness" is the freer form in use in 18th-century France.
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as the targets of contempt for all. Respect has, at its heart, something to do
with superiority and inferiority; and the broad extension of superiority for
some almost inevitably meant an insistence upon the inferiority of others.
IV. HATE SPEECH AND INSULT BETWEEN "HONOR" AND
"HUMAN DIGNITY"
To be sure, the tale did not end with the Nazis. Postwar German law
has continued on its long trajectory. Honor has continued to trickle down
through all echelons of society, now reaching (at least theoretically) Jews
and other minorities. Meanwhile, German legal thought has inched forward
in the direction of a historic conceptual shift: a movement away from the
value of honor and toward the value of human dignity. Nevertheless, it
would be a mistake to imagine that the old days of honor are entirely past.
On the contrary, honor-oriented thinking continues to haunt German legal
doctrine on "human dignity," just as it haunts the everyday life of the law
of insult.
There have been, of course, real and stirring changes over the last fifty
years-but they are changes that have almost always taken place against the
background of the old law of honor. At the close of World War II, there
was a concerted effort to establish new norms of dignity. Thus, the new
Italian constitution of 1947 sanctified "social dignity" for all."6 The
German Basic Law of 1949 also guaranteed "human dignity" in its first
article. 6 7 Still and all, elsewhere in German constitutional thought an older
terminology of honor hung on.168 In particular, the Basic Law continued to
imagine that generalizing honor was what was needed for the healthy
regulation of the public sphere: Its Article 5, Section 2 guaranteed personal
honor against depredation:
(1) Every person has the right to express and disseminate his
opinion freely .... (2) These rights [of free expression of opinion]
find their limits in the provisions of the general laws, in the
166. See GIUSEPPE ARMANI, LA COSTITUZIONE ITALIANA 313 (1988) ("Tutti i cittadini
hanno pani dignit sociale .... (citing COsTITUZIONE [COST.] art. 3 (Italy)) ("All citizens have
equal social dignity .... ").
167. See GG [Constitution] Art. 1, para. 1 (F.R.G.) ("Die WUrde des Menschen ist
unantastbar.") ("Human dignity is inviolable."). For the accepted idea of the historical and
intellectual background to this provision, see I BONNER KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESEIL. supra
note 122, at 1-65; and especially id. at 7-10, for the prevailing tendency to emphasize the
influence of Kantian tradition as well as of Christianity.
168. Article 2 of the German Constitution, in particular, drew on the Humboldtian tradition
of thought about the freedom of "personality" in characteristically 19th-century ways. See GG
Art. 2.
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determinations of the laws for the protection of minors, and in the
right to personal honor.'
Clearly enough, this Section 2 presupposed the existence of the tradition of
insult law whose history I have recounted: A constitutional law of
"personal honor" could hardly fail to echo old ideas.'
Nevertheless, by constitutionalizing personal honor, the Basic Law did
seem to promise some kind of transformation, and a measure of
transformation has unquestionably resulted over the half century of social
reconstruction following. In the law of insult, dominant postwar juristic
opinion holds that "inner," moral, honor is a true measure-though jurists
have an exceedingly difficult time explaining how the law could possibly
protect inner honor.' t Human dignity, and in particular a Kantian analysis
of human dignity, has indeed become a fundamental theme in German
constitutional law.'72 Other old battles have been won by the forces of
change as well. In a famous 1958 case, known as the case of the Gentleman
Equestrian, it was finally held that money damages were permissible in
accordance with general principles of the protection of honor and human
dignity incorporated in the Basic Law. 73 This decision established at last
the possibility of money damages, and so of civil "personality" actions for
the redress of wounded honor.7 Most importantly for my tale, it marked an
historic break-though a remarkably late one-with some of the values of
aristocratic culture.
Nevertheless, despite many changes dating both to the Germany of
Hitler and to the Germany of Adenauer, honor and respect are still values
that originally sprang up somewhere outside our familiar world of general
equality; the basic grammar of German legal doctrine is still, in sundry and
169. Id. Axt. 5, § 2.
170. Since "personal honor" is still to be found in the Basic Law, German constitutionalists
continue to wrestle with some very old traditions in the laws of insult (and the law of personality)
in their efforts to find the right interpretive range for it. See, e.g., I BONNER KOMMENTAR ZUM
GRUNDGESEIT, supra note 122, at 127-37 (discussing personal honor by reference to the historic
law of insult and of personality).
171. For the difficulties, see Kfibler, supra note 49, at 543. For further discussion in the
leading literature, see HIRSCH, supra note 78, at 2-3.
172. See, e.g., Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, Die Menschenwilrde als Verfassungsbegriff, 40 JZ
201 (1985).
173. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 26, 349 (Urteil v.
14.2.1958, I ZR 151/56) (F.R.G.). For a full account, with discussion, see Edward J. Eberle,
Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in Gernman and American Constitutional Law, 1997
UTAH L. REV. 963, 1015; for continuing complaints that Germans remain too reluctant to award
money damages, see DOERING, supra note 45, at 123. Eerily similar facts appear in the well-
known opinion of Learned Hand in Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936).
174. For accounts of the state of German law, see Johannes Hager, Der Schutz der Ehre im
Zivilrecht, 196 ARCmv FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 168 (1996); and Hans D. Jarass,
Die Entwicklung des allgemeinen Persdnlichkeitsrechts in der Rechisprechung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in RECHT DER PERSONLICHKEIT 89, 103 (H.-U. Erichsen et al. ads.,
1996).
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sometimes strange ways, a grammar of the old language of social hierarchy.
The tenacity of that grammar is something that we can see both in the law
of insult generally and in the postwar history of hate-speech regulation
more narrowly. Let me now turn to each of those topics in turn.
To begin with the topic of insult: Of course, the German law of insult
has reached shores far from the old country of the eighteenth century.
Insults are no longer prototypically offenses offered to honor-conscious
aristocrats, who would regard the idea of money damages as shocking. But
the everyday law of insult, in its current shape, has not escaped its origins.
Quite the contrary. Achtung, "respect," remains the fundamental working
term of insult jurisprudence; and in its workings, it is not Kantian respect. If
Germans are no longer "polite from arrogance," as they perhaps still were
in the Nazi era, they remain legally polite according to forms that date from
eras of arrogance. Most strikingly, the remarkable strength of the dueling
tradition continues to show in the very substance of what is considered an
insult in German law. For, down to this day, the definition of the sorts of
substantive insults penalized under the law of insult is, to a startling extent,
still drawn directly from old dueling norms. In some cases, we hardly need
even consult the dueling literature to guess that this is so. One of the
standard examples of an insulting gesture, in German.75 analysis, is still the
Ohfeige-the box on the ear, or insulting slap--famous as a duelist's
gesture. It is presented, in current German doctrine, as an example of a
Tdtlichkeit, an aggravating act of physical violence. Tdtlichkeit is today a
somewhat out-of-the-way term that is seldom used in everyday German,76
but it had an established place in the literature of dueling. It is revealing to
quote our commentary again, this time on the topic of Tdtlichkeit, alongside
a passage from a standard nineteenth-century dueling manual. The modern
commentary reads as follows:
The statute introduces a qualification where the insult takes place
by means of a physical assault [mittels einer Tdtlichkeit], that is, an
effect directed immediately toward the body which, according to its
objective sense, expresses a particular lack of respect for the value
and worth of the affected person (for example, spitting, slapping,
cutting the hair, etc.). Since the basis of the qualification cannot be
an intrusion into the integrity of the body, but merely the
declaration of a particularly humiliating lack of respect for the
affected person, it is not necessary that there be any actual bodily
175. And Italian. See ALBERTO CRESPI ET AL., COMMENTARIO BREVE AL CODICE PiNALI
§ 594, at 1355 (1992) (discussing the treatment of lo schiaffo).
176. Although Mr. Nikolas Eschen observed to me, in a personal communication of October
28, 1999, that "Titlichkeit is often used in everyday German to describe intentional rudeness in a
sports game outside a play-action, like slapping the opponent, spitting on him or ... to walk on
somebody's knee."
1334 [Vol. 109: 1279
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1334 1999-2000
Enforcing Civility and Respect
touching .... Even a slap that fails to hit its target can be an insult
by means of physical assault, though not an immoral touching of
the body of another person, insofar as that touching does not take
place in a way that particularly diminishes the worth and valuation
of the affected person [soweit dies nicht in besonders
entwiirdigender Weise geschieht] .... '77
This passage carries remarkable echoes of the old duelists' notion of the
nature of insults. The old dueling literature was of course, for the most part,
less juristically developed than the passage just quoted, but its view of the
nature of human conflict was recognizably the same, as in the following
German example from 1896, which goes well beyond the Tdtlichkeit to
include all manner of insults:
One distinguishes three grades of insult. The first grade is insult
through words or writing, although this can also take place through
a hand movement, through a disparaging gesture, or through a
contemptuous sneer, when they are so understood by the parties.
A crude insult [eine Beschinpfiing] is regarded as an insult of
the second grade, whereas a blow, regardless of whether it is strong
or weak, whether it is made defensively, or by accident fails to
land, is characterized as an insult of the third grade.
Also in the category of insult of the third grade is the threat of a
coarse insult by means of physical assault [die Androhung einer
thdtlichen Beschinpfung], the accusation of having committed a
criminal act (fraud, theft, etc.), or the seduction of a family
member. 178
Remarkably much of the substance of this taxonomy survives, in one
place or another, in the modem law of insult, including both accusation of a
criminal offense and seduction of a family member.' 9 A lengthier account
of the concept of the dueling insult, taken from a recent secondary work,
gives a taste of how much the spirit of the dueling ethic lives on in the
contemporary jurisprudence of insult, if in a less irascible form:
A duel was possible only where there had been an insult, of which
there were three broad categories. The first classification was the
simple slight [or insult] (einfache Beleidigung), constituted by
impoliteness or inconsiderate behavior. The second level of insult
177. SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 54. § 185. at 1394. For a similar discussion, see 5
STRAFGESETZBUCH: LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR: GROBKOMMENTAR § 185.27 (Hanus-Heinrich
Jescheck et al. eds., 10th ed. 1989).
178. H. KuFAHL & J. SCHMIED-KOWARZIK, DUELLBUCH 213 (Leipzig, Wcberg 1896). For
the original French model of this three-grade division, see CHATAUVILLARD, supra note 108, at
11-12.
179. See supra notes 65, 78-79 and accompanying text.
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was cursing or attribution of shameful qualities, examples of which
might be calling someone an Esel (jackass) or Schwachkopf
(imbecile). A tertiary offense was gravest and was rendered through
a blow or a slap, the spectacular gauntlet-in-the-face falling under
this heading, although they were rarely that hammy. To merely
touch another's person qualified as a third-level offense, and if at a
masked ball you were goosed by a tipsy soldier demanding a beer,
the pinch that the Knigsberg lawyer Ernst Borchert found himself
in in 1896, a twenty-pace pistol duel with five exchanges was
hardly an overreaction, though the rascal was dead by four. The
violation of another's physical integrity was considered so
reprehensible that even a threatened blow was regarded as an
extreme offense, and so gentlemen would spare themselves the
exertion by stating simply: "Consider yourself slapped!" The
seduction or lewd touching of one's wife, daughter, sister, or other
female dependent, could constitute a "blow," and similar actions or
words that jeopardized one's entire moral being (as the phrase
usually went) were also aggravated third-level insults, amenable
only through bloodshed. 8'
Most of the wild excess of this world is gone of course-not least
because no one is still willing to risk death as a result of an insult. On the
other hand, it is disconcerting to acknowledge how many of these "dueling
insults" still potentially count as insults under current law, from the use of
the epithet Schwachkopf!, to the imputation of capacity to engage in
criminal acts, and on down. It is also disconcerting to acknowledge how
much of the calculus of whether those insults count as insults still depends
on whether they attribute "shameful qualities" or the like to their target.
It is disconcerting, moreover, to note that the very operative terms of
the modem-day law of insult remain dueling terms, held over without
change since the nineteenth century. Ehre itself-honor-is of course
regarded as the value protected by the statutory provision on insult
(although the statute itself does not mention the term); perhaps there is
nothing surprising in that. It is surely remarkable, though, that the law of
insult continues to revolve around acts that are ehrenrUhrig, that "sully the
honor," or that are Ehrenkriinkungen, "affronts to the honor." 81 Jurists no
longer use the old term satisfaktionsfidhig, "capable of giving satisfaction";
but in the law of collective insult, they still discuss the problem of whether
180. MCALEER, supra note 114, at 47.
181. For Ehrenkriinkungen of the police, see BayObLG [Bavarian Court of Appeals], NJW,
43 (1990), 921 (922) (F.R.G.). German law also still speaks of Krankungen, "affronts"-for
example with regard to Jews protected under hate-speech doctrine. See BVerfG [Federal
Constitutional Court), NJW, 47 (1994), 1779 (178 1) (F.R.G.) ("die kinkende Aullerung" ).
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this or that group is beleidigungsfdhig, "capable of being insulted." "s This
is, in fact, a remarkable development: Law that used to protect the
Satisfaktionsfdhigkeit of aristocrats now protects the Beleidigungsfdhigkeit
of Jews.
And at the heart, finally, of the conception of Beleidigung, of insult,
there still lies a kind of high-society concept of civility-a concept that
necessarily limits the reach of the German enforcement of respect. For
"civil" behavior, in the thought-world of the law of insult, remains the kind
of civility that was characteristic of upper-status behavior in centuries past:
It remains civility that revolves around the highly formalistic, often
thoroughly insincere, outward show of respect--even, as we have seen, in
the socially charged contexts of the treatment of women and Turks.
This brings me at last to the topic that has intrigued American
commentators the most: the rise of German hate-speech regulation. The
postwar tale of the German law of hate speech is indeed a striking one, for
this too is a body of law that has been marked by fifty years of troubled
struggle over the cultural and doctrinal legacy of the old law of honor-so
troubled that human dignity today threatens to vanish entirely as an
expressly protected value.
Where, then, did Germany's much-admired hate-speech regulation
come from? Over the first decade of the Federal Republic, hate-speech
regulation remained essentially' 3 a matter of insult law, founded on the
same § 185 of the Criminal Code that is invoked against Germans who
show "the bird" or call the wrong people du, and on the same requirement
of a private criminal prosecution. This was a body of law that had to be
refashioned somewhat to serve its new "hate-speech" function: Creating a
law of "collective" insult that covered Jews was a departure.'
Nevertheless, law of insult it remained, particularly in its focus on private
prosecution. '85 In the early years of postwar hate-speech regulation, the
burden thus fell upon an "insulted" Jew to bring a private prosecution, in
the classic way, to vindicate his wounded personal honor after he had been
shown disrespect.
A wave of anti-Semitic agitation in 1959-1960 led, however, to an
attempt to expand the conceptual range of the law. The classic analysis of
182. For the longest explanation of which groups qualify, see BGH. J7, 44 (1989), 644, (645)
(F.R.G.). The compound form "-fAtigkeit" is of course common in German legal parlance (e.g.,
§ 1 BGB: Recbtsfdhigkeit, § 104 BGB: Geschdftsunf'dhigkei; § 50 Zivilprozeordnung IZPO]:
Parteifdhigkeit). I do not mean to suggest that every instance in which it appears shows the
persistence of the concept of Satisfaktionsfdhigkeit. Nevertheless, the genetic connection between
Satisfaktionsfdhigkeit and Beleidigungsfdhigkeir seems to me clear.
183. In this brief discussion, I focus only on the principal provisions dealing with hate
speech. For a fuller account of the ensemble of laws applicable to acts that might be characterized
as "hate speech," see Kilbler, supra note 16, at 335.
184. See id at 341.
185. See Stein, supra note 16, at 831.
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the direct, demeaning show of outward disrespect by individuals did little to
deal with such evils as desecrated cemeteries. Such acts polluted the general
climate of dignity without representing any individual show of disrespect.
Accordingly, a new § 130, on Volksverhetzung, "inciting the populace to
hatred," was added to the repertoire of hate-speech provisions. This section,
which reworked an older provision on incitement to class conflict,
introduced two new concepts into the analysis of the hate-speech problem:
"public peace" and, in tune with the postwar times, "human dignity":
Whoever attacks the human dignity of others in a manner that tends
to disturb the public peace, by
(1) goading to hatred against segments of the population,
(2) demanding that violent or capricious measures be taken against
them, or
(3) verbally abusing [beschimpft] them, maliciously exposing them
to contempt, or slandering them,
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment from three months to
five years.186
The idea of protecting public peace drew on some intellectual sources
different from anything I have discussed in this Article. The idea of human
dignity (which the drafters introduced in order to avoid naming any specific
protected groups)' 87 might have been expected to guide the law of hate
speech into new paths, pushing postwar law forward into a new world of
dignitary thinking that would extend beyond the old culture of dueling, with
its focus on the individual show of disrespect for the personal honor of'
another.
Yet the history of § 130 StGB is a study in how deeply old patterns of
thought about honor could continue to dominate German legal thought,
despite all of the ambitions for a new law of human dignity. When the new
section was passed, jurists understood that it was intended to establish
human dignity as a different value alongside the honor protected by the law
of insult. 188 At the same time, they were thoroughly unsure what human
186. § 130 StGB. The section also covers printed materials that incite hatred, which I will not
discuss here.
187. See Franz Streng, Das Unrecht der Volksverhetzung, in FESTSCHIRIFT FOR KARL
LACKNER ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 501, 504 (Wilfried Kuper ed., n.d.).
188. See Josef Schafheutle, Das Sechste Strafrechtsainderungsgesetz, 15 JZ 470, 471 (1960).
Schafheutle writes,
Zwar haben die Gerichte auf Grund der bisherigen Strafvorschriften gegen
die Tater in den meisten Fallen auf Strafen erkennen krnnen, die Schwere des
Unrechts und der Schuld entsprachen. Sie waren dabei aber vielfach auf
die Beleidigungstatbestande angewiesen. Was sonst an Straftatbestinden noch in
Frage kam, wie die §§ 93, 140, 166, 303, 304 StGB und die §§ 4, 28 des
Versammlungsgesetzes, war nur zum Teil mit dern Sachverhalt in Deckung zu bringen,
konnte aber vor allem ebensowenig wie die Beleidigungsvorschriften den Kern des
Unrechts treffen, urn das es ging, namlich den Angriff auf die Menschlichkeit, die
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dignity could mean in practical terms. German constitutional scholars had
developed, in the 1950s, a powerful body of Kantian thought on the nature
of human dignity, which rested on subtle ideas of the distinction between
exchangeable "value" and non-exchangeable "dignity." "s These subtleties
did not seem practical to the drafters of the new hate-speech regulation of
§ 130; they felt the need to grasp at some more concrete conception."'
The tale of how they found their more concrete conception is a tale of
the strengths of the old social traditions and of the consequent weaknesses
of German hate-speech regulation: For, strange though it may seem, the
draftsmen drew their concrete conception of human dignity from military
law, a classic arena of honor-based thinking. In the wake of the horrors of
the Nazi period, the Federal Republic's military Codes of Conduct and of
Criminal Law had been amended to include provisions on "human
dignity." Foreigners will assume that these provisions aimed to prevent a
repetition of Nazi atrocities,' but in fact their principal aim was different.
German legislators wanted to guarantee the dignity of Germans, ensuring
that they would be treated as citizen-soldiers, and not as underlings. The
following language was the result:
Military Code of Conduct [Soldatengesetz] § 11. Obedience.
(1) A soldier must obey his commanding officers....
Disobedience is not present, when an order is not followed that
injures human dignity ....
Menschenwiirde und den allgemeinen Rechtsffieden, den es dagegen zu vcrteidigen
gait, daB sich Ausbriche des Hasses und der Intoleranz gegen einzelne Gruppcn von
Mitbtirgern richteten.
To be sure, courts were able to impose punishments against nmalefactors on the
basis of previous criminal provisions that corresponded to the gravity of the evil and to
the guilt of the deed. They were frequently thrown upon the law of insult, however. As
for other criminal law that came into question, such as §§ 93, 140. 166. 303, 304 StGB
and §§ 4, 28 of the law on public assemblies: Those provisions could only partly cover
the facts of the cases, and above all they were as little able as the law of insult to strike
at the core of the evil, namely, the attack on humanity, on human dignity, and the
general public peace, which had to be protected against outbreaks of hatred and
intolerance directed against groups of fellow citizens.
Id. Jurists also, importantly, took human dignity to be a liniting principle in the jurisprudence of
§ 130, specifying a sub-class of cases within those that threatened public peace. See Lohse, supra
note 65, at 1677. Even as a limiting principle, human dignity should theoretically have been able
to serve as the basis of a new jurisprudence.
189. For the influence of Kant on value and dignity, see the discussion and assessment of the
ideas of Ginter Dtlrig in Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum. Die Afenschenwllrde als Verfassungsbegriff.
40 JZ 201,205 (1985).
190. See Streng, supra note 187, at 504-05.
191. See, e.g., Craig R. Whitney, As the Battlegrounds Shift, the Draft Fades in Europe, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1999, at 3 (treating these provisions as determining when it is -correct" for
soldiers to disobey orders, rather than when it is permitted).
192. § 11 SoldatenG. Gehorsam.
(1) Der Soldat muB seinen Vorgesetzten gehorchen....
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Military Criminal Code [Wehrstrafgesetz] § 22. Binding force of an
order; Mistake.
(1) [Disobedience] is not illegal, if the order is not binding, in
particular if it ... injures human dignity .... 93
Military Criminal Code [Wehrstrafgesetz] § 31. Treatment that
dishonors soldiers [Entwilrdigende Behandlung].
(1) Whoever intentionally treats a subordinate in a way that
dishonors him. . . shall be punished by imprisonment or
punitive arrest of no less than two weeks." 4
What did these new provisions mean? Their setting was the interaction
between two individuals, the commanding officer and soldier, against the
background of centuries of traditions requiring soldierly respect. Inevitably,
therefore, the new provisions were understood as guaranteeing the
individual show of respect. Indeed, "human dignity" in all three provisions
was interpreted in a way that assimilated the "inhumane" order to a
demeaning insult "sullying the honor": "An order injures human dignity if
it encroaches ... deeply on the sphere of rights of the subordinate, on his
honor, his status in the eyes of the world [Ansehen], his military position,
his health, his life, his financial existence, etc... ." , "An order wounds
human dignity if it damages the dignity of the person receiving it or of a
third party." 96 " Treatment that dishonors a soldier consists in behavior that
consciously and seriously injures the human and soldierly dignity or the
sense of honor [die menschliche und soldatische Wiirde oder das
Ehrgefiihl] of the soldier.... Treatment dishonoring a soldier thus includes
coarse insults [die grobe Beleidigung] . . . ." "'
In these commentaries, the value of "human dignity" was more or less
smoothly melded into the value of honorable interaction. The primary arena
of "dignity" was understood to be the world of one-on-one contact between
officer and soldier-the classic arena of interpersonal interaction in which
questions of "personal honor" had always presented themselves. Bizarrely
enough, it was in this military law, so remote from the thought-world of
Ungehorsam liegt nicht vor, wenn ein Befehl nicht befolgt wird, der die
Menschenwtrde verletzt ....
193. § 22 WStG. Verbindlichkeit des Befehls Irrtum.
(1) In den Fallen der §§ 19 bis 21 handelt der Untergeben nicht rechtswidrig, wenn
der Befehl nicht verbindlich ist, insbesondere wenn er... die Menschenwtlrde
verletzt ....
194. § 31 WStG. Entwurdigende Behandlung.
(I) Wer vorsttzlich einen Untergebenen entwilrdigend behandelt... wird mit
Gefllngnis oder mit Strafarrest nicht unter zwei Wochen bestraft.
195. MARTIN RiTrAU, SOLDATENGESETZ: KOMMENTAR 116 (1957).
196. HERBERT ARNDT, GRUNDRISS DES WEHRSTRAFRECHTS 191 (2d ed. 1966).
197. Id. at 220. This passage did try to deepen the concept of human dignity by associating it
with what separates men from animals.
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everyday race relations, that the drafters of the new hate-speech law of
1959-1960 thought they found practical content for their doctrine.""8
The military model did not, of course, dictate all of the subsequent
development of hate-speech law. Nevertheless, jurists continued to think of
the human dignity question in the way that commentators on military law
did: The paradigmatic violation of dignity remained, in their minds, the
demeaning show of disrespect offered by one person to another. The result
was some noticeable, and sometimes distressing, limitations on the reach of
German hate-speech legislation. As a leading critic of the jurisprudence of
§ 130 would complain twenty-five years later, the habit of looking to
military law, and more generally to old-style ideas of personal honor, rather
than to the great ideals of the constitution, survived.'" One consequence
was the reasoning in the notorious problem I mentioned above: The
problem of the tavern-keeper who posts a "No Turks Allowed" sign. To
German. judges accustomed to traditional concepts of honor, the question,
even under § 130, was necessarily whether such signs offered an intentional
insult-whether they unambiguously gave the show of disrespect: "Since
the slogans on these signs do not make it clear why Turks cannot enter the
establishment, it cannot be determined whether Turks, in these signs, are
declared to be less valuable members of the community or whether their
right to life within the community is being challenged." '
Signs that read "No Turks Allowed" would seem, to almost any
American, to flout fundamental norms of equal access, regardless of the
intent of the person posting them."0 Yet German judges were able to see
these signs differently because they thought of dignity as something that
was paradigmatically wounded when one person openly expressed his lack
of respect to another. To the mind of the court, there had, in effect, to be
198. See Streng, supra note 187, at 505. These reforms play a role in German popular
consciousness, as reflected in a recent novel about the Turkish experience in Germany. The scene
here is laid in a military camp. Strikingly enough, it shows some of the same old sensitivity to
bodily touching that characterized the old world of dueling: "'Darf ich Sic Anfassen?' fragte einer
der Unteroffiziere. Ein Vorgesetzer durfte nur durch den Inhalt seiner Befehle Gewalt
anwenden-flir direkte Berirungen brauchte er eine Erlaubnis. Es hing mit den
Menschenrechten zsammen. '.May I touch you?' asked one of the N.C.O.'s. A superior was
only allowed to apply force through the content of his orders-for direct bodily contact, he needed
permission. It was a human rights thing." STEN NADOLNY, SELIM ODER DIE GABE DER REDE 60
(1990).
199. See Lohse, supra note 65, at 1678.
200. ld. These same standards made their way into the scholarly commentary on § 130:.
An attack on human dignity [for purposes of § 130 StGB] is present only when that
attack is directed not just against the discrete rights of personality (for example, honor),
but also when it touches a human being in the core of his personality, by presenting that
human being, in disregard [Mi3achrung] of the principle of equality, as of lesser value
[untenvertig], and contesting his right to life in the community.
SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 54, § 130, at 1107.
201. Contrast this with the discussion of American tort law infra note 326 and accompanying
text.
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something like an old duelists' encounter-some act by which one person
intentionally failed to make the outward show of respect to another-before
the statute could be brought into play. Hate-speech regulation was
accordingly not construed to require a general climate that guaranteed
minorities an equal sense of dignity; it was understood as something like a
more "humane" and philosophical law of insult. This left little room for a
law of hate speech that would address itself to the deeper structure of social
relations-indeed, no room even for a law of hate speech that would require
tavern-keepers to take down signs excluding Turks.
Personal honor thus continued to set the tone for human dignity. That is
not to say that German hate-speech legislation achieved nothing. It is only
to say that, in building a law of human dignity, German lawyers had to
work in the way that lawyers work: with the materials that their social
traditions provide. The result, though, was a problem that has not gone
away. German jurists still have not found a way to craft a concept of human
dignity in hate speech that fully transcends inherited concepts of personal
honor, and indeed seem to have lost the thread of human dignity entirely. In
1985, dissatisfaction with § 130 led to another round of statutory revision.
This dissatisfaction had to do with the group that remains, in practice, the
principal beneficiary of German hate-speech law: the Jewish community. It
was unhappiness with the failure of courts to punish the "Auschwitz lie"
that stimulated a redrafting of the Criminal Code. This time, though, the
drafters concentrated simply on § 185, the old provision on insult. Their
strategy was to eliminate the requirement that a private prosecution be
brought in order for an insult action to succeed.2 ' Thus, the law of insult
made its way once again into the heart of hate-speech legislation. The
Auschwitz lie problem, however, did not vanish. Continued distress at the
failure of courts to punish adequately the Auschwitz lie led to yet another
revision in 1994, this time of § 130. This last revision, however, largely
eliminated human dignity, transforming the provision into one primarily
turning on "public peace." 
20 3
What the future will bring is, of course, hard to say. For the moment,
though, the tale of German hate speech is a tale of unsuccessful efforts to
leave interpersonal honor behind and to enter a new legal world of social
dignity. The logic, and to a large extent the law, of insult continue to form
the socio-legal basis of German hate-speech regulation: The
Beleidigungsfdhigkeit of late-twentieth-century Jews, to say it again,
remains largely the descendant of the Satisfaktionsfidhigkeit of nineteenth-
century aristocrats.
202. For a detailed description, see Stein, supra note 16, at 857-66.
203. See the account, with a translation of the new version of § 130, in Kubler, supra note 16.
at 344-46.
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The history of this descent of dignity, from aristocrats to Jews, is a
history, I would like to note, that gives the lie to two of the deepest and
most pessimistic commentators on German affairs: Friedrich Nietzsche and
Max Weber. Nietzsche thought that aristocratic "rights" could never be
successfully generalized in a democratic society. 0' He was wrong; what has
happened in Germany is precisely that aristocratic rights have been
generalized. Weber addressed the question of the "democratization" of
aristocratic values in 1917, in the midst of World War I, at a time when
social hierarchy remained firmly rooted in Germany. As he saw it then,
aristocratic patterns of behavior could sometimes spread down through the
social ranks in modem societies: "Beyond question, a true aristocracy can
impress its ideal of noble behavior on an entire population. For the plebeian
classes imitate aristocratic 'gestures."'" 05 Yet he denied that anything quite
like that could happen in Germany. He believed that German
Satisfaktionsfdhigkeit was a concept that could never be democratized. 6
Weber, too, was wrong. Satisfaktionsfdhigkeit has been democratized late
in the twentieth century, and indeed has become the Beleidigungsfdhigkeit
204. See FRIEDRICH NIE'zsCHE, Jenseits von Gut und Bese, in 3 WERKE: 660. para. 202
(Karl Schlechta ed., 1984) (describing anarchists and socialists as -cins im zahn Widerstande
gegen jeden Sonder-Anspruch, jedes Sonder-Recht und Vorrecht (das heiBt im letzten Grunde
gegenjedes Recht: denn dann, wenn alle gleich sind, braucht niemand mchr 'Rechte')") ("united
in bitter resistance against every special claim, every special right and privilege (that is to say, in
the last analysis, against every right: For when all are equal, nobody needs 'rights' any longer")).
For Nietzsche specifically on the process of the diffusion of civility, taking a version of what
I will call the Hume line, see infra notes 366-370 and accompanying text. See also FRiEDRICH
NIETzscHE, MENSCHLICHES, ALLZUMENSCHLICHES. EIN BucH FOR FREIE GEISTER 164-65, para.
250 (Augsburg Goldmann 1981) (2d ed. 1886).
Manieren-Die guten Manieren verschwinden in dem Mage, in welchem der EinfluB
des Hofes und einer abgeschlossenen Aristokratie nachllllt .... Solite cs aber mit den
Manieren immerfort bergab gehen? Es scheint mir vielmehr, daB die Manieren cinc
tiefe Kurve machen nd wir uns ihrem niedrigsten Stande nllhem. Wenn erst die
Gesellschaft ihrer Absichten und Prinzipien sicherer geworden ist. so daB diesc
formnbildend wirken (widhrend jetzt die angelemten Manieren frilherer formen-bildender
Zustinde immer schw~icher vererbt and angelent werden). so wird es Manicren des
Umgangs, Geb~irden und Ausdriicke des Verkehrs geben. welche so notwendig und
schlicht natfirlich erscheinen mtissen, als es diese Absichten und Prinzipien sind.
Manners-Good manners disappear to the degree that the influence of a court and a
closed aristocracy declines .... But is it the case that manners should continue to go
downhill forever? It seems to me, rather, that manners are declining in a curve, whose
lowpoint we are approaching. Once society becomes more sure of its aims and
principles, those aims and principles will create forms that correspond to them. (By
contrast, the manners that we are taught now are the product of earlier circumstances,
which created their own forms; those manners are inherited and learned in ever weaker
ways.) In the future, there will be everyday manners, gestures, and expressions in
intercourse that seem as inevitable and natural as society's aims and principles
themselves.
Id.
205. MAX WEBER, Waldrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland, in GESAMMELTE POITIsCHE
ScHR*-rEN 270 (3d ed. 1958).
206. See id. at 271-72 (contrasting the "democratizability" of French and German aristocratic
patterns with the non-democratizability of Satisfaktionsfdhigkeit).
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of ethnic and cultural minorities-most especially of Jews, who once upon
a time tried unsuccessfully to defend their honor by inducing others to duel
with them.2"o
The net consequence is that Germany has what we conspicuously lack
in the United States: a true law of insult, founded in the protection of honor.
The assumptions of an old aristocratic world have been translated into a
democratic idiom.08
What should one say about this? The outlines of the legal history are
clear enough: The law of insult, as it exists today, includes a number of
more or less Roman elements, and a number of elements that are purely the
confections of German legal thought. Still and all, what the law of insult
represents is, in most regards, a large-scale generalization of dueling norms
throughout German society. After a century and a half of development, the
right to take offense, a right once confined to the "higher circles" of
society, has become a right that belongs to all Germans.209 That does not
mean that ordinary Germans perceive themselves as dueling aristocrats. The
development is not one that is present to the minds of ordinary people.
Nevertheless, it is a development that does seem to matter for the
explanation of German law. In some ways, Germany does seem to have
seen a leveling up-an extension of aristocratic norms throughout what
were once "lower" orders of society, and that is a phenomenon that calls
for analytic discussion.
V. THE FATE OF INSULT IN FRANCE
In different ways, the same phenomenon can be found in France.
French law also has an attachment to honor, and the French system, like the
German, is correspondingly less solicitous of freedom of speech than is the
American. Moreover, France, too, has a law of insult, historically connected
with old-regime hierarchical forms; and in France, as in Germany, the law
of insult forms the foundation of what, to some Americans, seems an
admirable program for the regulation of hate speech. Nevertheless, taken as
207. Compare the episode in which Moritz Itzig tried, unsuccessfully, to draw Achim von
Arnim into a duel that would establish the "Satisfaktionsfplhigkeit" of Jews, described in
DEBORAH HERTZ, JEWISH HIGH SOCIETY IN OLD REGIME BERLIN 258-59 (1988). For similar
duels over Jewish honor in late-19th-century France, see NYE, supra note 119, at 205-10.
208. It is also important to observe that legal insults, like duels, happen overwhelmingly
between status-equals. For insults, see DOERING, supra note 45, at 19-20; for duels, see NYE,
supra note 119, at 167, which elegantly argues that the status equality of dueling culture laid the
foundation for new forms of French equality in the 19th century. See also FREVERT, supra note
91, at 83 (noting the resistance to the idea that "lower" orders could duel).
209. In offering this interpretation, I should note that I differ from Professor KUbler. who
argues that in modern society the concerns of free speech have come to trump old concerns of
honor. See Kiibler, supra note 49. His argument may largely hold true of the law of defamation. I
do not think it holds true of the law of insult narrowly understood, as regulated by § 185 StOB.
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a whole, the French law of civility is different from the German in revealing
ways.
First of all, the narrow law of insult in France has today shrunk to
almost total insignificance. Nonpublic insults-the classic dueling insults
that are the main target of the German law of insult-are punishable only in
summary police proceedings in France. In order for an insult to get into a
French court of law, it must injure both honor and reputation. Only
defamatory insults are matters for the "law," matters entitled to full-scale
adjudication. Correspondingly, there is no legal culture of insult of the
German kind in France. The state of this French law is my topic in this
Part V.
But the French tale only begins with the decline of the law of insult.
The decline of the law of insult has been accompanied, in France, by the
rise of a culture of social norms of politeness. France today is the very
model of a society in which matters of civility are governed not by law but
by social norms-though, as we shall see, those social norms themselves
have a remarkably lawlike flavor, and indeed are partly descended from
one-time legal norms. The rise of this culture of distinctly legalistic social
norms of politeness is my subject in Part VI.
To begin, then, with the law: There is, to be sure, still a law of insult on
the books in France, just as there is in Germany. Indeed, the early history of
the French law of insult reads much like the early history of the German
law of insult. The French government was the most vigorous of early
modem Europe in its efforts to force duelists to come into court.20 As in
Germany, it was a consequence of the monarchy's campaign that French
thinking about the law of insult was perforce connected with thinking about
the problem of dueling.21' As in Germany, too, the law of insult was
connected with larger questions of status and deference. In eighteenth-
210. The general history is recounted in BI.LACOIS, supra note 104. at 95-111, 175-88.
French legislation of the early modem period is conveniently reproduced in CHATAUVU.LARD,
supra note 108, at 135-87, 219-482. As part of its program, the monarchy set out to induce
aristocrats whose pride had been wounded to litigate rather than fight. To this end, the monarchy
established special "Courts of Honor" to adjudicate disputes. See Edit du Roi, Portant Raglement
gdndral sur les Duels, Aug. 1679, art. 5, reprinted in CHATAUVLLARD, supra note 108, at 162.
For the beginnings of this, see BILLAcois, supra note 104, at 102. This program was, however,
notoriously unsuccessful: Aristocrats refused to come to court. Indeed, their refusal provided a
basis for the development of French social thought; figures like Montesquieu and Rousseau tried
to explain why honor mattered so much, and why affairs of honor were not affairs of law.
211. See, e.g., Code Pdnal ou Recueil des Principales Ordonnances, Edits et Dclarations. sur
les Crimes et Ddlits, avec un Essai sur l'esprit & les motifs de la Procddure Criminelle, Ttre
XXXVI: Des injures et des libelles diffamatoires, at cxlviii n. I (Paris, Chez Saillant & Desaint 3d
ed. 1765); see also Seconde partie, Texte des ordonnances, Edits & Ddclarations. Titre XXXVI:
Des injures et des libelles diffamatoires, Charles IX Ai Saint Germain en Laye, en Janvier 1561.
art. XIII, at 247-48 (cross-referencing discussion of" insult" with discussion of dueling).
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century French doctrine, the law of insult naturally presupposed distinctions
between persons according to their "quality.", 
2 2
For a time in the late eighteenth century, moreover, it looked as though
the French law of insult might develop along the same path as the German
law of insult. By the late years of the ancien rigime, French authors had
already begun to flirt with the critical idea that all persons, and not just
aristocrats, were entitled to a legal claim for vindication of their honor. The
idea of equality of honor before the law was particularly widespread in the
last years before the Revolution.213 Social attitudes began to change, too, at
212. See, e.g., I FRANCOIS SERPILLON, CODE CRIMINEL, OU COMMENTAIRE SUR
L'ORDONNANCE DE 1670, at 368 (Lyon, Perisse 1767) ("La qualit6 de celui qui insulte, & celle de
Ia personne insultde, peuvent rendre les injures simples ou graves; le lieu, le temps & autres
circonstances, aggravent l'injure, ou la diminuent .... ) ("The quality of the insulter, and of the
person insulted, can render insults simple or serious; the place, time, and other circumstances.
aggravate the insult, or mitigate it .... ). Compare the Hannoverian statute, quoted supra note
118, for the continuing vitality of these ideas in Germany down into the middle of the 19th
century. Serpillon's text generally provides an overview of 18th-century French procedures in
cases of insult. See 1 SERPILLON, supra, at 368-78.
213. Thus, one 1781 author argued that the system of Courts of Honor, developed to deal
with dueling aristocrats, should be extended, so that there would be Courts of Honor for every
level of society. Jacques Vincent M. de la Croix, Rdflexions Philosophiques sur I'oigine de In
Civilisation, Et sur les moyens de remddier aux abus qu'elle entraine tome 2, no. I, at 10
(Amsterdam, Belin 1781) ("II seroit peut-6tre A ddsirer qu'un autre Tribunal 6rigd dans le mme
esprit, dtendit son empire sur tous les Membres du Tiers-Etat .... ) ("It would perhaps be
desirable that a court established in the same spirit have jurisdiction over all members of the Third
Estate .... ); id. at 16 ("[Je ne verrois pas d'impossibilit6 A driger dans toutes les Villes
principales du Royaume un Tribunal Moral.") ("It does not seem impossible to me to establish a
Court of Morality in the all the principal towns of the kingdom."). A leading criminal law text of
1780 opined that the deep attachment to honor in France meant that all persons must count as free
"citizens":
Le caract~re dominant de notre Nation est, comme 'on sqait, une extrame ddlicatcsse
sur le point d'honneur: drlicatesse qui a pris vraisemblablement sa source dans cette
maxime de notre Droit Franqois, qui ne souffre point d'esclavage dans cc Royaume, &
qui veut qu'en naissans sujets du Roi, nous naissions tous libres & citoyens.
The dominant character of our nation is, as is well known, an extreme delicacy with
regard to the point of honor. This delicacy probably has its source in the maxim of
French law, which refuses to suffer any slavery to exist in this kingdom, and which
wills that, having been born subjects of the King, we should all be born free, and
citizens.
MUYART DE VOUGLANS, LEs Loix CRIMINELLES DE FRANCE, DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL 832
(Paris, Barrois 1783) (citation omitted). For an earlier statement by a non-lawyer, see MONSIEUR
DE [CHAMPDEVAUX], L'HONNEUR, CONSID8Rt EN LuI-MME, ET RELATIVEMENT AU DUEL 86
(Paris, Pierre-Alexandre le Prieur 1752) ("L'Honneur, quoiqu'en disc le pr6jugd, est de tous les
dtats de la vie .. ") ("Honor, whatever inherited prejudice may say to the contrary, is the
possession of all statuses of life .... ). Even the standard text on the law of insult. Dareau's Droit
des Injures, made the same point, a bit more tentatively, in 1775. See F. DAREAU. TRAITP, Dt.S
INJURES DANS L'ORDRE JUDICIAIRE 291 (Paris, Prault 1775). To be sure, Dareau did not set out to
upset the entire hierarchical social structure of pre-Revolutionary France. Nevertheless, it was a
major goal of his book to argue that all insults belonged in court. The logic that applied to
aristocratic dueling applied throughout society: For just as aristocrats had to be brought into court
so that they would not do violence, so others had to be brought into court so that they would not
do violence. Dareau wrote of les gens du peuple, "people of no particular social standing":
Si un juge ne consultoit que les iddes qu'on peut avoir des disputes entre gens de cette
esp~ce, il seroit presque toujours tent6 de les renvoyer hors du Cour & du procs. Mais
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least in the urban forcing ground of Paris: Studies of the late eighteenth
century suggest that low-status Parisians, unlike rural contemporaries from
the south of France, believed that their honor should be vindicated against
insult.24 The same idea continued to find promoters after the Revolution
began, too-some of them of a wondrous and charming Revolutionary
utopianism.
215
Nevertheless, no such scheme was realized. To be sure, there was, as a
number of scholars have observed, a kind of "nationalization" of honor
il doit faire attention que les injures entr'eux sont de consdquence. & qu'aussi-tot
qu'elles demeurent impunies, elles am nent A des voies de fait souvent tr.s-funestes.
If a judge consulted only prevailing notions about disputes between people of this ilk.
he would almost always be tempted to throw out the case. But one must be mindful of
the fact that insults between these people are of consequence, and that as soon as they
go unpunished, they lead to often deadly acts of violence.
DAREAu, supra, at 291. For another example, see I M. THORILLON. IDtES SUR .ES LOix
CRIMINELLES 64 (Paris, Belin 1788):
Mais si je propose de substituer aux duels rnparations honn tes. telles que l'excuse
devant les personnes t6moins de l'offense, je ne proposerai jamais, comme le fait M.
Vermeil .... des r6parations distingu6es pour les uns: les Roturiers en allant chez les
Nobles ....
But if I propose to substitute reparations of good will for duels, such as an apology
made before the witnesses of the offense. I would never propose, as M. Vermeil
does.... different sorts of reparations for different people, with commoners required to
present themselves to nobles ....
The passage he attacks here is Frangois-Michel Vermeil, Essai sur les Rformes dfaire dans notre
Lgislation Criminelle 115 (Paris, Demonville 1781), which proposes that a commoner who has
insulted a nobleman be compelled to go personally to his victim to apologize in a public
ceremony, while a nobleman who has insulted a commoner be permitted to make his apology
before a notary and witnesses. For the special dishonorability of being compelled to visit another
person, see James Q. Whitman, The Seigneurs Descend to the Rank of Creditors: The Abolition of
Respect, 1790, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 249 (1994). For imitation of aristocratic manners among
the lower orders in the late 18th century, see YVEs CASTAN. HONNf-TErt Er RELATONS
SOCIALES EN LANGUEDOC (1715-1780), at 17-18 (1974).
214. See GARRIOCH, supra note 32, at 37-38 (contrasting his findings for Paris with those of
CASTAN, supra note 213, at 260-61).
215. In 1791, for example, a certain P.C. Nioche published a Motion avec Projet de Loi sur le
Duel et sur les injures et voies defait entre Citoyens [Motion with Proposed Law on Dueling, and
on Insults and Assaults Between Citizens] [voies de fair--the French equivalent of Tltlichkeitl.
This was a text that reviewed the long French tradition of punishing insults offered to and within
the dueling classes, only to insist that, in the new order. "every citizen who. by words or writing.
seeks to humiliate, degrade or abase another citizen" was to be subject to punishment under a
Revolutionary law of insult. See P.C. NIOCHE. MOTION AVEC PROJET DE LOI SUR LE DUEL, Er
SiR LES INJURES ET VOtES DE FAIT ENTRE CITOYENS 50-60 (Paris. Provost 1791): see also
[Target] Projet de Code Criminel, Correctionnel et de Police. Prsentds par la Commission
Nomm6e par le Gouvemement, at xvii (n.p. 1801) (expressing nostalgia for honor and shame
societies by stating, "Heureux ... les peuples oi la honte scule, la perte de l'honneur et de la
consid6ration, Ia crainte de rencontrer dans les yeux de ses concitoyens des signcs de mpris ou
d'une opinion d6favorable, sont une punition redoutde.") ("Happy ... those peoples among
whom shame alone, the loss of honor and esteem, the fear of discovering signs of contempt or of
an unfavorable opinion in the eyes of their fellow citizens, are a dreaded punishment."): id. at
xxxiii (proposing, inter alia, that acquitted defendants receive a medal inscribed "Innocence
reconnue par la loi" ("Innocence recognized by the law") as a "tdmoignage d'honneur"
("testimonial of honor")); id. at 3 (describing shaming inscriptions on the tombstones of
criminals).
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over the course of Revolution, as all Frenchmen were accorded a share in
honor as long as they fought for the fatherland.1 6 In revolutionary France,
as in Nazi Germany and perhaps almost everywhere, when honor became a
common possession of all, it did so under the banner more of nationalism
than of liberalism. But there was no parallel generalization of honor in the
law. Proposals to include a "right to honor" in the 1789 Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen failed.17 Some radicals aimed at an
egalitarianism of honor,218 but the term "honor" itself was so strongly
associated with the old order that Jacobins tended rather to speak of
replacing "feudal honor" with "virtue. 2 19
Only once the Jacobins were gone did the time come for insult
legislation. But when that time came, it turned out to be a time, not for a
new glorification of the law of insult, but for its harsh diminution.
Legislators, perhaps still leery of something associated with the aristocratic
world of dueling, produced a law that severely downgraded insult. In
1796, the government of the Directorate produced a Code of Crimes and
Punishments.22' This Code declared a hodgepodge of offenses to be matters
of "mere police," to be dealt with summarily before police tribunals
without recourse to ordinary courts of law. Among these offenses were
"verbal insults."2 '' This led to at least one bitter complaint from a
commentator who saw the Revolution as having given citizens whose honor
had been wounded no recourse-and this, he said, despite numerous efforts
216. See GEOFFREY BEST, HONOUR AMONG MEN AND NATIONS 18-36 (1982); GEORGE
KELLEY, Dueling in Eighteenth Century France, in THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 251-53 (1980);
Norman Hampson, La Patrie, in THE POLMCAL CULTURE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 125,
134-36 (Colin Lucas ed., 1988); Hampson, supra note 151, at 211-12.
217. See BEIGNIER, supra note 13, at 86. For examples, see STIPHANE RIALS, LA
DtCLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN 608 (1988) (setting forth a draft proposal
of Target safeguarding "[l]a vie de l'homme, son corps, sa libertd, son honneur" ). For proposals
of Siey~s safeguarding the right of every citizen to defend "sa vie, son honneur, & sa propridtd,"
see id. at 618. For a proposal holding that punishment must never reflect "de rang, d'dtat, ou de
fortune" of the accused, see id. at 623. For an anonymous proposal safeguarding "existence ...
libertd... propridtd ... HONNEUR," see id. at 630.
218. For a discussion of the efforts of the sans-culottes to eliminate respectful greetings on
the street, see SYLVIE WELL, TRisORS DE LA POLrrESSE FRANQAISE 7 (1983).
219. See NYE, supra note 119, at 33 (quoting Mercier and Robespierre).
220. Heavily concerned with reestablishing order, this Code focused on court structure and
the regulation of the police. See Code des Ddlits et Peines du 3 Brumaire, An IV (1796), in
BULLETIN DES LOIS, S~rie 1, Tome 6, Livre I, §§ 16-25 (regulating the police); Livre II, §§ 150-
166 (establishing police tribunals); cf Loi sur la police intdrieure des communes de la Rdpublique
du 10 Venddmiaire, An IV (1796) (regulating police control of localities).
221. See Code des D6lits et Peines du 3 Brumaire, An IV, § 605, no. 7 ("[Sont punis de
peines de simple police] [lies auteurs d'injures verbales, dont il n'y a pas de poursuite par Ia voie
criminelle."). Since the Revolutionaries had never defined what "injures verbales" might be
subject to "poursuite par la voie criminelle," the meaning of the phrase is unclear. Presumably the
phrase was effectively without meaning. See the description of the application of this law in
SCIPION BEXON, PARALLPELE DU CODE PNAL D'ANGLETERRE AVEC LES Lois PItNALES
FRAN(;AISES 238-44 (Paris, Fauvelle & Sagnier, An VIII 1800).
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to introduce insult legislation."' Such complaints had no effect; the drift of
French legislation was set. Under the definitive criminal code of the
Napoleonic period, the Code Penal of 1810, most expressions of contempt
were once again declared to be matters for the police-not "crimes" but
"contraventions." Only a narrow class of public or published "insults" -
really cases of defamation, not insult-were to be considered crimes, and
even those insults carried only a fine.tm Aristocratic honor just did not
222. See BEXON, supra note 221, at 238-39:
Cependant, il n'existe point encore parmi nous deptis la rdvolution. de lois contre le
calomniateur, quoique cette question importante ait dtd prnsentdc plusieurs fois au corps
Idgislatif et que j'aye entendu y r~pondre que ces lois dtoient faites et que de nouveles
6toient inutiles; du moins, je n'en connais aucune ....
Le Code des ddlits et des peines du 3 brumaire an 4. est la scule loi qui parle dc la
calomnie; mais elle ne s'applique que sur la calomnie ou les injures verbales dont il n'y
a pas de poursuites par la voie criminelle; et elle en attribue la connoissance aux
tribunaux de police municipale .... A l'dgard des injures ou des calomnies dcrites, j'ai
vu sans cesse les citoyens qui en dtoient l'objet ne savoir o" en demander la rdpamtion
et ola pouvoir l'obtenir.
Enfin, aprbs avoir long-temps cherchd les moyens d'en obtenir justice... on a ditd
rdduit a recourir t des demandes en rdparations civiles. en recherchant les anciennes
lois et en les invoquant contre les calomniateurs.
Meanwhile, since the Revolution, there do not exist, among us, laws against defamers
and insulters, even though this important question has been presented to the legislative
body several times, and though I have heard it said that laws of this kind had been made
and new ones were of no use; in any case, I do not know of any ....
The Code of crimes and punishments of 3 Brumaire An 4 is the only law that
speaks of defamation and insult; but it applies only to defamation or verbal insults
which cannot be prosecuted by means of criminal law; and it accords jurisdiction to
municipal police tribunals .... With regard to insults and written defamations, I have
constantly witnessed citizens who have been the targets of such insults and defamations
not knowing where to seek reparation and how to go about obtaining it.
Finally, after having searched long for ways of obtaining justice. . . people have
been reduced to seeking civil damages, by digging up old laws and invoking them
against their defamers and insulters.
Honor, long regarded as the most precious possession of every Frenchman, was no longer
important enough to merit full-scale litigation in courts of law. For the commonplace that honor
was most precious, see, for example, VOUGLANS, supra note 213, at 209 (" '[D]'un commun
accord,' on dit que l'honneur est 'prdfdrable A tous les biens de la vie.") (" [fit is universally
agreed that honor is preferable to all goods in life.").
223. See CODE PtNAL, EDrTON CONFORM A L'EDmoN ORIGINALE DOU BULLETIN DES Lois
Livre lI, Titre II, Chapitre I (Paris, Garndry 1810):
375. Quant aux injures ou aux expressions outrageantes qui ne renferment
l'imputation d'aucun fait prdcis, mais celle d'un vice ddtermind. si ces ont dtd
profdrdes dans des lieux ou des rdunions publiques. ou insdrdes dans des dcrits
imprimds ou non, qui auraient dtd rdpandus et distribuds, la peine sera une
amende de seize francs A cinq cent francs.
376. Toutes autres injures ou expressions outrageantes qui n'auront pas eu cc double
caract&e de gravitd et de publicitd, ne donneront lieu qu'A des peines de simple
police.
377. [insults proffered in the course of litigation]
378. [dissemination of confidential medical information]
375. With regard to insults or gross and outrageous expressions that do not include the
imputation of any precise fact, but do include the imputation of a particular vice.
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matter enough in Revolutionary France to be of concern in the law. In fact,
the real concern for "honor" in the 1810 Code lay elsewhere: Committed to
maintaining government authority, the Code included a special provision
protecting police officers and government officials from insults "tending to
inculpate their honor or their dglicatesse."224 Insult law was more a matter
of protecting the police against the public than of guaranteeing redress for
wounded honor.
These Revolutionary enactments essentially created the French law of
insult as it exists down to this day: The Revolution pushed the French law
of insult into the category of a mere "police" infraction-one, moreover,
largely aimed at protecting the honor, not of ordinary citizens, but of
the police themselves. Post-Revolutionary developments never restored
the French law of insult to its old glory. Honor, of course, continued
to matter immensely in everyday nineteenth-century French life.25 and
if they have been offered in public places or at public meetings, whether or not
they have been inserted in printed writings that have been broadcast and
distributed, they shall be punished by a fine of from 16 to 500 francs.
376. All other insults or gross and outrageous expression that do not have this double
character of severity and publicity shall be subject only to simple police
punishments.
377. [insults proffered in the course of litigation]
378. [dissemination of confidential medical information]
Id. Livre IV, Chapitre II, sec. I:
471. Seront punis d'amende, depuis I francjusqu'At 5 francs inclusivement...
11. Ceux qui, sans avoir 6t6 provoqugs, auront profdr6 contre quelqu'un des
injures, autres que celles prdvues depuis I'art. 376 jusques et compris ['art.
378 ....
471. Punishable by a fine from one to five francs inclusively ...
11. Those who, without provocation, shall have offered to another person
insults other than those contemplated in sections 376 to 378 ....
224. Id. Livre III, Chapitre III sec. II, para. 222:
Lorsqu'un ou plusieurs magistrats de l'ordre administratif ou judiciaire auront requ
dans l'exercise de leurs fonctions, ou ? l'occasion de cet exercise, quelquc outrage
tendant inculper leur honneur ou leur ddlicatesse, celui qui les aura ainsi outragds sera
puni d'un emprisonnement d'un mois h deux ans.
Si l'outrage a eu lieu h l'audience d'un cour ou d'un tribunal, il sera puni d'un
emprisonnement d'un mois A deux ans.
If one or more officials of the administrative or judicial order receives, during the
exercise of their functions, or on the occasion of the exercise of their functions, some
gross insult tending to inculpate their honor or their dilicatesse, the person who has
insulted them in this way shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of one month to
two years.
If the gross insult has taken place in the presence of a court or tribunal, it shall be
punished by a term of imprisonment of one month to two years.
225. See generally NYE, supra note 119, at 180-81 (discussing social philosophy and social
practice generally); WILLIAM M. REDDY, THE INVISIBLE CODE: HONOR AND SENTIMENT IN
POST-REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE, 1814-1848 (1997) (discussing the centrality of honor in early-
19th-century France). For early attempts to develop new protections for honor in the law, see
EMILE BEAUSSIRE, LES PRINCIPES DU DROIT 367-89 (Paris, F. Alcan 1888); and I A. BOiTt,,L.
COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 241-47 (Paris, A. Fontemoing 1899). For a general survey of
1350 [Vol. 109: 1279
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1350 1999-2000
Enforcing Civility and Respect
law.22 Social hierarchy in particular did not vanish from nineteenth-century
French legal analysis. 27 Neither did dueling.28 But mere" expressions of
lack of respect or disrespect, such as are the stuff of the German law of
insult today, became matters for the police. Only defamatory insults-
French attempts to defend the idea of a law protecting honor from the late 1880s onward. see
BEIGNIER, supra note 13, at 44-47.
226. See, e.g., JULES ROGER, DLITs DE PRESSE 103 (Lot Du 29 JUILLET 1881) (Paris. L
Larose et Forcel 1882) (discussing honor as one of the interests still protected by the limited law
of insult).
227. This was emphasized by jurists reacting both to the laws of 1819 and of 1881. For the
latter, see JOSEPH ROUX, LA Lot DU 29 JUILLET 1881 Er LES DI.trTS DE PRESSE 123 (Paris.
Amand Giard 1882):
La ddfinition que Ia loi donne de l'injure est assez dlastique pour que les juges puissent
appr~cier en toute libert6 le caract~re des injures; ils devront tenir compte en cola des
circonstances de temps, de lieu, de dignitd de Ia personne etc.... qui peuvent faire
varier le sens des termes prftendus injurieux.
The definition of insult given by the law is rather elastic, in order that judges may be
fully free to evaluate the character of the insults in question; in making their evaluation.
they should take account of the time, the place, the dignity of the person, etc.. which
can cause the sense of the allegedly insulting terms to vary.
See also WORMS, supra note 22, at 109, responding to the idea of reintroducing formal status-
distinctions into statutory law:
Est-ce que ... gr-ice Ia marge laissde entre le minimum et maximum do Ia peine dont
est frappe l'injure, le juge n'a pas le moyen de tenir compte de toutes ls nuances, et
de faire 6tat, par exemple, tant du degrd de culture de l'offensd que de celui put-3tre
fort diffdrent de l'offenseur?
Is it not true that... thanks to the range between the minimum and maximum penalty.
thd judge has the means to take account of all the nuances, and to factor in. for
example, the degree of culture of the offended person just as much as the (perhaps very
different) degree of culture of the person giving offense?
For the statute of 1819, see de Broglie's report to the Chambre des pairs in 1819, quoted in
ROGER, supra note 226, at 100: "Les memes paroles ne sont point injurieuses t tous les degrs de
l'6chelle sociale. C'est au plaignant A dtablir cc qui est injure A son dgard. au tribunal ft le
reconnaitre et A le prononcer." "The same words are by no means insulting on all levels of the
social scale. It is up to the plaintiff to establish what counts as an insult with regard to him; it is up
to the court to recognize it and find accordingly."
228. See NYE, supra note 119, at 172-215. The "codes" of the duel were effectively
incorporated into the law, as courts, despite the abolition of any special regulation for duels.
convicted only duelists who had acted dishonorably according to accepted dueling practices. See
id at 151-53. For the background to this development already in the 17th century. see iL at 25.
See also WORMS, supra note 22, at 69-76.
Dueling was indeed, in the eyes of some French commentators, the locus of a generalization
of honor throughout French society. As Worms put it:
Dans Jhering on lit que " le droit est Ia condition de l'existence morale, dont Ia ddfcnse
soutenue revient f la conservation morale de soi." (Autrement dit: je ne suis pas. je
n'existe pas si je ne suis vengd.) Quant au droit dit de l'honneur, il est le droit de Ia
conservation 6thico-sociale de soi. C'est avec raison que Ia ddmocratisation du duel, du
duel sdrieux que nous avons seul en vue, a dtd vantde. au delft mCme de nos frontiares.
comme tin progrits dgalitaire dans le sens des iddes reformatrices de Ia France.
One reads in Jhering that "'law is the condition of moral existence, and the defense of
one's rights is a matter of one's own moral survival." (To put it differently: I am not. I
exist not, if I am unavenged.) As for the right to honor, it is the right of ethico-social
survival. It is for good reason that the democratization of the duel, of the serious duel.
which is the only type we are considering, has been vaunted, even beyond our borders,
as a matter of egalitarian progress in the spirit of French ideas of reform.
Id. at 80.
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"public" ones that included the "imputation of a fact" 2 29-were deemed to
merit litigation in court. The locus of honor was no longer insult but
defamation-no longer testy "private" encounters between aristocrats, but
defamatory "public" encounters that took place in the pages of newspapers.
The old regime was, to be sure, not entirely gone. Defamatory statements
were still defined, not only as injuring reputation (as in the United States)
but also as injuring honor.23 ° Nevertheless, the old jurisprudence of respect
had vanished.
The result, right up to the present, is a French law that looks much more
like the kind of law that Americans are familiar with than does German
law; American liberals will instantly feel more at home in France than they
ever will in Germany. For, since French honor is now principally about
defamation,23' the interest in honor is always balanced against the value of
free expression.232 Honor questions in France, unlike Germany, have come
to be regulated by statutes on the press-especially233 in an 1881 law, still
229. Or, still under the 1819 legislation, of a "vice ddtermind." See Loi sur Ia Repression des
Crimes et Dlits commis par la voie de la Presse, ou par tout autre moyen de publication (17 Mai
1819) Chapitre V. De la Diffamation et de l'Injure publique, para. 20, in BuLLETIN DES Lois. no.
278, at 469 (Paris, Imprimatur Royale 1819) [hereinafter Loi sur la Rdpression des Crimes et
D6lits commis par la voie de ]a Presse].
230. See, e.g., Vrru, supra note 13, at 1574-75.
231. In the law of defamation in Germany, too, a balance between honor and free expression
is always struck. See Kilbler, supra note 16, at 337. My point in emphasizing French balancing is
not to say that these values are never balanced in Germany, but rather to emphasize the
consequences of the decline of the law of insult narrowly defined in France.
232. See Hauch, supra note 36, at 1236 (discussing the balancing of values and French law).
233. Though initially in a repressive enactment of 1819, Loi sur la Rdpression des Crimes et
D6lits commis par la voie de la Presse. The law on insult:
Chapitre V. De la Diffamation et de l'Injure publique.
13. Toute allegation ou imputation d'un fait qui porte atteinte A l'honneur ou Ai
la considdration de la personne ou du corps auquel le fait est impute, est une
diffamation.
Toute expression outrageante, terme de mrpris ou invective, qui ne renferme
l'imputation d'aucun fait, est une injure.
19. L'injure contre [public officials engaged in public duties, ambassadors, and other
envoys to the King] sera punie d'un emprisonnement de cinq jours h un an et d'une
amende de vingt cinq francs h deux mille francs, ou de l'une de ces deux peines
seulement, selon les circonstances.
L'injure contre les particuliers sera punie d'une amende de seize francs ,A cinq
cents francs.
20. Ndanmoins, l'injure qui ne renfermait pas l'imputation d'un vice ddtermind, ou qui
ne serait pas publique, continuera d'8tre punie des peines de simple police.
Chapter V. On Defamation and Public Insult.
13. Every allegation or imputation of a fact that affronts the honor or the esteem of a
person or of the organization about which the fact is imputed, is a defamation.
Every gross or outrageous insult, term of contempt or invective, that does not
include the imputation of any fact, is an insult.
19. Insults against [public officials engaged in public duties, ambassadors, and other
envoys to the King] shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of five days to
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in effect today, which formed an integral part of the effort to bring true
republicanism to France" by safeguarding press freedoms. Because the
law of honor in France has come to be classified as part of the world of
newspaper reportage, French lawyers are accustomed to the idea that
questions of honor are linked with questions of freedom of expression. In
this, France looks quite different from Germany, where debates over the
role of free expression in the law of honor remain much more
problematic. 6 In France, one is tempted to say, questions of honor have
migrated fully into Habermas's "public sphere," whereas in Germany they
have not. While the French law of honor once concerned the world of
aristocratic respect and deference, it has come to concern overwhelmingly
the world of journalism. Honor is no longer something primarily wounded
one year and by a fine of 25 to 2000 francs, or by one of these two punishments
alone, according to the circumstances.
Insults against private persons shall be punished by a fine of 16 to 500 francs.
20. Nevertheless, insults that do not include the imputation of a determinate vice, or
that are not public, shall continue to be subject to simple police punishments.
Cf. Law No. 12,390 of Mar. 25, 1822, Loi relative Ar la Rdpression et ,& la Poursuite des Ddlits
commis par la voie de la Presse ou par tout autre moyen de publication (establishing further
repressive measures).
234. See BEIGNIER, supra note 13, at 151; NYE. supra note 119, at 175-76.
235. The current version appears at Presse et Communication, Loi du 29 juillet 1881.
Appendix to NOUvEAU CODE PtNAL art. 29, 1905. 1933 ch. IV (96th ed. Dalloz 1999) (Fr.)
[hereinafter C. PAN.]: Des crimes et delits commis par la voie de la presse ou par tout autre moyen
de publication.
(ord. 6 mai 1944) Toute alldgation ou imputation d'un fait qui porte atteinte Ai l'honncur
ou h la considdration de la personne ou du corps auquei le fait est imputd est une
diffamation. La publication directe ou par voie de reproduction de cette alldgation ou de
cette imputation est punissable, meme si elle est faite sous forme dubitative ou si elle
vise une personne ou un corps non expressdment nommds, mais dont l'identification est
rendue possible par les termes des discours, cris, menaces, fcrits ou imptim6s, placards
ou affiches incriminds.
Toute expression outrageante, terme de mdpris ou invective qui ne renferme
l'imputation d'aucun fait est une injure.
Every allegation or imputation of a fact that affronts the honor or the esteem of a person
or of the organization about which the fact is imputed is a defamation. The publication,
whether direct or by means of reproduction, of such allegation or imputation is
punishable, even if it is made in dubitative form or if it is aimed at a person or an
organization not expressly named, but the identification of which is made possible by
the terms of the discourse, ejaculations, threats written or printed, placards, or posters
subject to prosecution.
Every gross insult, term of contempt or invective that does not include the imputation
of any fact is an insult.
On the abandonment of the Napoleonic "vice ddtermin6" standard, see C. BAZILLE &
CHARLES CONSTANT, CODE DE LA PRESSE: COMMENTAIRE THPORIQUE & PRATIQUE DE LA LOt
DU 29 JuIET 1881, at 204 (Paris, A. Durand & Pedone-Lauriel 1883) (" La Loi de 1819 exigeait
l'imputation d'un vice d6termind, ce qui donnait lieu, en jurisprudence, 5 d'assez grandes
difficultds; aujourd'hui, l'injure existe encore bien qu'il n'y ait pas imputation d'un vice
ddtermind, il suffit qu'on ait constatd une parole ou terme de mdpris A± l'dgard d'un individu.").
For later developments, see VrrU, supra note 13, at 1575-98.
236. See C. PtN. (96th ed. Dalloz 1999) (commentary by Yves Mayaud), app. Presse et
Communication, law of July 29, 1881, at 1946, para. 106 ("L'incrimination d'injure touche, dans
tous les cas, A la libertd d'expression telle que la rdglemente cette Ioi .... ).
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within the confines of high "society," where information passes through
gossip and rumor. Honor is now something wounded in the open spaces of
modern "society," where information passes through mass media, and
where what matters is not just individual status but also the contest for
political preeminence."' As a result, the casual American reader might
conclude that France is much more an American-style liberal democracy
than is Germany. France, an American might think, had a liberal revolution
like our own, and French legal thinking therefore acknowledges the
importance of free expression.
The casual reader should hesitate, though, before concluding too much.
While free expression does matter a great deal in France, honor remains a
value that outweighs the value of freedom of expression in many cases.23
The persons protected against "legal" insults are, moreover, still carefully
defined to include government officials; French insult law is law intended
to guarantee respect for the government.239 Most especially, it is intended to
237. In the 19th century, correspondingly, dueling became an aspect of the lives of French
journalists, who were regularly challenged on account of the "insults" they had printed. See NYE,
supra note 119, at 138-39, 187-90. For the similar obligation of American journalists to duel, see
WYATT-BROWN, supra note 39, at 356; and Mark Schmeller, Eating Fire: Journalistic Combat in
Antebellum America (Apr. 29, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law
Journal).
For historiography tracing the rise of French "public opinion" in the 18th century, and
insisting on the importance of that rise, see Keith Baker, Politics and Public Opinion Under the
Old Regime: Some Reflections, in PRESS AND POLITICS IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 208-14
(Jack Censer & Jeremy Popkin eds., 1987); and JURGEN HABERMAS, STRUKTURWANDEL Iti
OFFENTLICHKEIT 133-41 (1990), which discusses France and Germany.
238. Honor is not a constitutionally sanctioned value in France, see BEIGNIER, supra note 13,
at 88 n.4, but it is at all times balanced against the interest in free speech, see Hauch. stepra note
36, at 1236.
239. See C. PaN. art. 433-35 (96th ed. Dalloz 1999):
Constituent un outrage puni de 50 000 F d'amende les paroles, gestes ou menaces. les
dcrits ou images de toute nature non rendus publics ou l'envoi d'objets quelconques
adressds i une personne chargde d'une mission de service public, dans l'exercice ou Ii
l'occasion de l'exercice de sa mission, et de nature At porter atteinte t sa dignitd ou au
respect dfi A la fonction dont elle est investie.
Lorsqu'il est adressd t une personne drpositaire de l'autorit6 publique, l'outragc est
puni de six mois d'emprisonnement et de 50 000 F d'amende.
Words, gestures, or threats, writings or images of any nature that are not made public,
or the sending of objects of any kind addressed to a person charged with a mission in
public service, during the exercise or on the occasion of the exercise of that mission, of
a nature to affront the dignity or the respect due to the function with which that person
is invested, constitute an outrage, and shall be punished by a fine of 50,000 francs.
When such outrage is addressed to a person who is the holder of public authority, it
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of six months and a fine of 50,000 francs.
Note the acute observations of Roger on the consequent state of affairs, in which government
officials were effectively the only persons protected in law against insults:
Vous rencontrez un individu dans la rue, vous l'insultez, ou encore une poldimique
s'engage sur un livre nouveau, peu A peu, elle s'6chauffe, elle s'envenime, on en vient
aux allusions mrchantes, A des expressions trop vives, A l'injure. Puis un beau jour vous
apprenez que votre adversaire est un magistrat, qu'il veut porter plainte, est-ce que [Art.
33, sec. I of the Loi du 29juillet 1881] est applicable?
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guarantee respect for police officers, who have been darlings of French law
since the Napoleonic period.2  The government gets the benefit of the
protection of honor in a way that the American liberal tradition would never
tolerate. France remains a land of honor of a kind the United States simply
is not.
Still and all, if France remains a land of honor in the law, it must be
underscored that it is not quite a land of honor like Germany. French law is
no longer meant to protect persons insulted in casual, private encounters."
This means that the law of insult in France has come to exclude what
remains the principal stuff of the law of insult in Germany. Nobody in
France is prosecuted for calling someone else tu rather than vous. In France,
the old law of "nonpublic" insult, once used to penalize the sort of
expressions of disrespect that gave rise to duels, became, after 1796, a new
law involving something very close to the issuance of parking tickets. Such
is the form it retains. 2 Today "nonpublic" insults are defined in the Code
as the lowest level of "police" offense, calling for the imposition of a fine
of no more than 250 French francs (about forty dollars) when they have not
been "provoked."243
A Rome, l'affirmative n'eat pas dtd douteuse ... mais aussi il n'y avait pas de ces
surprises, les Romains dtaient toujours rev~tus des insignes dc lcur* charges. Outrager
l'homme, c'dtait outrager la robe, l'autoritd.
You meet an individual in the street, you insult him. Or there is a heated discussion
over a new book; little by little, the discussion heats up. it becomes envenomed, one
progresses to nasty allusions, to expressions that are a bit too sharp, to an insult. Then
one fine day you learn that your adversary is a magistrate, that he is initiating an action.
Is this law [Art. 33, sec. 1 of the law of July 29, 1881] applicable?
In Rome, there would have been no doubt about the affirmative case... ; but there
would not have been any surprises either The Romans always wore the insignia of
their offices. Insulting the man was insulting the robe. the authority.
ROGER, supra note 226, at 105-06. In France, by contrast, the official position of magistrates had
to be signaled by their engagement in official duties before liability could arise. See id. at 106.
240. The discussion by Joseph Roux, for example, is concerned disproportionately with
insults to public officers. See ROUX, supra note 227. at 116, 123. 127; WORMS, supra note 22, at
97-99. See generally HENRI PRUDHOMME, DE LA COMPtTENCE EN MATItRE DE DttLrrS
D'OUTRAGES PAR PAROLES ENVERS LES MAGISTRATS Er FONCTIONNAIRES (Paris. n.p. 1883).
The contrast with Germany is revealed in the categories used by French national statisticians.
Where Germans have long kept figures on Beleidigung, the Annuaire Statistique de la France
tallies only "Outrages et Violences i d6positaires de l'autoritd.' See. e.g., L'INsTrr NATIONAL
DE LA STATISTIQUE Er DES ETUDES ECONOMIQUE, ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE DE LA FRANCE
1994, thl.P.0l-1, at 857 (1994) (Infractions constat es par les services de Police et de
Gendarmerie) (mttropole).
241. For complaints about this state of affairs, see the remarks of the Belgian magistrate, M.
Limelette, quoted in WORMS, supra note 22, at 111; "L'injure devient-elle done anodine, sans
danger, partant, parce qu'elle n'aura pas de publicitd... ?"
242. There were similar developments in Germany, presumably under the influence of French
law, in the early 19th century. But even "police" measures in Germany remained much more
lawlike than they were in France.
243. See C. pP-N., Contraventions, art. R. 621-2 (96th ed. Dalloz 1999) (-L'injure non
publique envers une personne, lorsqu'elle n'a pas dtd pr&cdd6 de provocation. est punic de
l'amende pr6vue pour les contraventions de la I" classe.") ("A nonpublic insult against a person.
if it has not been preceded by a provocation, shall be punished by a fine contemplated for
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This is as nothing compared to the German law of insult. What is more,
even what is found in the Code overstates the importance of the French law
of insult as it exists today. It seems doubtful that either species of insult,
public or nonpublic, is often prosecuted, at least outside of the context of
"racist" speech. It is a matter of formal policy in France that prosecutors do
not generally pursue matters of legal, public insult.'"4 As for nonpublic
insults, it seems very likely that the police do not take notice of those
either-unless the insults in question are offered to officers of the law.
Indeed, aggrieved persons are formally encouraged, in France, to seek
mediation of any dispute arising out of an insult, on the assumption that the
police simply do not involve themselves in such things any longer.245
That is not to say that the law of insult in France has no life whatsoever.
Certain defamatory insults do seem to end up in court. These involve, most
especially, instances in which one person has called another, in one way or
another, a "Fascist. '' 216 (One also finds a variety of defamation cases in
which Frenchmen have been "insulted" through public references to their
contraventions of the first class."); id. Peines, art. 131-12. ("Les peines contraventionelles
encourues par les personnes physiques sont: 10 L'amende .... ") ("Punishments for contraventions
incurred by the physical person are: (1) Fines . . ."); id. art. 131-13 ("Le montant de I'amende est
le suivant: 10 250 F au plus pour les contraventions de la 1" classe .... ) ("The amount of the
fine is the following: (1) 250 francs at the most for contraventions of the first class .... " ).
244. See Sdnat, Session Ordinaire de 1997-1998, Annexe au proc~s-verbal de la sdance du 18
juin 1998, Rapport d'Information ("Traditionnellement, les magistrats du Parquet ne prennent
jamais l'initiative des poursuites en mati~re de diffamation et d'injures concernant Ics
particuliers.") ("Traditionally, prosecutors do not take the initiative in pursuing defamations and
insults against private persons.").
245. See, for example, the literature of the Service Mddiation, Chaussde de Nivelles, Paris.
which acknowledges that the French police simply do not involve themselves in the sorts of
insults that play such a large role in Germany:
Trop de gens se permettent d'agresser verbalement ou physiquement IA ou les
personnes qui les interpellent avec toutes les consdquences ddsobligeantes sinon
dramatiques qui peuvent s'ensuivre. La police, quant A elle, n'a pas toujours les moyens
de s'investir dans ces litiges souvent empreints de problmes relationnels. Une action
en justice est grndralement 6cartre car trop onrreuse par rapport A l'enjeu en cause.
Quoi qu'il en soit, il faudra, dans la plupart des cas, vivre encore des anndes Ah cot d'un
voisin A qui on ne parle plus, dont on se mrfie. Alors, pourquoi ne pas tenter [a
mediation?
Too many people allow themselves to show verbal or physical aggression to persons
with whom they have run-ins, with all the uncivil, if not dramatic, consequences that
may arise. The police, for their part, do not always have the resources to devote to these
disputes, which are frequently colored by personal relationships. A court case is
generally out of the question, because it would be too costly for what is at stake in the
case. And yet it will be necessary, in the majority of cases, to continue to live for years
next to a neighbor with whom one is no longer on speaking terms, and whom one
distrusts. So, why not try mediation?
Mediation is also presumably possible, with the consent of both complainant and accused, under
CODE DE PROCtDURE P8NALE [C. PR. PlN] art. 41 (Fr.), loi no. 93-2 4 janv. 1993 (establishing
that the procureur de la Rpublique can, with the parties' agreement, use mediation).
246. For examples, see C. PaN. (96th ed. Dalloz 1999) (commentary by Yves Mayaud). app.,
Presse et Communication, 1947, para. 117 (use of letters "SS" after name of minister; " mule de
Barbie," (emulator of Barbie); addition of epithet "crdmatoire" (crematory) after last name of
minister)); id. at 1948, para. 118 (" nazis" or "nazillons").
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supposed involvement with the Vichy regime or with the Nazis.) "7 Where
the law of insult still lives, moreover, it retains some of the coloration of old
dueling norms, just as it does in Germany: French law still speaks of
"affronts to the honor" -"atteintes 1'honneur" -just as German law
does.' Some classic dueling insults, such as "blockhead," are still
punished in French courts. "9 Other odd public insults are occasionally
punished too.
Moreover, the old law of insults also retains a certain life in French
hate-speech legislation. Indeed, such legislation has a sixty-year history in
France. For a brief time before the defeat of France by the Nazis, French
law included a 1939 hate-speech decree, conceived in a traditional form as
covering both defamation and insult.25 Military defeat brought repeal of
that decree in 1940;1 but today, once again, "racist" speech may indeed be
pursued both under the "law" of "public" insult"2 and under the
"policing" of "nonpublic" insult. 3 And, as in the case of Germany, this
247. For examples, see C. P.N. (96th ed. Dalloz 1999) (commentary by Yves Mayaud), at
1934, para. 9.
248. See C. PtN. art. 29 app. at 1933 (96th ed. Dalloz 1999) (loi du 29 juillet 1881).
249. See C. PA.N. (96th ed. Dalloz 1999) (commentary by Yves Mayaud). at 1948, para. 118
(giving as an example of an insult "buse" or " blockhead"). Numerous other examples are given
in the same section.
250. See Law of Apr. 21, 1939, D.P. 1939, IV, 351 (Fr.).
251. See Law of Aug. 27, 1940, D.P. 1940, IV, 254 (Fr.).
252. See C. PfN. art. 32 app. at 1953 (96th ed. Dalloz 1999) (loi du 20 juillet 1881). The law
provides:
La diffamation commise [by any of various means of publication] envers une prsonne
ou un groupe de personnes raison de leur origine ou de leur appartenance ou de ler
non-appartenance h une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion d~termin6e sera
punie d'un emprisonnement d'un an et d'une amende de 300 000 F ou de l'une de ces
deux peines seulement.
Defamation committed [by any of various means of publication] toward a person or
group of persons by reason of their origin or their membership or nonmembership in an
ethnic group, nation, race, or particular religion, shall be punished by a term of
imprisonment of one year and by a fine of 300,000 francs or by one of these penalties
alone.
ld. References merely to "foreigners" in general, however, do not fall under this statute. See
commentary, in id at 1956, para. 18. Compare Loi du 29 juillet 1881. art. 24 (independent crime
of provocation to racial discrimination or hatred):
(Loi n 72-546 du I" juillet 1972) Ceux qui, par l'n des moyens dnoncds A 'article 23
[that is, publication by any of various means], auront provoqud t la discrimination, A la
haine ott A la violence h 1'gard d'une personne ou d'un groupe de personnes h raison
de leur origine ou de leur appartenance ou de leur non-appartenance ,h une ethnie, one
nation, une race ou une religion d6termine, seront punis d'un emprisonnement d'un an
et d'une amende de 300 000 F ou de l'une de ces deux peines seulement.
Those who, by any of the means described in article 23 [that is, publication by any of
various means], provoke discrimination, hatred, or violence with regard to a person or
group of persons by reason of their origin or their membership or nonmembership in an
ethnic group, nation, race, or particular religion, shall be punished by a term of
imprisonment of one year and by a fine of 300,000 francs or by one of these penalties
alone.
Cf. Douglas-Scott, supra note 10, at 318 (discussing the Gayssot Act).
253. See C. PiAN. art. R. 625-27 (96th ed. Dalloz 1999):
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French hate-speech legislation must be read in the light of a long historical
tradition, reaching back for generations. French jurists remain, indeed,
strikingly aware that their law of hate speech is the descendant of an older
tradition in the protection of personal honor, now extended to cover even
the least of persons, as an example from a textbook suggests:
An important place, among those sentiments to which modern
legislation extends the protection of the criminal law, has devolved
to honor and personal dignity. Whatever position a human being
may occupy in society, however modest the function he may serve,
he feels a deep need not to be humiliated, not to be treated with
disrespect by those around him.
For a long time, this need was addressed only in the criminal
law protecting honorability against defamation and insult, to which
the Press Law of July 29, 1881 devoted several provisions. Today
the presence, on the soil of our country, of a growing number of
foreigners, and the profound alteration of social relations that has
given rise, over the last few years, to habits of thought that have
been called "racist" or "sexist," have had the effect of provoking,
by way of reaction, the appearance of new criminal law, inserted in
the law of 1881 and in the Criminal Code, and tending to guarantee
the personal dignity of every individual against discriminatory
attacks.
25 4
La provocation non publique la discrimination, ai la haine ou A la violence i l'5gard
d'une personne ou d'un groupe de personnes h raison de leur origine ou de leur
appartenance ou de leur non-appartenance, vraie ou suppose, A une ethnic, une nation,
une race ou une rdligion drterminde est punie de I'amende prSvuc pour les
contraventions de la 5' classe.
Les personnes coupables de la contravention prdvue au prtsent article encourent
dgalement les peines complmentaires suivantes:
1. L'interdiction de drtenir ou de porter... une arme ....
2. La confiscation d'une ou plusieurs armes ....
Nonpublic provocation to discrimination, hatred, or violence with regard to a person
or group of persons by reason of their origin or their membership or nonmembership
in an ethnic group, nation, race, or particular religion, shall be punished by a fine
contemplated for contraventions of the fifth class.
Persons guilty of a contravention contemplated by this article also incur the
following complementary penalties:
1. A prohibition on keeping or bearing... a firearm ....
2. The confiscation of one or several firearms ....
254. VtTU, supra note 13, at 1574.
Parmi les sentiments auxquels le 16gislateur moderne dtend la protection du droit pnal.,
une place importante est drvolue ii l'honneur et ah la dignitd personnelle. Quelle que soil
en effet la position qu'il occupe dans le corps social, si modestes qui soient les
fonctions qu'il assure, l'8tre humain ressent profonddment le besoin de n'Wetre pas
humilid, m~prisd par ceux qui l'entourent.
Pendant longtemps, ce besoin n'a dtd satisfait que par le biais des incriminations
protdgeant l'honorabilitig contre la diffamation et l'injure, auxquelles la loi du 29 juillet
1881 sur la presse a consacrd plusieurs dispositions. Or la presence, sur le sol de notre
pays, d'un nombre grandissant d'dtrangers et la modification profonde des rapports
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In passages like this we see precisely the pattern of leveling up we saw
in Germany: French law, too, generalizes old norms of high-status honor as
new norms of universal dignity. And again, as in Germany, the
consequence is that denigratory racist remarks that carry no penalty in
American law can be prosecuted in France. This is true not only of racist
defamation but also of racist insult in the narrow sense. "Nonpublic" racial
insults, too, are fitted into the traditional jurisprudence-though they are
punishable by a fine of up to 10,000 francs, rather than 250 francs, along
with a range of other penalties. 5 As in Germany, too, the "Auschwitz
lie" -the denial of the Holocaust-has provoked especially severe criminal
responses. 6
Nevertheless, if the law of insult still lives on in French hate-speech
legislation, the vigorous culture of the popular law of insult that
so noticeably characterizes German legal life is wholly absent in France.
Insult has been defined as not a question of law or rights; and
correspondingly, there is no French popular practice of invoking law or
rights when one is insulted. Casual empiricism-my conversations with
French acquaintances-suggests that most French people do not even know
that the law of insult exists, though they do know that it is unlawful (and
unwise) to insult a police officer.5 7 A current paperback guide to etiquette
makes it clear that the idea that insults might be severe enough to go to law
has simply vanished in France, though the memory of dueling has not:
Knowing How To Respond to an Insult
Most etiquette manuals forget this chapter. For a simple reason:
It is very difficult to give rules of conduct in this domain. Let us try
to tackle the problem with a little more boldness. First of all, what
is an insult?
Three centuries ago, insults like "rascal" [bglftre] or
"skinflint" [fesse-nathieu] were rewarded with sword thrusts.
Nowadays, they get a chuckle.
Still, one is sometimes insulted publicly by a testy automobile
driver, an unpleasant pedestrian, or a foul-tempered fellow subway
passenger.., and in terms that hardly vary. The most adroit
approach remains to shrug one's shoulders and continue on one's
way. After all, you will not cross paths with the insulter again.
sociaux ont fait naitre depuis quelques ann&es de tendances d'esprit qu'on a dites
"racistes" ou "sexistes" et qui ont eu pour effet de provoquer. par n!action.
l'apparition d'incriminations nouvelles, insdrdes dans la loi de 1881 ct dans Ic Code
penal, et tendant garantir la dignits personelle de chacun contre les atteintes
discriminatoires.
Id.
255. For the full range of penalties, see C. PAtN. art. 131-12 to 131-18 (96th ed. Dalloz 1999);
and supra note 253 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Douglas-Scott, supra note 10, at 318.
257. E.g., Conversation with Mme. Isabelle Bahuet. in New York. N.Y. (July 14, 1999).
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Nevertheless, it does happen that the insult is too serious to be
treated with disdain. What to do?
The duel is no longer in use, since the beginning of the
century ....
The duel no longer being an option today, is it appropriate to
settle a dispute with fisticuffs? Nothing is less appropriate! ...
So what should one do if one is insulted publicly, at a dinner,
for example? The best solution is to have enough wit in repartee to
ridicule the insulter with a well-put response.s
No trace here of the popular German culture of the law. The French
way is not a lawsuit, but self-help through repartee. Moreover, even where
cases of legal insult do get into court, they never seem odd for the reason
that German cases do. Though French jurisprudence continues to speak of
honor, it lacks what is so strikingly present in the German-efforts to
penalize behavior that seems, to an American, simply rude. The use of tu
rather than vous is not a matter for the law in France, or at least not for
formal legal regulation. Dire as the social consequences may be of failing
to address another person as monsieur or madame, no one imagines that
that failure carries legal consequences.
258. HERMINE DE CLERMONT-TONNERRE, POLITESSE OBLIGE: LE SAVOIR-VIVRE
AUJOURD'HUI. GUIDE DES BONS USAGES 82-83 (1996). It is well worth quoting the omitted
portions of the passage:
Still, one often thinks of the duel that ranged the Marquis of Cuevas against Serge
Lifar, the dancer who obsessed him [son danseurfitiche], in the 1930s. Or of the duel
between Gaston Deferre, mayor of Marseille, with the Deputy Rend Ribi&re [in the year
1967] ....
On the other hand, a man who witnesses an insult made to a woman in his
presence must not let the affront go unchallenged. From that moment, he finds himself
confronted with a frankly ticklish problem: Should he roll up his sleeves and give the
insulter a lesson? No. Above all, not in the course of a dinner, where doing so would
create a situation impossible to control. Let the affront go without saying anything?
That would be to act like a coward. The solution consists in disconcerting one's
adversary, as in judo, by pretending to agree with his views, ridiculing him all the
while.
Id.
On the 1967 duel of Gaston Deferre and Rend Ribi~re, the last recorded in France, see
BILLACOIS, supra note 104, at 182-83; and NYE, supra note 119, at 216. Madame de Clermont-
Tonnerre errs on the date of the duel between Serge Lifar and the Marquis de Cuevas, which
actually took place in 1958. See BILLACOIS, supra note 104, at 185.
For a similar passage dating from 1889, consider Henry Fouquier: "Jadis, les injures
amenaient presque toujours des duels; aujourd'hui, elles sont devenues si frdquentes, si
disproportionn6es avec les faits, qu'on leur oppose souvent, et sans pouvoir etre taxd de lkchetd, Ic
plus absolu d6dain," quoted in WORMS, supra note 22, at 54.
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VI. NONLEGAL REGULATION IN FRANCE
It would be a great mistake, though, to conclude from the relative
absence of the law in regulating French civility that there is no regulation at
all. On the contrary, France is rich in regulation enforcing respect and
civility, but it is regulation that takes place in other spheres. It is, in fact, of
the first importance to track the regulation of civility into those other
spheres. What we find, when we investigate a variety of nonlegal
institutions, is that the French law of insult has undergone not death, but a
kind of transmigration. The concepts, and the very terminology, of the old
law of insult survive. But they survive outside the law as technically
defined. In particular, the enforcement of respect goes on in the world of
education and everyday manners in ways rich in political meaning.
Here, again, history is the key to understanding the enforcement of
respect as we see it in France today. In particular, we must return once
again to the history of dueling. Nineteenth-century dueling culture
established what has become a general pattern in France: the adoption of
legal terminology and legal assumptions in technically nonlegal settings-a
striking pattern of the translation of law into lawlike norms.5 9 Thus, early
in the nineteenth century, the decline of the technical law of insult was
accompanied by the rise of a kind of quasi-legal substitute: the duelist's
"code" of behavior. Dueling remained a widespread and widely defended
practice in the nineteenth century. Its mores were regulated by an 1836 text,
by the Comte de Chatauvillard, whose prescriptions were internationally
accepted.' Chatauvillard presented his rules as a law outside the law:
If the code of the duel stands outside the law, if there can be no
code but that sanctioned by statute, let us not hesitate, nevertheless,
to give that name to the rules imposed by the rules of honor, for the
rules of honor are a thing no less sacred than governmental laws.6'
259. In order to avoid confusion among European readers, I should note that the term
"norms" is used differently in American legal writing from the way it is typically used in France
especially. "Norms," to an American scholar, are non-legal, whereas in French writing. "norms"
refers specifically to legal rles.
260. For a discussion of the general acceptance of the text in France, see NYE supra note
119, at 137-38; in Germany, see MCALEER, supra note 114, at 46. For the pre-19th-century
tradition, see, for example, SuITE DE LA CiVILTrr FRANCOISE, OU TRAIT DU POINT-D'HONNEuR
& DES RIGLES POUR CONVERSER & SE CONDUIRE SAGEMENT AVEC LES INCIVILS & LES
FKCHEUX (Paris, Chez Helie Josset 1676).
261. CHATAUVRIARD, supra note 108, at 5 ("Si le code du Duel est en dehors des lois, s'il
ne peut y avoir de code que celui sanctionnd par la loi, n'h6sitons pas, cependant. ,A donner cc nom
aux r~gles imposdes par l'honneur, car l'honneur n'est pas chose moims sacr6e que les lois
gouvemementales.").
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It was Chatauvillard who produced the tripartite analysis of "insults"
that I quoted above in Part II of this Article.162 His nonlegal law of dueling,
as I suggested above, became the basis of what is still the law in Germany.
In a sense, it became the law in France, too. In a remarkable tale of the
interaction of social and legal norms, the French courts of the nineteenth
century accepted the validity of Chatauvillard's code, acquitting duelists
who had lived up to the demands of Chatauvillard.2 63 Thus, though the
duelist's definition of insults was never technically part of the statutory law,
it nevertheless became a kind of law in the courts. The courts are not what
matter most, though: Presumably, most cases of dueling never found their
way there at all. What matters is that Frenchmen who shared the
widespread duelists' culture lived according to Chatauvillard. In this way,
the extralegal "law" of dueling became a kind of everyday "law" of insult,
which survived through the nineteenth century.
Elsewhere too, the old law of insult found new homes away from the
courts of law. As the law of insult declined in the nineteenth century, we
can trace the rise of rules against insults in the clubs and associations that
proliferated in France. The rules of one small 1880 club, for example,
managed to pick up all the technical terms of the law of insult:
31. Members of the society must respect each other mutually and
make every effort to insure that tranquillity does not cease to
reign between them.
33. Every name that a member of the society is called, every
coarse epithet, every insult [injure] or direct threat to a
member of the society or to any other person who has come to
a meeting in the company of a member of the society shall be
punished by a fine of not less than one franc.
34. Every physical assault [voie de fait] upon a member of the
society while in the bosom of the society shall be punished by
exclusion from full participation in membership.
35. Exclusion from the society will be pronounced upon any
member who is guilty of an affront to the honor of the society
or to one of its members [qui aura porti atteinte b l'honneur
de la socijt ou de l'un de ses membres].26
262. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
263. See NYE, supra note 119, at 133-35, 140-42, 145-47. Repeated efforts to introduce
special legislation on the duel failed in France; unlike German law, French law simply treated
dueling as part of the general law of homicide and assault. See id. at 134. Over the course of the
19th century, however, courts made it their practice to acquit "honorable" duelists. See id.
264. RIGLEMENT DE LA SOCItTI DE LA RUE-DU-GUIg, FOUGERt 1880, reprinted in JEAN-
Luc MARAIS, LES SOCItn S D'HOMMES: HISTOIRE D'UNE SOCIABILITI DU 18' SItCLE ,A NOS
JOURS 69 (1986).
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Such regulations prohibiting" 'epithets,' verbal 'injuries,' 'menace,' or rude
gestures" were extremely common. 2' Here again we witness the
transplantation of the regulation of insult from the courts into lesser social
institutions.
The "social" norms of France thus did not simply arise outside the law;
they developed by adopting and transmuting the terms and assumptions of
the law, making for a characteristically French codification of everyday
behavior. We can detect this pattern of adoption and transmutation of the
law in the sphere of education as well. Education is, indeed, the most
important sphere of all: It is in education, not in the law, that we see the
post-Revolutionary French state hardest at work to establish norms of
civility. Here, again, we have to look to an old history to understand French
practice today. The tradition of associating schooling with the teaching of
"good manners" goes back to the sixteenth century in France. As scholars
like Jacques Revel and Roger Chartier have shown, the "good manners"
that were taught in French schools through most of the early modem period
came to be closely associated with aristocratic norms of behavior.2 ' By the
latter part of the eighteenth century, though, an Enlightened style of
antiaristocratic thought had established itself, one that rejected many of the
"artificialities" of aristocratic politesse. When those "artificialities"
reasserted themselves in the early nineteenth century, they largely became
the possession of a new style of bourgeois life, revolving around a carefully
inculcated practice of the outvard show of respect. As the republican
tradition achieved its slow triumph over the course of the nineteenth
century, those old "artificialities," once firmly associated with the royal
court, won a place in the newly evolving republican school system.
Indeed, even as the law of insult faded over the course of the nineteenth
century, French governmental efforts to inculcate norms of politesse in the
schools gathered momentum, and the program of education in the schools,
31. Les socidtaires se doivent respecter mutuellement et faire tous leurs efforts pour
que le bon accord ne cesse de rdgner entre eux.
33. Tout surnom donnd a un socidtaire, toute dpithNte grossi&e, toute injure ou menace
directe envers un socidtaire ou toute autre personne venue Ai Ia Rdunion en
compagnie d'un socidtaire seront punis d'une amende qui ne pourra C-tre moindre
de un franc.
34. Toute voie de fait envers un socidtaire au sein mfme dc Ia socidtd. sera punic de
l'exclusion de plein droit de Ia socidtd.
35. L'exclusion sera prononcde contre tout socidtiire qui aura pond alteinte !t
l'honneur de la soci6td ou de l'un de ses membres.
265. NYE, supra note 119, at 130-32.
266. See ROGER CHARTMR, LECTURES ET LECTEURS DANS LA FRANCE D'ANCIEN RGLME
45-86 (1987); Jacques Revel, The Uses of Civility. in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE 167-205
(Roger Chartier ed. & Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1989). On the formative importance of early
modem civility manuals in the making of French education, see also MAURICE CRUBELUER.
L'ECOLE Rf-PUBLIcAINF 1870-1940, at 78-84 (1993).
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especially toward the end of the nineteenth century, always included an
emphasis on training in norms of politeness. The strongly republican
government that took charge of France in 1880267 was responsible, not only
for the liberal 1881 law on freedom of the press, but also for the 1881 law
on compulsory primary education. That law was intended to substitute
"moral and civic" education for religion in the schools; 68 in practice, this
turned out to mean, in large part, teaching good manners-both rules of
decency and rules of civility. As one of the founding fathers of French
republican primary education described it in 1880, pupils learned both good
manners and the classically Cartesian style of French reasoning: "on the
one hand, habits of personal cleanliness, order, self-respect, justice, and
mutual benevolence; on the other, habits of lucid, clear, precise thinking,
and well-considered and firm judgment." 
269
The program of inculcating good manners was particularly important in
the countryside, as part of the effort to transform, in Eugen Weber's famous
phrase, "peasants into Frenchmen." The republican school was supposed
to improve manners and customs, and soothe the savage breast. The
polite forms that were inculcated "softened the savagery and
harshness natural to peasants." . . . Schools set out to "modify the
habit of bodily hygiene and cleanliness, social and domestic
manners, and the way of looking at things and judging them."
Savage children were taught new manners: how to greet strangers,
how to knock on doors, how to behave in decent company.70
It is not surprising that, in the teaching in these republican schools,
we can discover the same phenomenon we find in private associations:
the transmigration of the vocabulary of the law. Thus, the 1891 "morals"
curriculum for the elementary schools of one French dipartement aimed to
inculcate the basics of the law-including the law of insult as well as of
dueling. In their third trimester, pupils were to learn:
1. Application and development of the idea of justice. Justice is
absolute, without exception. It obliges us:
267. See generally KATHERINE AusPrlz, THE RADICAL BOURGEOISIE: THE LIGUE
D' ENSEIGNEMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC (1982).
268. For the growth of the ideal of moral education out of the older civility literature, see the
elegant treatment by FRAN(OIS JACQUET-FRANCILLON, NAISSANCES DE L'ECOLE DU PEUPLE.
1815-1870, at 248-57, 250-52 (1995) ("De civiliser A moraliser").
269. F. PCAuT, L'EDUCATION PUBLIQUE ET LA VIE NATIONALE 5 (Paris, Librairie Hachette
1897) (" d'une parte, des habitudes de propretd corporelle, d'ordre, de respect de soi, de justice, de
bienveillance mutuelle; et de l'autre, des habitudes de pens6e lucide, claire, prdcise, de droit et
ferme jugement"). On P6caut as a founding father, see CRUBELLIER, supra note 266, at 77.
270. EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL
FRANCE, 1870-1914, at 329-30 (1976).
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(a) To respect human life. Homicide, legitimate defense (death
penalty), duelling.
(b) To respect human freedom. Inviolability of the person;
freedom, a condition of morality; slavery (slave trade),
serfdom.
(c) To respect property. Property is sacred; it is a right founded
on individual freedom and work. Theft (various kinds:
fraud, poaching, etc.). Donation and transmission of
property, inheritance.
(d) To respect the honor and reputation of others. Calumny,
defamation, ill-gossip, insult, indiscretion, envy, ingratitude
are counter to the idea of justice. Benevolence towards
others. What is meant by public opinion.
(e) To respect the given word (see above, under Soul) .... 7,
The law of insult may have been demoted to a mere "police" offense in the
criminal code, but in the schools of the dipartement of the Somme, it stood
ranged in full glory alongside the law of property, the law of homicide, and
all the rest.
Why this emphasis on teaching good manners? As Weber's argument
suggests, the republican government lavished such attention on the teaching
of politesse because generalizing politesse served the purpose of integrating
all Frenchmen, rural and urban, into a single republican culture. Teaching
everybody correct manners was necessary, as leading educators of the Third
Republic stressed, for the making of a true social democracy: Teaching
politeness meant teaching respect for others, and so teaching all Frenchmen
to behave respectfully was part of creating a society founded not on honor
but on human dignity-a society in which everyone was entitled to respect.
Schools were to inculcate "the dignity of the person in every human being,
true foundation of democracy and of free institutions, from which flows
self-respect, and the respect for others, for women, and for children."'
After all, the Republican ideal ran, "the little Frenchman has the privilege
of belonging to the nation that was the first to proclaim before the face of
the world the rights of man and the citizen," and his "moral and civic"
education was to educate him accordingly. 73 Universal politesse meant
universal membership in a society of dignity for all.
271. Department of the Somme, Morals Curriculum 1891 (Aug. i. 1891). in PHYLLIS STOCK-
MORTON, MORAL EDUCATION FOR A SECULAR SOCIETY 184 (1988). For the idea of using
education to combat crime, see JACQUET-FRANCILLON, supra note 268. at 255-57.
272. PI CAUT, supra note 269, at xv.
273. CRUBELLIER, supra note 266, at 86 (" [Lie petit Franais a le priviltkgc d'apparicnir ,A la
nation qui, la premiere, a proclamd Ak la face du monde les droits de I'hommc ct du citoyen.").
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This tendency survives in French education down to this day.27' 1 The
official prescription for teaching in the French schools-which are of
course still subject to tight national control-still includes teaching the
"rules of politesse.''2 75 This is not entirely easy to interpret, of course:
Every Western school system includes some form of training in "good
manners." Nevertheless, the teaching of "rules" of politeness in the French
schools sits very comfortably with a larger French tendency-the tendency
to speak, as so often in quasi-legal terms, of codes of politeness in everyday
life, to understand politesse as a set of ordered and learnable norms. For
that reason it seems not unreasonable to guess that the teaching of those
rules is more seriously meant and more formative in France than in a
country like the United States.
For indeed, the tendency to speak of codes of politesse, just as one once
spoke of the code of the duel, is remarkably widespread in France. 76 Here
at last we pass beyond formally stated institutional rules to consider what
undoubtedly matters most for the maintenance of French civility: social
enforcement. The observation that formalized courtesy plays a peculiarly
274. A recent memoir of a French upbringing still touches all the 19th-century republican
chords. Learning fine French manners means learning to be a lover of all mankind in a distinctly
courtly way:
Un gentleman est courtois, un Franqais plus encore: il est en outre beau parleur,
subtil et humoriste, son esprit est orn comme le sont sa livrde et ses gestes. Accucillir
ses invitds, s'entretenir avec eux: tel est l'usage de la vie, une sociabilitd faite d'intdret
pour les autres et pour les questions fondamentales .... Nous avons appris A nous
intdresser A notre prochain, l'6couter et ? le mettre en valeur. Elever un enfant, c'est
l'introduire dans le monde magnifique de I'humanitd. L'oducation consiste ii apprendre
la beautd morale.
A gentleman is courteous, a Frenchman even more so: What is more. he speaks
beautifully, subtly, and humorously; he has an elegantly ornamented wit, just as he has
elegantly ornamented dress and elegantly ornamented gestures. To welcome his guests.
to converse with them: This is how life is lived, with a sociability founded in the
practice of taking an interest both in other persons and in fundamental questions [of
philosophy and the like] .... We have learned to take an interest in our neighbor, to
listen to him, and to value him. To raise a child is to introduce him to the magnificent
world of humanity. Education consists in learning moral beauty.
ODILE MARCEL, UNE EDUCATION FRANQAISE 35 (1984).
275. See Minist~re de l'dducation nationale, de la recherche et de la technologie, Programmes
de l'6cole primaire, Cycle des approfondissements (visited Dec. 3, 1999) <http://www.edtication.
gouv.fr/primlprogec/inextens/acitoyen.htm>.
276. One 19th-century author could even call his guide to politesse the "Code Civil." See
HORCE A. RAISSON, CODE CIVIL. MANUEL COMPLET DE LA POLITESSE, DU TON, DES %aANItRES
DE LA BONNE COMPAGNIE (Paris, B. Renault 14th ed. 1853), cited in NYE, supra note 119, at 267
n. 11. Raisson, it should be noted, called almost every one of his many books a "code." For an
interesting early example of the French law-ification of honor, see DISCOURS DE MORALE, SUR
L'HONNEUR, L'OPINION, LES DEVOIRS, LES PASSIONS, LE BONHEUR & LES PLAISIRS, &C..
ADRESStS A UN JEUNE SEIGNEUR 5 (Cambridge, Chez de Senne 1788): "L'honneur consiste dans
la constante habitude, & l'indbranlable volont6 de faire le bien selon sa charge & ses moyens."
This echoes the famous definition of the law in DIG. 1.1.10 (Ulpian. libro primo regularum).
"Justice is the constant and unwavering determination to give unto each his due." "Codes" of
politesse were preceded by "codes" of dueling conduct. On the importation of these from Italy.
see NYE, supra note 119, at 25.
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important role in the organization of French society is, of course, a
commonplace. 2' Foreigners often speak of this aspect of France: "The
polite tradition is considered a rampart of French civilization, a code of
behavior that makes life in society possible."2" Foreigners also often note
that French politesse is thought of as peculiarly artificial, just as its critics
used to say in the late eighteenth century: "The whole of society rests on a
bogus politeness, on courtesies that no one practises except to mask their
real thoughts." 27 9 To outsiders, France seems a society of appearances, a
place where the outward show of respect dominates to a strange excess.
French authors, for their part, also frequently note the centrality of politesse
in French society, although rather than emphasizing its "artificiality," they
often like to focus on its "codified" character. As Proust, the most elegant
witness, described it, the "code" of good behavior had a "jurisprudence," a
body of case law.' This "l[ploliteness" is, as another French author puts it,
"the cornerstone of bourgeois behaviour .... How one greets people, how
one introduces oneself, how one says thank you, and how one expresses
feelings form a cultural concentrate that balances proximity against the
distance that must be maintained in relation to other people."'' It is, I
think, in this widespread social commitment to the codes of politeness that
we really come to the heartland of the French culture of civility.
For the French do have a culture of civility. This is something that
deserves to be emphasized, since Americans often perceive the French to be
rude. No surprise: Americans in France bring a species of what seems like
rudeness down upon themselves. French codes of civility require outward
shows of respect that Americans typically, and egregiously, neglect.
American tourists frequently charge into French encounters without
offering even the minimally polite formulas that educated French persons
expect-without even beginning by saying, "Bonjour, Madame" or
"Bonjour, Monsieur." Inevitably, such Americans are perceived as rude;
inevitably, they are snubbed in response. On a deeper level, perhaps,
Americans take offense at the very toleration for "artificiality" that lies at
the heart of French politesse; the French practice of artificiality does not sit
well with an American taste for authenticity. All of this opens a gulf of
277. On its formality, see W.L. WILEY. THE FORMAL FRENCH (1967).
278. SANCHE DE GRAMONT, THE FRENCH: PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE 305 (1969).
279. THEODORE ZELDIN, THE FRENCH 55 (1983): cf GRAMO,NT. supra note 278. at 305
("Politeness in the French sense is not natural but contrived. It is precisely because it is artificial
that it is recognized as a mark of special attention. It is. as Montesquieu remarked, an
embellishmenL").
280. MARCEL PROUST, LE COIt DE GUERMANTES II (Thierry Lager & Brian Rogers eds.). in
2 A LA RECHERCHE Du TEMPS PERDU 882 (Jean-Yves Tadi6 ed.. Gallimard 1988) (1922) (" [Elle
ne voyait rien dans le code des convenances que lui indiqufat la jurisprudence ai suivre ....").
281. BPATRix LE WITA, FRENCH BOURGEOIS CULTURE 81 (J.A. Underwood trans..
Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1988).
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cultural incomprehension that leaves Americans too little aware of the
strength of the French culture of civility.
Yet that culture of civility is strong; and it is, once again, full of the
memory of an aristocratic past. Such has indeed been the burden of some of
the most widely discussed, and (for the most part) 28 2 well-received
sociological writing on France of the last decades, including Norbert Elias's
Civilizing Process 283 and Pierre Bourdieu's Distinction.24 Both authors, and
many others as well,285 emphasize the same point: The culture of politesse
that is such a marked feature of French social life is an historically
aristocratic culture that has been generalized throughout French society. As
Elias classically put it: "[B]ourgeois society, in everything that concerns
social conduct, [has taken] over the ritual of courtly society without
developing it with the same intensity."" The sense of this courtly
background to everyday interaction is so powerful that when French
witnesses describe the French pattern of courtesy, they are rarely satisfied
with the observation that politesse is highly codified. They generally find it
important to add observations about the history of social conflict in France:
Politesse is associated, in French commentary, with the old French
aristocracy; and the wide extension of patterns of politesse is associated
282. Important doubts are raised about Elias's argument in DANIEL GORDON, CITIZENS
WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY: EQUALITY AND SOCIABILITY IN FRENCH THOUGHT, 1670-1789, at 86-
91 (1994); and EMMANUEL LE ROY LADURIE. SAINT-SIMON app. (1997). Gordon questions
whether courtly forms of politeness were really the only ones at large in French early modem
culture, and takes particular pains to emphasize the egalitarian coloration of salon interaction
already present in the 17th century, see GORDON, supra, at 93, and certainly in the 18th century.
See also JEROEN DUINDAM, MYTHS OF POWER (Lorri S. Granger & Gerard T. Moran trans..
1994) (attacking Elias's picture of court society).
Gordon's argument is fundamentally incompatible with my own, and it is important to say a
word about it. The strength of at least a narrow version of Elias's claim-a version holding that
there was a generalization of aristocratic values in the late 18th and 19th centuries-is, I think,
clear on the strictly legal-historical evidence I offer here. Within the history of the law of insult.
there is no escaping the aristocratic heritage. This is, however, only a point about law; it says
nothing about the more elusive and complex social practices that are Gordon's subject.
At the same time, I agree entirely with Gordon's claim that the forms of civility are not
necessarily hierarchical-not even, as Duindam has argued, in monarchical courts. On the
contrary, as I argue infra text accompanying note 363, civil interaction is often egalitarian. As I
also argue below, however, a hierarchical image of society does belong to the VorverstiIdnzi.s
underlying even egalitarian relations; and to that degree, something like Elias's claim makes
sense.
283. ELIAS, supra note 24.
284. PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE
(Richard Nice trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1984) (1979).
285. See, e.g., NYE, supra note 119, at 8 ("[A] male code of honor... survived the
destruction of the Old Regime in 1789 by accommodating its practices and usages to the unique
sociability and legal arrangements of bourgeois civilization .... [A] code that sustained a military
and landowning race (the term used by nobles themselves). . . appeal[ed] to their bourgeois
successors ...."); see also MARCEL, supra note 274, at 145 n.B ("[Lla bourgeoisie ... n'existe
pas comme telle et ne peut surgir financi ement, socialement et 6conomiquement qu'en
s'identifiant A l'ancienne noblesse ....").
286. ELIAS, supra note 24, at 504.
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with a peculiar pattern of French egalitarianism that has extended
historically aristocratic styles of behavior throughout society.'
To speak of this "egalitarianism" is not to say, to be sure, that there is
no sense of social hierarchy left in French politesse. Quite the contrary:
Like the German law of insult, the French social regulation of civility is
strongly oriented toward rank and respect. Here, for example, is how one
French author describes the Franco-American contrast in one of the aspects
of French politesse that is most baffling to foreigners, the salutation in
letters:
When a correspondent writes me from the United States, his letter
ends with the one-size-fits-all formula used in Oregon as well as in
New England: "Sincerely yours." Sincerely what, I ask you. But no
matter! The Americans have always had a flair for not getting tied
up in knots over the forms of aristocratic society, which they have
never known.
By contrast, like all of my compatriots, at the end of every
letter I am led to a self-interrogation. Should I write: "Veuillez,
Monsieur, recevoir l'expression de mes sentiments distinguds"
[" Be so kind, Sir, as to receive the expression of my distinguished
sentiments"]? Shouldn't my sentiments, in this instance, really be
"respectful"? Should I write "recevez" [ordinary form of
"receive" ] or "agr6ez" [elevated form of "receive" ]? Would it be
appropriate that I speak of my "consideration," and should my
consideration declare itself to be "high" or merely
"distinguished" ? And the "compliments" ? And the "sentiments
empress6s" [" fervent sentiments" ]? You have to wrack your brain
over the adjective "devoted," dip your pen ten times in addressing
a woman, a colonel, an archbishop. All of this has been coded
[codg]; one must absolutely not lose one's bearings, and the
democratic professor that I believe myself to be is always
astounded when one of his students offers him his "cordial
thoughts." 288
As this passage suggests, the norms of politesse that are so central in
French life, and that foreigners absorb only after occasionally painful
struggles in everyday interaction, by and large call for a show of differential
287. For a rich collection of examples. tracing a wide range of aspects of current French
politesse to their old regime routes, see WEIL, supra note 218. For a 19th-century example, see
NYE, supra note 119, at 166 (" [Olur bourgeois fin -de-sikcle cedes nothing to old regime nobles in
courtesy, correctness, and probity." (quoting Daniel Cloutier)).
288. MICHEL WINOCK, PARLEZ-MOI DE LA FRANCE 84 (1995). For a guide to closing
salutations, graduated according to the "distance" between the correspondents. see WHO'S WHO
IN FRANCE 1993-1994, at 1801 (1994).
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respect for other persons.289 (It goes without saying, once again, that they
also involve certain highly effective methods of cutting and snubbing; being
polite and being pleasant are not the same thing.)
Nevertheless, the French tendency to generalize respect throughout the
population is powerful. The French emphasis on maintaining a high level of
respect at all times is particularly marked in the practice of forms of
address. French persons remain, despite changing mores,290 much slower
than persons of almost any other European nationality to use the "thou"
form, maintaining the formal "you" even with persons they know quite
well. This practice of showing a sort of stiff equal respect to everybody is,
in the eyes both of the French and of observant foreigners, a decidedly
republican practice. Stefan Zweig, for example, made a point of
emphasizing the egalitarianism of French courtesy:
Once, when I was in an elegant restaurant-it was Larue, near the
Madeleine-in came some rich farmers from Normandy, who had
been to a baptism; they thundered in in heavy shoes that beat the
floor like horsehooves, in village costumes, their hair so thick with
pomade you could smell it in the kitchen. They talked loud, and got
louder the more they drank, and merrily slapped their fat wives on
the thighs without a moment's embarrassment. It didn't bother
them in the least to be honest-to-god country people sitting between
white dinner jackets and elegant make-up jobs, but even the waiter,
shaven smooth as a mirror, didn't turn up his nose, as he would
have done with such bumpkin guests in Germany or in England. Fie
served them with the same politeness and irreproachability that he
served the ministers and excellencies, and it even gave the Maitre
d' pleasure to offer a particularly hearty welcome to these fractious
guests. Paris was a place where there was simply a coexistence of
contraries, not a higher and a lower.. .. 29
The same point is to be found in French commentators: As one author
of a guide of politesse put it in 1821, "All men should be equal before la
politesse as they are before the law. 292 Others said similar things in the
nineteenth century as well. 93 Contemporary etiquette books continue to
289. Of course, it has to be said that "showing respect for other persons" is not a self-
explanatory phrase; in fact, some of them are ways of showing respect that are peculiar to French
practice.
290. On these, see WELL, supra note 218, at 70-71.
291. STEFAN ZWEIG, DIE WELT VON GESTERN: ERINNERUNGEN EINES EUROPAERS 125
(1955).
292. NYE, supra note 119, at 129 (quoting LOUIS-DAMIEN EMERIC, NOUVEAU GUIEI). )t; tLA
POLITESSE 23 (Paris, Roret & Roussel 1821)).
293. As another, more cynical, French author-or at least, one more conscious of the
artificialities of the outward show of respect-wrote in 1837, "La politesse is the simulacrunm of
love for one's neighbor; it is a tacit truce between men consumed by self-love, the silence of
egotism, an involuntary respect for human dignity. It has been invented to re-establish in this
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speak in exactly the same terms.29 It remains an ideal of French politesse, if
only an aspirational one, that all persons should be able to act like Zweig's
LaRue Maitre d', treating all with an irreproachable equality.
What we thus see in the French case, taken all in all, is much the pattern
of leveling up that we saw in the German law of insult, though principally
on the social rather than the legal plane. Reaching back into the seventeenth
century, and perhaps further, a style of courteous behavior that had been the
characteristic of a courtly culture was gradually diffused throughout French
society. Everyone who masters the "artificialities" of French politesse has
thus become, to a certain extent, a participant in aristocratic society. The
story is not just a social one, though; it is important to emphasize that it has
both legal and political aspects as well. The law mattered in the formation
of French politesse, for the "code" of French norms was at least partly
formed on the template of the law. As for politics, the French state,
especially through the educational system, has made the general extension
of courteous forms a central element in the republican ethos since the
nineteenth century. More broadly, there is a kind of republicanism in
French politesse whose importance should not be minimized. The fact that
everybody can expect to be called vous has something to do with the kind
of republic that France is.
world the appearance of equality." Id. (quoting I EDOUARD ALLErZ, DE LA D--tOCRATIE
NOUVELLE. OU DES MOEURS Er DE LA PUISSANCE DES CLASSES MOYENNES EN FRANCE 107
(Paris, F. Lequieu 1837)). For another example, see id. at 155 (quoting JEAN MAC#- LES VERTUS
DU RtPUBLICAIN (n.p. 1848)) (" [Plositive law is never exhaustive and politesse must make up for
the gaps in the code ... [supplying] fraternal love .... reciprocal egalitarianism.... universal
suffrage.").
As Heinrich Heine put it, the goal of the French Revolution was to abolish bourgeois
inequality and to substitute aristocratic equality for all. See HEINRICH HEINE, ENGUSCHE
FRAGMENTE (1828), reprinted in REISEBILDER 499 (1993) (" [lenn die Canaillc roturie sich
die Freiheit nahm, jene hohe Noblesse zu k6pfen. so geschah dieses vielleiht weniger urn ihre
Gifter als um ibre Ahnen zu erben, und statt der bilrgerlichen Ungleichheit cine adlige Glcichheit
einzufiihren.").
294. See, e.g., SABINE DENUELLE, LE SAVOIR-VIvRE: GUIDE DES RIGLES Er DES USAGES
D'AUJOURD'HUI 9 (1999):
Ak la politesse des apparences---tenue, aisance. nmintien. gestes-se juge Ic degrid de
culture et d'ducation de quelqu'un, inddpendanment de son rang social et de son
niveau de fortune; les coutumes peuvent varier d'une rdgion ou d'une classe sociale h
l'autre, mais la ddlicatesse de la personne et l'aisance des manieres ne connaissent pas
de fronti~res.
A person's degree of culture and education is judged by the politesse of appearances-
physical bearing, ease and assurance of manner, gestures-independently of that
person's social rank and level of fortune; dress may vary from one region or social
class to another, but the dilicatesse of a person and the ease of manners know no
borders.
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VII. THE AMERICAN CASE
Clearly enough, there is much in these societies that sets them apart
from the American republic. Before trying to analyze the differences among
French, German, and American societies, though, it is important to sketch,
if only rapidly, the state of American civility and American law.
A word of methodological caution first. My goal in this Part is to show
that the United States displays a relative lack of civility, both in its social
practices and in its law. Showing such relative differences is the great
strength of comparative law; showing such differences does not, of course,
imply that the United States has any absolute lack of civility. To readers to
whose minds exceptions spring, let me therefore emphasize: This is a
comparative study!
Seen in comparative perspective, then, the lack of civility in the United
States-at least outside the American South-is as proverbial as the
presence of civility in France. The very intensity of the pro-civility
campaign suggests that American society displays fewer of the forms of
respectful interaction than do French and German societies. And indeed,
just that has been said about American society for many generations. Norms
of politesse are much less generally shared and idealized among Americans
than among French, at least outside the American South and some nonurban
areas. Everyday interaction in the United States has long had a more free-
form character, patterns of deference having begun to vanish noticeably by
the late eighteenth century.295 "Excess of ceremony," Noah Webster
already instructed schoolchildren in 1789, "shews want of breeding. That
civility is best which excludes all superfluous formality."29 6 Americans
know how strongly this attitude has survived into the present. Forms of
address vary considerably, and the use of first names, often regarded as an
English-language equivalent of the "thou" form, is common.29 This
tendency is one part of a larger phenomenon that has evocatively been
called "pseudo-Gemeinschaf";298 European visitors have long observed
that American interaction is characterized by a kind of obligatory
camaraderie that non-Americans experience as a deliberate general
rejection of norms of politesse-and that Europeans can experience as
295. See the survey of developments in CMIEL, supra note 9, at 40-45. For the growing
informality even in the prescriptions of American etiquette books since World War I. see ARTHUR
M. SCHLESINGER, LEARNING How To BEHAVE: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF AMERICAN
ETIQUETrE BOOKS 49-61 (1946).
296. Webster's advice is quoted and discussed in CMIEL, supra note 9, at 45. For the
antiaristocratic bent of Webster, see also id. at 52-53.
297. On the use of first names, and on slang undercutting hierarchy generally, see id at 128-
29.
298. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 50 (1973).
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"barbarism," in Robert Wiebe's phrase.? As one French visitor to the
United States said of an 1864 political rally, it was a
"strange scene," far removed from French rural gatherings " where
some elegant gentleman addresses our worthy peasants in that
dignified... style" or even from meetings of the French proletariat
where "decency" and "civilized manners" ruled more often than
not .... "These people [the Americans] deal and wish to deal only
with their equals; one has to speak their language, to be even more
vulgar than they are." "
Arthur Schlesinger thought that this American pattern should be traced to
the social origins of our first settlers in "the peasant and working
classes."' ' It is certainly possible to quarrel with Schlesinger's book on
various counts, but it is true that our civility culture looks like a thing of
peasants in contrast to that of France. No generalization of aristocratic
norms to the lower orders here has taken place; if anything, as Kenneth
Cmiel has shown in his book Democratic Eloquence, American culture has
put pressure on everyone operating in the public sphere to dumb it down, to
talk on the lowest social level.
To be sure, the tale is not one of wholly unmixed "barbarism." The
United States belongs, in some limited ways, to the same Western tradition
as do Germany and France. It is true, for example, that dueling, and its
associated cult of honor, existed for a very long time in the American
South.0 2 During the early Republic, it existed in the North as well?0
Particularly in colonial Virginia, there was a culture of politeness that could
299. WIEBE, supra note 9, at 47-54.
300. CMIEL, supra note 9, at 72 (quoting and discussing Ernest Duvergicr de Hauranne).
301. SCHLESINGER, supra note 295, at 1.
302. See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE
19TH-CENTuRY AMERICAN SouTH 9-33 (1984); KENNETH S. GREENBERG, HONOR AND
SLAVERY 4-23 (1996); WYATt-BROWN, supra note 39. at 350-61. For colonial Virginian ideas of
honor, see GREENBERG, supra, at 96-97. For the aristocratic origins of much of Virginia's elite,
see DAVID HACKEtT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 212-16
(1989). For the origins of Massachusetts settlers in the "sturdy middle class of England." sec id.
at 27. For William Penn's doubts about the value of dueling, see id at 458. For endemic violence
in colonial backcountry, see id. at 765-71. The reluctance to go to law was there as well. Compare
the advice given to Andrew Jackson by his mother. "Always settle them cases yourself." quoted
in id. at 765. Cf. GREENBERG, supra, at 21-22 (describing eyewitness accounts of Jackson's
defenses of his honor against insult). Nevertheless. Americans have tended to describe their
variety of the duel itself as an egalitarian institution: "We are all parvenus, pretenders or snobs."
WYATr-BROWN, supra note 39, at 355 (quoting William J. Grayson).
303. See AYERS, supra note 302, at 19-20, 23-24; WYATT-BROWN, supra note 39, at xv
(discussing persistence of honor norms in early-I 9th-century New England); Joanne Barrie
Freeman, Affairs of Honor. Political Combat and Political Character in the Early Republic II n. 16
(1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with The Yale Law
Journal). For social rules of deference that hung on in Massachusetts into the early 19th century,
see FISCHER, supra note 302, at 180. For a discussion of deference education in colonial Virginia,
see id at 314-16, 321-22; WYAlT-BROWN, supra note 39, at 161-62.
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look very European: The young George Washington wrote a book of Rules
of Civility and Decent Behavior for himself that advised emulating
"persons of quality" and not the "vulgar." 3" The first Federalist
presidencies had an often-remarked air of the aristocratic about them."5
Styles of a kind of "aristocratic" decorum dominated American language
until the mid-nineteenth century as well.3  Into the present, moreover, a
"culture of honor" has survived in the American South, as Richard Nisbett
and Dov Cohen have argued in a remarkable recent study.3 7 In fact, Nisbett
and Cohen document both psychological and physiological responses to
insults among Southerners-physiological responses that include such
markers as increased testosterone levels.30 8 Insults clearly play something
like the social role in the South that they play in the honor culture of
Germany-though with an important difference: Southern insults lead to
high rates of violence that we do not see in German society. Within the
present-day African-American subculture, too, there is literature identifying
a strong, and often violent, propensity to react to insults.3 9 Honor culture is
thus not entirely absent in the United States.
Indeed, our tradition has even included a certain measure of the same
law that we find in Germany and France. Thus, many American states
passed insult and anti-dueling statutes in the nineteenth century,3"' and three
Southern states still have dueling statutes on the books.3t' Within the
common law, too, there are remains of the age of dueling to be found, in the
304. See CMIEL, supra note 9, at 28.
305. On this aristocratic air and the conflicts over it, see Freeman, supra note 303, at 24-73.
306. See CMIEL, supra note 9, at 14 ("By the mid-nineteenth century ... the very decorum
that 'gentlemen of the old school' saw as essential to principled behavior was viewed by large
segments of the democratic public as 'aristocratic."'); id. at 57, 91-92, 202-03.
307. See RICHARD E. NISBETr & DOv COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH (1996).
308. See id. at 41-55.
309. See ELIJAH ANDERSON, THE CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE AND THil,
MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 66-106 (1999).
310. For anti-dueling statutes, see ALA. DIG. LAWS 134 (D. Woodruff 1836): 2 CONN. DIG.
LAWS 334 (Durrie & Peck 1823); N.J. PUB. LAWS 237 (Josiah Harrison 1833); 2 N.Y. REV.
STAT. pt. IV, chap. 1, tit. 1, § 6 (Packard & Van Benthugsen 1829); 1 OHIO STAT. 441 (Corey &
Fairbank 1833); and PA. DIG. LAWS 334 (James Kay, Jr. & Bro. 1852). For a discussion of the
high rates of defamation suits in the early years of the settlement of British North America, see
WYATr-BROWN, supra note 39, at 447.
On Georgia's repeal of its dueling statute, see also 22 AM. JUR. 468 (1834): and Livingston's
Draft Code of Offences and Punishments for Louisiana, tit. 19, ch. 6, p. 133 (B. Levy & Co.
1822). For Mittermaier's rejection of the American practice of rendering duelists ineligible for
public office, as an unacceptable defaming punishment, see MITIERMAIER, BEITRAGE ZLJR LEHIRE
VOM DUELL, ARCHIV DES CRIMINALRECHTS 379 n.f. (n.p. 1834).
311. These are Mississippi, Virginia, and West Virginia. For these statutes and their "origin
as part of an anti-dueling code," see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TIlE
LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 60 (5th ed. 1984). See also FLYNN, supra note 26. at 76-79 (noting cases
of the heightened sensitivity of Southern courts to insults as justifying violent acts as late as the
1930s, and especially the persistence of the Texas "paramour" law, which until 1971 treated a
husband's murder of his wife's lover, if caught flagrante delicto, as justified). For dueling and
honor, see Post, supra note 7, at 704-05.
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doctrine of assault and battery. The familiar tort-law principle that any
"touching" may qualify as a battery sounds a lot like the old German and
French doctrines of the Tdtlichkeit and the voie de fait; touchiness, as it
were, is characteristic of the duelist's ethos. As the standard dueling manual
of the nineteenth century put it, "Quiconque touche, frappe" ,-" To touch a
person is to hit him."3 2 It is unsurprising, then, that the common-law
doctrine of battery dates precisely to the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries-the high era of early modem dueling. 3 This doctrine
made its way into the United States too, in a period when dueling was still
common, as the earliest American case on the doctrine of battery makes
clear.314 It hangs on today, an odd relic of an aristocratic age.
Moreover, if there are traces of an aristocratic tradition within
American law, there are traces of what we can think of as an antiaristocratic
tradition too. Some historically low-status populations in the United
States-especially racial minorities, most especially African Americans-
display, of course, a strong sense that America is a place with a history of
social hierarchy. That sense is close in spirit to the sense of historic social
hierarchy that helps shape legal culture in Germany and France. It is
accordingly no surprise if among commentators on race matters we find the
most determined insistence on the need for hate-speech legislation: Many
African-American authors show something akin to the European sense that,
after centuries of distinctions in dignity, honor ought now somehow be
generalized throughout the population. The same is true of at least some
commentators on the place of women in American society, who have also
tried to grasp at whatever there is in the American legal tradition that would
permit the construction of a law of generalized dignity.
Yet all this does not make the United States European. Those who
would like to see a law of generalized dignity here have not found much to
grasp; for the fact is that our dominant legal tradition has developed in a
312. CHATAUVILLARD, supra note 108, at 9.
313. For the early history (though without reference to the culture of dueling) see 8 W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 422-23 (1922). which traces the shift from a
medieval concept of battery as "'the infliction of physical injury" to the modem concept of a
touching importing an insult; and FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 218-19 (13th ed.
1929). The leading statement of the modem rule is Cole v. Tunier. 6 Mod. 149 (Q.B. 1705) (Holt,
CJ.) (" mhe least touching of another in anger is a battery."). See also Regina v. Cotesworth. 6
Mod. 172 (Q.B. 1705) (Holt, CJ.) (holding that spitting is a battery).
314. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated,
As to the assault, this is, perhaps, one of that kind, in which the insult is more to be
considered, than the actual damage; for, though no great bodily pain is suffered by a
blow on the palm of the hand, or the skin of the coat. yet these are clearly within the
legal d[e]finition of Assault and Battery. and among gentlemen. too often induce
duelling, and terminate in murder.
Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (I Dall.) 111. 114 (Pa. 1784) (McKean. Ci.). For
continuing citation of this case, see I THOMAS ATKINS STREET. THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
LIABILrIY 6 (1906).
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way that sets it sharply apart from the dominant traditions of Continental
Europe. If we have our bit of quasi-aristocratic tradition lying somewhere in
our past, the fact is that honor has, effectively, not survived as a cognizable
value in our law. Thus, the early American tradition of dueling and insult
law never evolved into anything like the German law of insult, or even the
French law of insult. Even in the American South, the law has
comparatively little to say about rude behavior."5 There is, to be sure, some
criminal law of "abusive language" in the United States. This law differs
from what we see in Europe, though. First and foremost, the American law
of abusive language is a law of fighting words, both by its own terms and
under the limitations of First Amendment jurisprudence. A mere show of
disrespect, without an immediate threat of violent breach of the peace, is
not punishable in the United States." 6 Moreover, and strikingly, the
American criminal law of abusive language focuses heavily on the use of
obscenities.317 In this regard, the American law of abusive language often
looks more like a law of decency than a law of civility.31s (Indeed, in other
respects too, the United States has more law of decency than France and
Germany do; we are, for example, much more resistant to public nudity
than either of those countries. Perhaps the best statement of the contrast is
to say, not that the Europeans have a law of civility where we do not, but
that where the Europeans tend to have a law of civility, we tend to have a
law of decency.) Like French and Germans, Americans make special
provisions to protect police officers from abusive language, but American
defendants in such cases are very frequently acquitted.319 As for the three
Southern anti-dueling statutes, to the extent they are invoked at all, they
have been assimilated into the mainstream of American jurisprudence.32
315. See, e.g., Cushing v. General Time Corp., 549 F. Supp. 768, 770 (N.D. Ala. 1982)
(holding that "insults" and "indignities" do not give rise to a cause of action in Alabama).
316. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 511 (15th ed. 1996).
317. See, e.g., Hooks v. State, 660 N.E.2d 1076, 1077-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding the
conviction of the defendant for shouting obscenities at officers, where obscenities could be
overheard by neighbors). A much discussed recent Michigan case, which ended in the conviction
of a canoeist who had used obscenities within the hearing of children, deserves to be cited here.
See A Canoeist Who Cursed Draws His Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1999, at A 13.
318. For cases involving sexual solicitation and obscenities, see 4 STUART M. SPEISER ET
AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 16:5, at 982-83 (1987). By Doering's count, 31.2% of the
insults used by German women had sexual content-mostly involving women calling each other
"whores" because of their sexual activity-and only 15.3% of the insults used-by German men
had sexual content. See DOERING, supra note 45, at 25, 116. For women as the only parties calling
their spouses' lovers "whores" or "adulterers," see id. at 35.
319. See 4 TORCIA, supra note 316, § 511, at 131-32; see also Michael G. Walsh,
Annotation, Insulting Words Addressed Directly to Police Officer as Breach of Peace or
Disorderly Conduct, 14 A.L.R.4th 1252, 1270-73 (1982).
320. In Mississippi, the statute seems to have dropped from litigation. The most recent case I
can find is Tattis v. Karthans, 215 So. 2d 685 (Miss. 1968). See also Henry v. Pearson. 158 So. 2d
695 (Miss. 1963), rev'd sub nom. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965). Henry was a civil-rights-
era case in which a Mississippi official brought a successful defamation suit; the verdict in favor
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Statutory law is not all we have, of course. There is also the common
law of torts. The limits on American tort law, though, are stark. The United
States does have one tort-law tradition of penalizing insulting language that
looks a bit like what we find in Europe. This is the practice, very vigorous
once upon a time, of requiring common carriers, innkeepers, and public
utilities to show courtesy to all comers. Especially in the late nineteenth
century, American courts often held common carriers liable when their
agents used just the sorts of epithets that show up in the European law of
insult: "deadbeat," "swindler," "lunatic," "big fat woman." 32 This cause
of action has largely vanished from American tort practice, though, even if
it is occasionally relied upon by courts today.3" Even in its heyday, it had
features that made it look quite different from the German or French law of
insult. It never extended to cover "mere discourtes[ies]" of the kind
sometimes actionable in Germany. 323 Like other comers of American law,
this law of insult was always something of a law of decency, focusing on
"profane or indecent" language.324 Most of all, of course, the setting of the
common carrier is worlds away from the duelist's encounters that informed
European insult law. Where European law has always aimed to guarantee
respect for honorable persons in all their daily doings, American law has
aimed more at guaranteeing access in certain broadly commercial
contexts.3' The difference is a sharp and continuing one: Down to this day,
Americans can see a sign that reads "No Turks Allowed" as fundamentally
of the plaintiff was later reversed by the Supreme Court. The scanty Virginia jurisprudence makes
the statute essentially one of the ordinary fighting-words type. See Sanderson v. Colonial
Williamsburg Found., [no docket number in original] 1990 Va. Cir. LEXIS 65 (Va. Ct. App. May
1990). But see, e.g., Pulliam v. Mien, 466 U.S. 522, 525 (1984); Old Dominion Branch 496 v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 282-87 (1974) (reversing the application of Virginia's statute in a
defamation action in which federal labor law protected abusive language used against "scabs");
Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 743 F. Supp. 1228, 1231-34 (W.D. Va. 1990) (concerning the
use of abusive language in repossession); Allen v. Burke. CIV. A. No. 81-0040-A, 1981 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18456 (E.D. Va. June 4, 1981) (concerning an arrest under the Virginia statute); Zayre of
Va., Inc. v. Gowdy, 147 S.E.2d 710, 713 (Va. 1966). West Virginia has the liveliest jurisprudence,
but it too remains scanty, and involves causes of action familiar under the ordinary tort law of
other states. See Estep v. Brewer, 453 S.E.2d 345, 346-50 (W. Va. 1994) (involving a defamation
suit); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d 70, 75-92 (,V. Va. 1984) (concerning privacy).
But see Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 280 S.E.2d 216, 219 (W. Va. 1981) (characterizing an
insulting-word statute as punishing "vituperative epithets or traditional racial slurs").
321. KEETON ET At.., supra note 311, § 12, at 58 nn.31-32 (quoting from cases in which
agents of common carriers used these insults, for which the carriers were found liable). For a
recent discussion, see Cohen v. Varig Airlines, 380 N.Y.S.2d 450, 459-60 (Civ. C. 1975). In one
interesting case, Reed v. Maley, 74 S.W. 1079 (Ky. 1903), the court considered and rejected the
extension of the reasoning in the common-carrier jurisprudence to cover a sexual approach to a
woman of the kind covered by the German law of Sexualbeleidigung. See Jean C. Love,
Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 123, 136-37 (1990). On Sexualbeleidigung, see supra notes 78-8 1.
322. See, e.g., Ricci v. American Airlines, 544 A.2d 428, 430-33 (NJ. Super. Ci. App. Div.
1988) (relying on the liability of common carriers for insults).
323. KEETON ET AL., supra note 311, § 12, at 58 n.3 1.
324. Id. § 12, at 58.
325. Though not generally speaking in shops. See id. § 12, at 58 & an. 38-39.
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offensive in a way that German jurists do not.3 26 Even when Americans
have had a living tort law of insult, that law has presupposed the open
marketplace as its setting.
In the rest of tort doctrine, the only sorts of nonviolent attacks that are
commonly thought to call for a legal response in the United States are ones
that damage reputation: defamatory and libelous statements. The classic
account of Prosser includes some charming American huffiness over the
very idea that mere incivility might give rise to tort liability:
[Outside the context of common-carrier liability,] defendants are
not liable for mere insult, indignity, annoyance, or even threats,
where the case is lacking in other circumstances of aggravation.
The reasons are not far to seek. Our manners, and with them our
law, have not yet progressed to the point where we are able to
afford a remedy in th6 form of tort damages for all intended mental
disturbance. Liability of course cannot be extended to every trivial
indignity. There is no occasion for the law to intervene with balm
for wounded feelings in every case where a flood of billingsgate is
loosed in an argument over a back fence. The plaintiff must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain
amount of rough language, and to acts that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind. There is still, in this country at least,
such a thing as liberty to express an unflattering opinion of another,
however wounding it may be to the other's feelings .... 327
In the employment context in particular, Regina Austin notes that there
is little restraint, under American law, on the use of abusive language. 2 1
There are, it is true, a few egregious forms of misbehavior that may fall
under the common-law category of "intentional infliction of emotional
distress." But that tort, and the related tort of outrage,329 clearly cover
326. Contrast the German law discussed supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text.
327. KEETON ET AL., supra note 311, § 12, at 59.
328. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1988); see also KEETON Er AL.. supra
note 311, §§ 12, 62 (Supp. 1988) (discussing workplace regulations). But see 4 SPEISER F.T At..,
supra note 318, § 16:21, at 1096-97 & nn.86-91 (citing cases). Unsurprisingly, the German law is
different. Section 193 of the Criminal Code instructs courts to take account of "justified interests"
where workplace superiors are accused of insulting their subordinates. Nevertheless, the sense that
dignity must be preserved applies to workplace subordinates in practice as it does to others. For
the duty of persons of authority in the workplace to speak respectfully to their subordinates, in a
way that respects their "Ehre" and "Menschenwurde," see, for example, 3VerwG I.
Disziplinarsenat, Oct. 23, 1974, 1 D 28.74, JURIS ref. no. WBRE002558400: and compare
BVerwG 1. Disziplinarsenat, Sept. 8, 1988, 1 D 70/87, JURIS ref. no. WBRE310098401. See also
DOERING, supra note 45, at 37. Doering guesses that there are many unreported workplace cases.
Nevertheless the tendency in Germany to regulate workplace interaction through addressing
"mobbing" is powerful and represents a dramatic contrast with the United States.
329. For the proposition that the torts of outrage and intentional infliction of emotional
distress are basically identical, see the cases cited in 4 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 318. § 16:13. at
1016 n.10.
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behavior that is far more grievous than are the piddling shows of disrespect
that can be sanctioned under the German law of insult, or even than those
that can be sanctioned under French "policing" rules.3" We require
considerable grievousness before any legal liability arises.33" ' If our doctrine
of battery is something of a duelist's doctrine, the rest of the code of
dueling never established itself in the common law: "[Tihe trespass action
for assault, which was a remedy designed to keep the peace, never was
extended to words which were more insulting, unendurable, and generally
provocative than blows."332 There are certainly cases in which the law of
battery is used to impose liability for disrespectful behavior-notably cases
with a tinge of racial conflict.333 Racial and ethnic insults, too, occasionally
give rise to successful claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.3" But those cases hardly amount to a developed body of civility
law.
The general American resistance to creating a law of civility has also,
and not least, marked American constitutional law. As all commentators on
comparative hate-speech law have noted, our constitutional law makes free
330. See KEErON ET AL., supra note 311. § 12, at 56:
The most cogent objection to the [law of intentional infliction of emotional
distress] lies in the "wide door" which might be opened, not only to fictitious claims.
but to litigation in the field of trivialities and mere bad manners. It would be absurd for
the law to seek to secure universal peace of mind, and many interferences with it must
of necessity be left to other agencies of social control. " Against a large part of the
frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a
community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the
law could ever be."
The drift of the law of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been to drop the historical
requirement that there be some physical injury before recovery may be granted. See 4 SP..ISER ET
AL., supra note 318, § 16:5, at 968-70; Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation. Civil Liability for
Insulting or Abusive Language, 20 A.L.R.4th 773-812 (1993). Nevertheless. even the cases that
can be adduced to show that this shift has taken place fit within the American pattern. See. e.g..
Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 1997). cert. denied. 119 S. CL 868 (1999) (holding that,
under Texas law, liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not extend to mere
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty oppressions); Van Stan v. Fancy Colours & Co.,
125 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997) (same under Illinois law); Dove v. PNS Stores. 982 F. Supp. 1420
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (same under California law); Griswold v. Fresenius USA. 978 F. Supp. 718
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (same under Ohio law); Waldon v. Covington. 415 A.2d 1070 (D.C. 1980)
(holding that physical consequences must be not unlikely to result or the defendant must enjoy a
special relationship to the plaintiff such as that of common carrier or debtor-creditor); Tuggle v.
Wilson, 282 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 1981) (focusing on obscene language): S & W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor
Broad., 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (involving incitement to violence): Harris v. Jones.
380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977) (holding that emotional distress must be severe); Ford v. Hutson, 276
S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 1981) (requiring extreme outrage); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961)
(involving indecent behavior). Similar standards apply in the few cases in which recovery for
ridicule is permitted. See 4 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 318, § 16:5. at 985-86.
331. See Love, supra note 321, at 137-38, 139 (discussing a case involving repeated
solicitations to have sex and repeated verbal abuse).
332. KEETON ET AL., supra note 311, § 12, at 57.
333. See, e.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel. 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967) (holding a
motor hotel club liable for battery for offensive treatment of African Americans).
334. See Love, supra note 321, at 128-35.
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speech a supreme value in a way that the law of Continental Europe does
not.335 The Supreme Court has indeed, after some decades of doubt, come
close to saying that it is unconstitutional to make rudeness actionable. This
was perhaps not always so. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire36 is often cited
as a decision that would have allowed regulation of rudeness, and it may be
that it did.337 Even with respect to Chaplinsky, it is important not to let our
attention wander too far from the facts. Chaplinsky partook of two very
peculiar types of insult cases. It was a case in which the defendant called a
city marshal a "damned Fascist." This means that it was, first of all, an
exception of a very common type: a case involving police officers. Insulting
police officers is a distinctive kind of offense-one that is much more
commonly punished throughout the world than are other kinds of insults.'
Second, Chaplinsky, with its use of the epithet "Fascist," belongs within
the special category of political-insult cases. Political-insult cases,
especially ones involving accusations of Fascism, are common in Germany
and France too.339 They have to do, it seems to me, less with the
management of civility than with the governance of political debate. It is
not at all obvious that the two sorts of problems are identical.
Whatever tendency toward permitting a law of civility there may have
been in the Chaplinsky case, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
clearly taken a different turn, at least outside the schoolroom setting."'
One of these is, of course, Cohen v. California,34' known to everyone as the
"f- the draft" case. Cohen, decided in an era as politically troubled as
the era of Chaplinsky, forbade California to criminalize a public utterance•. 342
of obscenities. It is often viewed as marking the constitutional death of'
civility law in America. Here again, though, it is not clear that the case was
really about civility. As I have emphasized throughout, public utterance of
obscenity raises very different issues from disrespectful statements or
gestures directed at an individual: Cohen is not about the law of civility, but
335. See, e.g., GEORG NOLTE, BELEIDIGUNGSSCHUTZ IN DER FREIHEITLICHEN DEMOKRATIE
(1992) (contrasting German and American treatments of free speech).
336. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
337. See, e.g., Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine, 106 HARv. L.
REV. 1129, 1131 (1993).
338. For a sample of cases in Germany, see HOHNEL, supra note 45, at 38-46; HAMBURGER
ABENDBLATr, supra note 45. For collective insult of the police, see BayObLG [Bavarian Court of
Appeals], NJW, 43 (1990), 921 (922) (F.R.G.). For France, see supra note 240. For current U.S.
law, see supra note 319 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., DOERING, supra note 45, at 97 ("typischen SS-Mann" ["typical SS man" I);
HOHNEL, supra note 45, at 12 ("alter Nazi" ["old Nazi"]). For France, see supra notc 246 and
accompanying text. For "insulting" accusations of communism as common in the 1950s in West
Germany, see DOERING, supra note 45, at 25.
340. On the permissibility of inculcating civility in the schools, see Bethel School District v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 683 (1986).
341. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
342. See id.
1380 [Vol. 109: 1279
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1380 1999-2000
2000] Enforcing Civility and Respect 1381
rather about the law of decency." 3 Nevertheless, it surely tells us something
revealing about American culture that Cohen should have been read as a
case about the law of civility. It was decided at a time, not only when
longstanding restraints on obscenity were falling away, but also when
everyday civility was in secular decline in many parts of the United States.
In whatever way we read Cohen, it is clear that, with Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell,'4 the Supreme Court has taken a position that would make the
German protection of personal honor-or even the French protection of
personal honor-difficult to institute in America. As Justice Rehnquist said,
proclaiming what is really the classically American view, citizens must
tolerate insulting and even outrageous speech in order to provide adequate
"breathing space" to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment. 5
There is Gooding v. Wilson,3 6 another case from the politically charged
1960s, which invalidated the breach-of-peace statute under which an
antidraft protester was convicted for using threatening language against
police officers. Under Gooding, even statutes aimed at penalizing fighting
words must face constitutional scrutiny. Not least, there is R.A. V. v. City of
St. Paul,'4 the much-cited case striking down a hate-speech statute. There
is, when you add all this up, a very great difference indeed between
American and Continental European legal traditions.
The difference can perhaps best be captured by saying that we
Americans balance different values than those balanced in Germany and
France. Where German and French law balances the value of free speech
against the value of honor, our law balances the value of free speech against
nothing at all-unless it is the value of the suppression of violence (and
sometimes the value of the suppression of indecency). The question of
violence, indeed, does sometimes play something of the role in America
that the question of honor plays in Europe. This tendency is implicit in the
American "fighting words" doctrine, which limits liability for spoken
words to cases likely to lead immediately to violence. The same tendency to
look for a threat of violence shows in the comparison between our law of
battery and assault and its German and French equivalents. The doctrines of
Tdtlichkeit and voie defait that we have seen in German and French law-
doctrines that bear a common dueling-era origin with our doctrines of
343. Indeed, the willingness to regulate questions of decency shows up in a number of
leading United States cases. See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; City of Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978): Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 505 U.S. 377, 385-88 (1992)
(discussing permissible speech regulation revolving around "obscenity").
344. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The contrast with French jurisprudence has been nicely drawn by
Hauch, supra note 36, at 1219.
345. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52-55.
346. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
347. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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assault and battery-form only one relatively minor part of the German and
French laws of civility.348 In America they are practically all that we have.
Even in the law of intentional infliction of emotional distress we still have
a strong tendency to look for physical injury before we will impose
liability.349 Lacking a category of honor as a protectable interest, Americans
are led to penalize only behavior that threatens to assail bodily integrity.
For honor is truly absent from our legal thought-world. By contrast
with Germany and France, American law has, it must be emphasized,
remarkably little to say about norms of hierarchical respect. As we have
seen, German law revolves around the showing of "lack of respect or
disrespect" in ways that assume that the fundamental problem of human
relations involves the assertion of hierarchical superiority by one person
over another in the outward show of respect. That is, indeed, what makes
the German law a law of civility and not a law of decency. American law is
just different. The difference can be nicely captured by means of the
sociology of Erving Goffman, whose accounts of the social psychology of
personal interaction are widely cited. As Goffman presents it, everyday
"civil" interaction is heavily informed by our sense of social hierarchy.
Everyday interaction is a compound of "deference and demeanor," closely
tied to social rank and social standing: "Deference images tend to point to
the wider society outside the interaction, to the place the individual has
achieved in the hierarchy of this society. Demeanor images ... pertain...
to the way in which the individual handles his position [in rank-ordered
society] .... 350
To Goffman, all interpersonal interaction is, in the end, largely about
rank-about relative status differences between the persons involved."'
This idea that there is a consciousness of rank in everyday interpersonal
relations is easy to apply to the sorts of rudeness that we see in the case law
on insult, and it can help us grasp what is going on in the German law I
have described. Calling another person du can indeed be understood as a
rank-oriented offense-as a refusal to show respect. French norms of
politesse are also largely concerned with the showing of rank-oriented
348. According to Doering's figures, insults involving a Tatlichkeit alone amounted to only
about five percent of the cases he surveyed, and ones involving both a Tatlichkeit and some verbal
abuse amounted to only about three percent. See DOERING, supra note 45, at 22. Presumably.
those figures considerably exaggerate the percentage of cases involving Ttlichkeiten, since such
cases undoubtedly end up in court in greatly disproportionate numbers.
349. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
350. GOFFMAN, supra note 30, at 82-83.
351. To be sure, only largely: Goffman distinguished between "symmetrical" and
"asymmetrical" interaction. See id. at 52. Nevertheless, the common impression that Goffman
analyzed society in fundamentally hierarchical terms is not false: His strong emphasis was indeed
on the "asymmetrical" style of interaction.
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respect in just the same way. 35 2 Nothing of the kind is to be found in
American law-pace Professor Post.353
352. See supra notes 288-289 and accompanying text.
353. I think it is important to state my disagreement both carefully and strongly. Post has
written a number of admirably argued papers in which he has tried to demonstrate that a variety of
intentional torts, especially defamation, effectively incorporate norms of civility into the law. Post
points to the recurring appeals to "community norms" that feature in the adjudication of these
torts. See, e.g., POST, supra note 7, at 120. These community norms, he argues, are inevitably
norms of "civility." See id. at 55-56, 58, 81-84, 116, 127-29, 132-33. 136. 151. "Civility," in
turn, Post describes by reference to the same sociology of Erving Goffman that I have employed
in this Article. See id. at 54-55, 62-63, 72-73. Adjudication of the tort of defamation and of like
torts, must, he concludes, represent efforts to maintain intact the -chain of deference and
demeanor," to safeguard the integrity of the fabric of civility in society.
Post makes some superb arguments. See, e.g.. id. at 73-74 (analyzing the mystery of the
rebroadcast of private facts in privacy tort litigation). He is by no means extreme in the views he
presents. He does not deny that American law requires a high degree of offensiveness before
intervening. See id. at 65-66. Nevertheless, his argument is misleading, and indeed wrong, in ways
-that must be brought out. A comparison with Germany and France shows. I think, what societies
that are organized around "deference and demeanor" look like and highlights how different the
United States is. Strikingly enough, Post adopts the sociology of Elias. which was developed to
account for Continental European civility, and applies it to his account of the United States. See
Post, supra note 7, at 716. Yet, of course, it is the burden of my Article to show that such casual
application of European sociology to American circumstances is misguided.
The contrast between Post's America and the Europe that I have described here shows most
dramatically, perhaps, in his acknowledgment that Goffman's sociology cannot easily be used to
describe the American law of defamation. Post writes:
A preliminary objection to this concept of reputation as dignity is that defamation law
will not impose liability for breach of a civility rule unless there has been a
"publication to a third party," whereas Goffman makes clear that rules of deference
and demeanor are especially characteristic of face-to-face interactions ....
Id. at 710. Post tries to deal with the difficulty in a characteristically elegant way. arguing that the
presence of third parties allows for a social judgment of whether, in effect, the act of incivility in
question was justified by the "unworth[iness]" of its target. See id. at 711. Yet I think Post is
simply trying too hard; a close look at Germany and France shows that there are societies that
comprehend the legal significance of face-to-face interaction in a way that fits into Goffman's
analysis much more comfortably. Post is really misapplying Goffman to the American case.
That Post can do so, I suggest, is the result of circularity in his argument: He defines
"community" as made up of norms of civility, only to conclude that where there is -community."
there is civility. This circularity shows particularly in his use of Goffman's sociology. Goffman,
when he spoke of deference and demeanor, offered a definition of civility. Post takes this
definition and uses it as though it were a description of a feature present in equal degree
everywhere. Yet nothing in Goffman's definition of civility implies that there must be equal
degrees of civility in all social settings. My survey has suggested the contrary. Goffman's may be
the right way to talk about civility, but there is a lot more civility, as defined by Goffman. in other
societies than there is in the United States. Even supposing Post is right when he says that our tort
law incorporates American norms of civility, he will prove little until he can demonstrate that
there are American norms of civility. Citing Goffman's definition demonstrates no such thing.
Moreover, the direct comparison with Germany shows us another weakness in Post's
account of how norms of civility are incorporated into American law. Even if there are
widespread norms of civility, as defined by Goffman, in America. they are by no means so
directly incorporated into legal doctrine as German norms are. As I have shown, the logic of the
German doctrine of the law of insult is notable for its resemblance to the logic of civility as
described by Goffman. Civility is about Achning for Goffman, about showing respect. The
German law of insult is about Nichtachtung oder AMilachwng, " lack of respect or disrespect," see
supra text accompanying note 45. German doctrine meshes directly with the dynamic of civility.
The same simply cannot be said about American legal doctrine, and to the (considerable) extent
that doctrine reflects underlying social norms, that is a revealing fact. It may be the case, as Post
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To say that America has absolutely no law of civility is to say too
much. But to say that in general America has no law of civility-especially
as compared with a country like Germany-is to make the right
generalization.
VIII. LEVELING UP/LEVELING DOWN
That generalization, in turn, rests on a larger one. Standing behind both
German and French attitudes toward the regulation of civility is something
else: a commitment to the broad distribution of "honor" or "dignity"
throughout society. This is a commitment, it deserves emphasizing, that
goes far beyond the civility problem that I touch on in this Article.
Continental European law is characterized by a very wide-ranging tendency
to assert the importance of maintaining "a minimum of honor" 354 for all.
It is this tendency, deeply rooted in cultural tradition, to guarantee a
"minimum of honor" that has established the conditions for hate-speech
legislation as it exists in France and Germany. In both countries, the
development of a body of hate-speech regulation has proven relatively easy
because in both countries the regulation of hate speech fits comfortably into
the longstanding tradition of the law of insult. The law of both countries
retains the marks of an old body of doctrine aimed at providing legal
protections for aristocratic honor; and the presence of that tradition has
meant that, as the problems of accommodating foreign populations have
grown, the law of both France and Germany has found a natural rubric35
for the protection of the honor of what are perceived to be outsider
populations as well. That is not to say that hate-speech regulation as it has
suggests, that finders of fact in America apply norms of respect when they look to "community
norms." But it surely remains important, and revealing, that American legal doctrine has never
developed the Goffman-like forms of legal argument that Germany's has. The contrast suggests
very strongly that norms of respect simply do not matter as much in the American legal world as
they do in Germany-a conclusion borne out by a comparison of many facets of American and
German law.
Pace Professor Post, then, I say again that the right generalization is that America has, for all
practical purposes, no law of civility comparable to the German law of insult.
354. STARK, supra note 14, at 26. For European provisions sanctifying "honor" or
"dignity," see, for example, COST. art. 3, 1 (Italy). For more recent examples in the constitutional
corpus, see BANGL. CONST. art. 31; BELG. CONST. art. 23; PORT. CONST. art. 26; CONSTITUCION
[C.E.] art. 18 (Spain) (right to honor); TURK. CONST. art. 27; LEY ORGANICA DE 5 MAYO 1982
(Spain); CODE DE DROIT CANONIQUE 1983 can. 220; U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 14; European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222; and UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 17, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 12 (1948). These examples are assembled and discussed in
BERNARD BEIGNIER, LE DROIT DE LA PERSONNALITI 78-79 (1992); and BEIGNIER, supra note 13,
at 90-91.
355. Quite fittingly, indeed, a "rubric." "Rubrics" were the red-letter subject headings for
the various texts in the Roman legal corpus in the Middle Ages. As with those rubrics, the rubric
of "honor" has provided a natural category for reasoning about dignity.
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developed in these countries is flawless. As I have tried to show, the
practice of civility in these countries remains rooted in forms of the show of
respect that can seem quite incongruous when translated into contemporary
legal norms. The point is only that dignity, as a value, pervades these post-
aristocratic systems so much that dignitary law of some kind is more easily
fashioned in France and Germany than it is in the United States.?
This pervasiveness of dignitary values also shows, it is worth noting (if
only in passing), in the French and German approaches to sexual
harassment. Sexual harassment law, which can also be thought of as law for
the accommodation of an outsider population, is in its infancy in Europe.
But, to the extent that it exists, it has been framed in distinctly dignitary
terms in northern Europe.357 Once again, that does not mean that European
sexual harassment law is likely to be flawless. European traditions of sexual
respect, as we have seen, are not likely to appeal to many feminists;358 and
at least one German feminist has already argued passionately against the
idea that sexual harassment law should revolve around "dignity."' 9 The
practice of speaking in dignitary terms is, however, very deep-seated in
Continental Europe, and the contrast with the United States is very strong.
It is, I suggest, a contrast that shows once again how powerful is the
Continental tendency to accommodate outsiders by according them "social
honor." These Continental systems, in short, have human "dignity" today
largely because they had personal "honor" in the past.
Let me try to frame this claim as clearly and carefully as possible. In
particular, I would like to make three points clear: First, by saying that
356. For observations that are in some ways parallel, see PHILIPPE D'IRIBARNE, LA LOGIQUE
DE L'HONNEUR: GESTIONS DES ENTREPRISES ET TRADITIONS NATIONALES (1989). which argues
that patterns of behavior in French factories reflect old regime traditions of honor that are absent
in the United States.
357. The German sexual harassment statute is framed in expressly dignitary terms. See
Beschaftigtenschutzgesetz [Employee Protection Law], v. 24.4.1994 (BGBI. I S.1412-13)
(FR.G.) (Art. 10 of the 2. Gleichberechtigungsgesetz [Second Law Guaranteeing Equal Rights])
(grounding the law of sexual harassment in dignity). So. notably, is the European Union directive
on the subject. Compare MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN, THE DIGNITY OF WOMEN AT NVORK (1988). the
report that provoked European Union activity. Although the French sexual harassment statute is
not framed in dignitary terms, it is striking that French case law has introduced, in an almost
instinctive way, consideration of dignity into the jurisprudence. See RJS 8-9/93 no. 842
("comportement ayant pu affecter la pudeur ou la dignit6') ("-behavior that may have had an
effect on the sense of shame or dignity"); Thierry Gare, Sduction ou Harc~lement, LA SEtAINE
JURIDIQUE EDITION GtNERALE, Mar. 11, 1998. at 445 ("ni inddcents. ni humiliants, ces actes
n'ont pu porter atteinte la dignitd de la plaignante" ) (" neither indecent nor humiliating, these
acts cannot have constituted an affront to the dignity of the plaintifF"); Franqoise Dckeuwer-
Defossez, Le harclement sexuel en droitfranfais: discrimination ou atteinte i la liberti?. JURIS-
CLASSEUR PERIODIQUE, 1993 I 3662, at 137, 138 (1993) ("En ctte fin de XXe si&le, Ic
harcalement sexuel est apparu insupportable parce que contraire d la dignitJ hunaine .. ")
("Here at the end of the 20th century, sexual harassment has come to seem unacceptable because
it is contrary to human dignity .... ").
358. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
359. See generally BAER, supra note 81 (arguing that the American antidiscrimination model.
with its focus on equality, is preferable).
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modern European civil dignity grows largely out of premodern aristocratic
honor, I do not mean to suggest that Germany and France are still
aristocratic or hierarchical societies. To be sure, there are still aristocrats in
Continental Europe, and Germany in particular remains a society that
impresses all Americans as quite hierarchical in spirit. Nevertheless, the old
regime is truly dead and gone in both Germany and France, and a
commitment to egalitarianism has truly established itself. What has
happened is not that the old world has survived, but that a grammar of
honor and dignity still undergirds both the German and French law of
interpersonal respect. Dignity became the stuff of the law of respect during
an era of aristocratic ascendancy. It remained the stuff of that law even
during the Fascist era, and it has remained the stuff of that law down to the
present, as the aristocratic coloration of the law has faded. It is not that
there has been a literal "persistence of the old regime," to borrow Arno
Mayer's famous phrase;3" rather, it is that there has been a persistence of
old assumptions about what matters most in the social world. When
Germans and Frenchmen reasoned about the law 150 or 200 years ago, they
started from the assumption that honor mattered. They have, in effect, never
stopped reasoning that way.36'
Second, I do not mean to endorse the view that "civil" interaction
always somehow involves hierarchical status-competition. This is the view
associated with Erving Goffman, who often wrote as though all human
interaction involved some effort at one-upmanship--that we are always
trying to elbow each other out of the way in a race for honor. Such a picture
of human interaction is, I believe, false: There is such a thing as
authentically egalitarian interaction. Indeed, on both sides of the Atlantic,
we observe a great deal of authentically egalitarian interaction. What
matters, though, is that even the most unimpeachably egalitarian interaction
takes place against the background of a notional scale of hierarchical
ordering. Two persons may interact as equals at a high level of status, or as
equals at a low level of status. In either case, they operate against the
360. ARNO J. MAYER, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE OLD REGIME: EUROPE TO THE GREAT WAR
(1981).
361. This is a pattern that can be nicely captured by borrowing the language of the
phenomenologist and sociologist Alfred Schiitz. As SchUtz presented it, interpersonal interaction
in every society drew on the "stock of knowledge" of the society in question. This meant that
social roles and patterns and behavior were inevitably informed by certain " taken-for-granted"
pieces of knowledge, acquired first in the family setting, and later from a whole host of
institutions that trained and coaxed the individual: "For in [historical societiesl the transmission
of socially relevant knowledge is... to a great extent independent of subjective relevance
structures ... and constitutes a taken-for-grantedness [Selbstverstdndlichkeitl firmly anchored in
the social structure . I..."  ALFRED SCHUTZ & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE STRUCTURES OF TIlE
LIFE-WORLD 293, 293 (Richard M. Zaner & H. Tristran Engelhardt, Jr. trans., 2d ed. 1973).
Germany and France are no longer aristocratic societies. But certain patterns of respectful
behavior that were "taken for granted" in earlier centuries are still taken for granted today. This
has had, as I have tried to show, great shaping force in the law.
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background assumption that human society tends toward hierarchy. The
hierarchical element in interpersonal interaction lies in that background
assumption, not in the actual dynamic of any particular interaction.
Hierarchy belongs to the Vorverstdindnis, the unspoken taken-for-
grantedness362 of a given interaction, not to the character of particular acts
performed in the course of that interaction. Thus, it is my claim that there is
an authentic egalitarianism in European dignitary culture, but that it is a
high-status egalitarianism, played out against a background assumption
that human society falls naturally into the high and the low. Thus, current
European egalitarianism is, once again, reminiscent of the old world of
dueling. A century ago, only status-equals would duel-and it goes without
saying that they were high-status-equals. 6 3 Today, it is the deep ambition of
European dignitary thinking to make all persons high-status-equals in just
the same way.
Third, by focusing on the aristocratic sources of the law of
interpersonal respect, I do not mean to claim that all honor, in the European
tradition, is aristocratic in origin. Historically, members of European craft
guilds also had a sense of their honor, as did, for example, the recipients of
academic degrees. Guild honor in particular has clearly survived in
Europe;364 and indeed, I believe that the proper analysis of European
economic regulation still must begin with a grasp of the tradition of guild
honor-of Weberian "Standesehre." 65 A full-scale description of
European societies as honor cultures would thus go beyond the problem of
aristocracy. Nevertheless, within the narrow realm of "respectful"
interpersonal relations, it is indeed the aristocratic tradition that matters
most in Europe.
And it is the relative absence of an aristocratic tradition that lies at the
heart of the American divergence from the European pattern. "Politeness
from arrogance" has vanished too thoroughly in the United States. The
consequence is that the United States, on the one hand, and France and
Germany, on the other, have followed divergent paths of development in
their march toward social egalitarianism as we see it today: Germany and
France have leveled up; the United States has leveled down.
362. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER. TRUTH AND METHOD 262 (Garrett Barden & John
Cumming trans., Crossroad Publishing Co. 1986) (1960):
[U]nderstanding means, primarily, to understand the content of what is said. and only
secondarily to isolate and understand another's meaning as such. Hence the first of all
hermeneutic requirements remains one's own foreunderstanding [Vonrerstdidnis],
which proceeds from being concerned with the same subject....
Thus the meaning of the connection with tradition ... in our historical.
hermeneutical attitude, is fulfilled in the fact that we share fundamental prejudices
[Vorurteile] with tradition.
363. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., D'IRIBARNE, supra note 356, at 85-94.
365. See WEBER, supra note 91, at 534-35.
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Strikingly enough, we can find language in the great tradition of social
thought that describes each of these paths, the American and the
Continental European, separately. What we cannot find is any account that
describes both.
Thus, the path that we see the United States taking, the path of leveling
down, is one that has often been identified as the only possible one. Hume,
Tocqueville, Proust, Marshall, and others have imagined that all modern
egalitarian societies must be societies without any developed forms of
politesse. As Hume put it:
Where power rises upwards from the people to the great, as
in all republics, [th&] refinements of civility are apt to be little
practised, since the whole state is, by that means, brought near to
a level, and every member of it is rendered in a great measure,
independent of another .... But in a civilized monarchy, there
is a long train of dependence from the prince to the peasant,
which.., is sufficient to beget in every one an inclination to please
his superiors .... Politeness of manners, therefore, arises most
naturally in monarchies and courts .... 366
Tocqueville, too, associated politeness with aristocratic society and did
not think it could survive in a democratic world:
Veritable dignity of manners consists in showing oneself always to
be in one's place, neither too high, nor too low; this is what the
peasant aims for as much as the prince. In democracies, all places
seem doubtful, and in consequence manners in a democratic
society, while they are often proud, are never dignified. Moreover,
they are never well regulated or truly cultivated [ni bien riglees ni
bien savantes].367
Proust employed his own kind of elegiac salon wit in asserting the same
point, with ironic reservations:
[I]t seems that, in an egalitarian society, politeness would
disappear-not, as is commonly believed, for lack of education, but
because certain persons would abandon the deference which is
366. DAVID HUME, Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, in I ESSAYS, MORAL,
POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 109 (London, T. Cadell 1772) (1742).
367. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DtMOCRATIE EN AMItRIQUE 269 (J.P. Mayer & Max
Lerner eds. & George Lawrence trans., Easton Press 1966) (1835). Compare also the reflections
of James Fenimore Cooper while
posing as a European visitor in Notions of the Americans ... : "There has been so
singular a compound of intelligence, kindness, natural politeness, coarseness and even
vulgarity, in many of these persons, that I am often utterly baffled in the attempt to give
them a place in the social scale."
CMIEL, supra note 9, at 66.
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owed to prestige, and which must have an element of fancy about it
if it is to be effective, and above all because other persons would
abandon the graciousness which one gives liberally and which one
refines when one senses that that graciousness is of infinite price to
the person who receives it-a price which however would suddenly
fall to nothing in a world founded on equality, like the price of
everything that is founded merely on relations of trust. But this
disappearance of politeness in a new society is not certain, and we
are sometimes too disposed to believe that existing conditions are
the only ones possible.... After all, politeness in an egalitarian
society would not be a greater miracle than the success of railroads
and of the military employment of the airplane.'
Marshall and Bottomore, too, in their Citizenship and Social Class,
thought that real democracy could be achieved only through the elimination
of status differences. 369 All of these men described something like what the
United States has progressively experienced.37°
What France and Germany have experienced, by contrast, is better
described by a different line of interpretation, one we can find in Rudolf
von Jhering, Max Weber, Norbert Elias, and the many followers of Elias
today. All of these spoke of leveling up.37' To Jhering, writing in the 1880s,
368. PROUST, supra note 280, at 746.47.
369. See T.H. MARSHALL & TOM BOTTOMORE, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 33 (1992).
They write,
Equality of status is more important than equality of income. Even when benefits are
paid in case, this class fusion is outwardly expressed in the form of a new common
experience. All learn what it means to have an insurance card that must be regularly
stamped ... or to collect children's allowances or pensions from the post office.
Id.
370. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 206-34 (1997). This work, with
its treatment of contempt in "democracy" tout court, belongs perhaps to the same camp.
Democracies, as I have tried to show, differ.
371. The same idea is also to be found among sociologists of fashion, who (like heting in the
passage cited in the following note) have seen the basic dynamic of fashion as involving imitation
of the higher orders by the lower. For critical discussion of this line of argument, see ALAN HUNT.,
GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF SUMPTUARY LAW 49-57 (1996). 1
cannot discuss here the subtle observations of Edward Shils, but they deserve to be quoted. Shils
commented on Elias:
The phenomenon of das sinkende Kulurgut was noticed by German writers on late
medieval society, and a parallel phenomenon was observed by Max Weber in his
studies of Indian society. He called it "brahmanization." This theme has been treated
by Professor M.N. Srinivas in his studies of "sanskritization." This assimilation of
elements of the value systems of higher classes and castes by lower strata is not,
however, identical either in quality or extent with the growth of the sense of
fundamental affinity which characterizes modem society.
EDWARD SHILS, CENTER AND PERIPHERY 14 n.5 (1975). Explaining this " fundamental affinity,"
he continued:
To a greater extent than ever before in history the mass of the population in modern
Western societies feel themselves to be part of their society in a way in which their
ancestors never did. Just as they have become "alive" and hedonistic, more demanding
of respect and pleasure, so, too, they have become more "civilized." They have come
to be parts of the civil society with a feeling of attachment to that society and a feeling
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the drama of shifting civility norms was the drama of the "mad rush of
class vanity and class jealousy":
The other classes have never rested until they have succeeded, as
far and as well as they are able, in getting possession of whatever
the higher classes have invented for themselves. Just as a new
fashion in dresses, which first pops up among duchesses, finally
works its way down to the wives of craftworkers, so it is also with
the forms of politeness.
7 2
Or as Elias carefully put it: "[P]rofessional bourgeois society, in everything
that concerns social conduct, takes over the ritual of courtly society without
developing it with the same intensity. 373 Neither author was concerned
with the law of civility-not even Jhering, who did not really regard civility
as properly regulable by law. But what both describe captures quite nicely
what has gone on in France and Germany.
These two lines of sociological argument-the line, we might say, of
Hume, and the line of Elias-seem irreconcilable. On the one hand, we
have the claim that egalitarianism destroys civility; on the other, the claim
that egalitarianism generalizes civility. They are not irreconcilable,
however. Different as the leveling-down and leveling-up interpretations of
the course of the development of civility in egalitarian societies sound, the
truth is that these different authorities are simply describing what have
turned out to be different paths of social development. 4 The error is in
claiming that there can be only one egalitarianizing tendency. In fact, in the
post-Revolutionary Western world, there have been at least two.
of moral responsibility for observing its rules and sharing in its authority ....
Nonetheless, this greater incorporation carries with it also an inherent tension. Those
who participate in the central institutional and value systems-who feel sufficiently
closer to the center now than their forebears ever did-also feel their position as
outsider, their remoteness from the center, in a way in which their forebears probably
did not feel it. The modem trade union movement... illustrates this development.
Id. at 14-15. These are observations that open the way to much more wide-ranging discussion than
I can undertake here, as are Shils's accounts of deference as reflecting the "central" ideas and
institutions of a given society. See id. at 239-55.
372. 2 JHERING, supra note 25, at 524.
373. ELIAS, supra note 24, at 504. For doubts about this "trickle-down" theory of culture, see
Peter Burke, Popular Culture Between History and Ethnology, 14 ETHNOLOGIA EUROPAEIA 5
(1984).
374. It is odd how few commentators speak of the possibility that there are simply differences
in the ways different societies have developed. There is Weber, who treats status-oriented society
and market-oriented society as existing in fundamental tension with each other. For an attempt-I
think an erroneous one-to distinguish different patterns of development in different societies, see
WEBER, supra note 91, at 639. See also WEBER, supra note 205, at 270. Among more elegant
writers, there is also Heine. See HEINE, supra note 293, at 499-501 (denying that the French
pattern applied in either England or Germany).
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X. EXCURSUS ON VIOLENCE AND MODERN HONOR CULTURES
Personal honor has survived the process of democratization in northern
Continental Europe-at least so far. Enough so that it is not wrong, in
contrasting them with the United States, to describe Germany and France as
modem honor cultures-although, to be sure, old-style "personal honor"
has been undergoing a gradual and partial transformation into new-style
dignity. To speak of Germany and France as honor cultures, though, is to
raise a troubling paradox involving the place of violence in these societies.
This is not a paradox that this Article can fully resolve, but it is one that it is
too important not to be addressed at least briefly.
The troubling paradox is simply this: Our literature on traditional honor
cultures assumes that a sensitivity to questions of honor goes hand in hand
with a propensity to do violence. People who care about their honor are
quick to explode. Correspondingly, honor cultures are, we usually think,
violent cultures. This is a connection that has been made in analyses of the
American South, where, down to this day, we see both high rates of civility
and high rates of violence. 75 It is also a connection that has been drawn in
familiar analyses of such societies as those of medieval Iceland" 6 or of the
contemporary Rif 3"7--places where the love of honor has been connected
with the practice of violence.37 There is, furthermore, a psychological
literature that sees an abiding link between anger, violence, and the sense of
having been shown disrespect. 9 The literatures of anthropology, sociology,
and psychology would lead us to expect that rates of violence in the
Germany and France I have described should be comparatively high.
Yet the opposite is the case. Indeed, it is a datum of major importance
in comparative law that rates of violence are low in northern Europe
compared with those in the United States, or indeed in most of the world.'
How can this be?
375. For high rates of violence in the South, see FISCHER, supra note 302. at 889-90.
WYATt-BROWN, supra note 39, at 366-71; and Sheldon Hackney. Southern Violence. 74 Am.
HST. REv. 906 (1969). See also Elliott Gom, "'Gouge and Bite. Pull Hair and Scratch": The
Social Significance of Fighting in the Southern Backcountry, 90 AM. HIST. REV. 18 (1985). For
low rates of violence in 17th-century New England compared to the Chesapeake colonies, see
FISCHER, supra note 302, at 191. For the culture of violence in Virginia. see id. at 400-05.
376. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOOD-TAKING AND PEACEMAKING (1990).
377. See Raymond Jamous, From the Death of Men to the Peace of God: Violence and
Peace-Making in the Rif in HONOR AND GRACE IN ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (J.G. Peristiany &
Julian Pitt-Rivers eds., 1992).
378. See FLYNN, supra note 26, at 21-24, 47-49, 76-79, 116-20 (discussing the connection
between insult and violence in various societies).
379. See AARON T. BECK, PRISONERS OF HATE: THE COGNmvE BASIS OF ANGER,
HOSTILITY AND VIOLENCE (1999); Jan Smedslund. How Shall the Concept of Anger Be Defined?,
3 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 5, 13 (1993) (" Everyone has a right to ... be treated ... respecfidly, and
when this right is violated, there is anger.").
380. Indeed, the greater presence of violence in American society has left its mark on the
very legal doctrine that I have described in this Article. As we have seen. American tort doctrine
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This is a question that is too vast to be answered in this Article;
answering it adequately would involve developing a full-scale explanation
for northern Europe's pattern of violence. Nevertheless, the problem of the
link between honor and violence is too important to be completely ignored.
Accordingly, in this brief Part, I want to say a very general word about how
European historical development produced the unexpectedly peaceable
honor cultures that I have described. (I also want to reject one familiar
answer-that of Norbert Elias-whose argument I address in the notes.)
381
displays a strong tendency to let conflicts slide into violence before it allows the law to intervene.
Our "fighting words" doctrine demands that the threat of violence be palpable. Perhaps
something similar can also be seen in the high profile of our torts of battery and assault. These too
are torts in which, as their names indicate, we think of the possibility of violence as rising close to
the surface; "quiconque touche," we still say in American law, "frappe." .to touch somebody is
to hit him." Even our law of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a law that in practice
tends to look for physical injury. It is American law, in short, that is framed by the expectation
that the threat of violence is ever-present; we have the law that assumes that the great social
problem is that people are likely to explode into acts of violence. German law, by contrast, seems
to assume that questions of honor can be peaceably litigated-that persons with a keen sense of
their personal honor will bring private prosecutions rather than immediately lash out.
381. In his much-admired work on "the civilizing process," Elias tried to explain the history
of good manners in Europe by combining, in effect, Weber's theories with Freud's. Elias agreed
with Weber that the tale of modem social history has largely been the tale of the decline of
everyday violence. He departed somewhat, though, from Weber's emphasis on the political
conflict between the state and its rivals to power. There had to be, Elias insisted, more to the
successful suppression of violence than the mere promulgation of laws forbidding violent acts.
Widespread social violence ends only when ordinary persons internalize norms of self-control. It
is only when people have been trained to suppress their own violent affect that violent encounters
become less prevalent in society at large.
This means, he thought, that the sociology of violence must rest on a knowledge of the
history of human psychology, and it is just such a history that Elias tried to develop. Focusing on
rules of decency-rules of table manners, rules requiring that we hide our bodily functions from
others-Elias argued that the rise of "good manners" is a chapter in the history of the decline of
violent behavior. The rules of good manners, he maintained, revolve largely around some of the
most animalistic features of human existence: They forbid us, typically, to indulge publicly in acts
associated with sexual desire and bodily functions. Their purpose is to encourage norms of self-
control by cutting at the root of our most violent animal instincts. Such rules, he claimed, first
established themselves in the aristocratic societies of the 17th and 18th centuries. These were
societies in which learning self-control was indispensable for aristocrats who had to pursue their
advancement in court without resorting to violence. The kind of self-control that Weber had
attributed to the bourgeoisie in his Spirit of Capitalism was thus in fact first to be found in the
aristocracy. Only after the rules of decency had established themselves in aristocratic society were
they adopted among the bourgeois, especially of the 19th century, who needed to master self-
control for their own purpose, the purpose of capitalist accumulation.
At first blush, Elias's argument does seem to offer some basis for explaining the shape of
modem European honor: Elias, of all sociologists, is the one who believed he could demonstrate
that a heightened sensitivity to "civility" would bring with it a diminished susceptibility to violent
impulses. Yet on close inspection, Elias's argument proves frayed and revealingly incomplete.
This is true, first of all, because Elias did not bring enough nuance to his account of good
manners. Elias never distinguished between decency and civility, speaking in an undifferentiated
way about "good manners." In fact, he drew essentially all of his examples from the realm of
decency, leaving civility rules fundamentally undiscussed in his oeuvre. For my purposes here,
this omission weakens Elias's study almost irremediably. Rules of decency, of the kind Elias
discusses, do indeed aim to patrol the border between the human and the bestial: and to the extent
that the bestial and the violent run together in human society, the history of decency can indeed be
the sort of psychological history of the monopolization of violence that Elias set out to write. It is
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Germany and France do indeed differ from the traditional honor
cultures that are commonly discussed in our social science literature. This is
not because violence was never a problem in these countries. Quite the
contrary: The dueling aristocracy presented a much-deplored problem until
1914, and even after; honor did go along with violence in northern Europe
for a very long time. Indeed, low-status Europeans participated in a culture
of honor-obsessed violence too-often enough through their own forms of
the duel, such as the knife fight.
382
Much of what set these countries apart from traditional honor cultures,
though, was something that emerges from the very story I have traced in
this Article-something long ago identified by Max Weber: the
commitment of European states to the monopolization of the legitimate use
of violence. The monopolization of violence was a preoccupation of the
European Continental monarchies from a very early date. What must be
emphasized, though, is that this was a preoccupation, not because violence
as such seemed objectionable. Premodern societies did not typically
imagine that violence was anything other than an ordinary condition of life.
The violence that European monarchies primarily sought to suppress was,
first and foremost, violence that threatened to shake the monarchies' own
grip on power. The monopolization of violence was not the product of some
grand universal social-evolutionary tendency to guarantee peace and bodily
integrity for all; it was the product of many centuries of European history
during which the state's weak hold on power was frequently challenged by
well-armed potentates. A monarchy like that of France, in the late Middle
Ages and the first part of the early modem period, had to be deeply
concerned with disarming rival claimants to authority; and consequently it
developed what was at first a limited program of suppressing violence
among the powerful-a program only much later extended throughout all of
relatively easy to write a history of human psychology that relates the problem of decency to the
problem of violence. Rules of civility, on the other hand. have to do, as I suggested earlier, with
hierarchical ordering within human society. It is not nearly so easy to argue that roles of civility
help clamp down on violent affect as it is to argue that rules of decency help clamp down on
violent affect Indeed, all of our psychological literature suggests the opposite. See supra notes
371-374 and accompanying text. If Elias has correctly identified the psychological mechanisms at
work in the decline of European violence, how can we possibly account for Mississippi or
Montenegro?
The answer, I would suggest, is that Elias was wrong in imagining he had identified
universally operative psychological mechanisms. What he identified, as I suggest in the main
text of this Part, were certain peculiar patterns of political development. It is not the case
that encouraging civility discourages violence. It is the case that European monarchies both
encouraged civility, as part of a larger effort to control the distribution of honor in their societies,
and clamped down on aristocratic violence, as part of a larger effort to guarantee their own hold
on political power. See ELIAS, supra note 24, at 447-53. 518-24.
382. See Daniele Boschi, Homicide and Knife Fighting in Rome. in MEN AND VIOLENCE:
GENDER, HONOR, AND RITUALS IN MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA 128 (Pieter Spierenburg ed..
1998); Pieter Spierenburg, Knife Fighting and Popular Codes of Honor in Early Modern
Amsterdam, in MEN AND VIOLENCE, supra, at 103-27.
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society. Indeed, as historians of the duel have observed, dueling itself arose
largely because sixteenth- and seventeenth-century aristocrats, who had
long been strong and independent potentates, had progressively been denied
the more threatening forms of violence that they had practiced in the late
Middle Ages. Having been stripped of their private armies, walled castles,
and military way of life, sixteenth-century aristocrats turned to dueling as a
tamer form of violence.
I suggest that the low rates of violence we see in northern Europe today
have to be traced, at least partly, to this long tradition of the monopolization
of violence. The northern European states of the late twentieth century are
the products of many centuries of efforts to monopolize the legitimate use
of violence against challenges by (especially though not exclusively) an
aristocratic class. One consequence of this history is an ingrained tradition
of suppressing violence. Another effectively independent consequence is a
tradition of bringing honor into the courts: Old insult rules designed to
bring honor-conscious aristocrats into court have persisted and indeed given
birth to new dignitary rules. In these modern honor cultures, generations of
governmental efforts have succeeded in uncoupling honor from violence.
Elsewhere the same pattern is not to be found. Other societies-most
especially American society-are just different. This arguably reflects, in
the last analysis, nothing more complex than the relative absence of a
Weberian monopolization of violence here. That absence, in turn, reflects
the fact that the American state has never faced the kind of authentic
challenges to its rule that have shaped its Continental European
counterparts. While there has always been plenty of violence in the United
States, that violence has rarely represented any significant challenge to the
legitimate rule of the American state. Well-armed potentates are not part of
our experience. It is, I propose, partly a consequence of the fact that we
have never developed the full-scale commitment to the monopolization of
violence that we see in northern Continental Europe.
Where traditional honor culture is to be found in the United States, it
tends, accordingly, to display its traditionally high rates of violence. Indeed,
if the account that I have sketched out in this Part is right, there is little
reason to suppose that more civility in the United States would produce
anything like northern Europe's low rates of violence. Those low rates of
violence are, in large part, the result of a pattern of the monopolization of
violence that our country has simply never seen.
X. CONCLUSION
All of this does not give us any certain information about the prospects
for a law of civility in the United States. There is no reason to believe that
any single social pattern is behind the success of a law of civility in various
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societies. Certainly there is no reason to believe that an aristocratic past
must lie in the background of any modem regulation of civility, simply
because such an aristocratic past lies in the background of the law of our
near western European neighbors. As Proust said, in a world with railroads
and military aircraft, who knows what else may come to pass?' The
comparative study that I have offered here does, however, show the
centrality of social preconditions for the making of values like "respect,"
whatever those preconditions may be. Northern European societies do not
just have pieces of dignitary legislation whose provisions can be
meaningfully retailed in law review articles. They have deeply rooted social
traditions of respect. Accounts of European law that are barren of
description of those social traditions will never be correct.
Moreover, the strength of such social traditions is, in ways we would
often prefer to forget, at odds with some of our philosophical ambitions. No
amount of philosophy-no amount of Kant or Rawls-can make the clay of
human society easy to work, and, dishearteningly, the clay of one place is
often not much like the clay of another. Thus what one recent philosophical
advocate of civility writes may be true, as far as it goes:
My point about manners ... is that whatever we must do in order
to accommodate our ends to the ends of others, we must do
something more in order to acknowledge the intrinsic value of
others. Acknowledging a person's intrinsic value-treating her with
respect-also requires that one treat her politely (considerately,
respectfully). If we treat someone rudely, then we fail to treat her
384with respect ....
This is admirable stuff, and people who live according to such norms are to
be cherished. But in trying to understand the law, we must remember that
such people will always be exceptions. If we want to talk practical sense
about respect in society, we have to talk about human beings as they are,
not about human beings as Kant would like them to be. The values of
respect have established themselves in some societies and not in others.
Where we find those values, they can be traced to social traditions that have
little to do with high Kantianism.
By the same token, the values of respect, where we find them, can be
traced to social traditions that have little to do with the high ideals of
tolerance that have grown up since the Holocaust. European hate-speech
383. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
384. Buss, supra note 3, at 797. Elsewhere, Buss is careful to make the argument that the
sources of codes of civility in past hierarchy do not bear on the intrinsic merits of those codes. See
id. at 809-10. True enough. I would maintain, though, that, whatever their merits, those codes are
less likely to establish themselves in societies that do not have a comparatively strong tradition of
social hierarchy.
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legislation is, indeed, as Friedrich Kilbler carefully and correctly says,
"largely a product of the second half of the twentieth century.""' More
broadly than that, the European legal culture of human dignity is largely a
product of the second half of the twentieth century. But if we focus too
exclusively on the last fifty years-on the era, so to speak, of European
Reconstruction-we are likely to deceive ourselves about how such a
dignitary culture became possible. The history of European dignity is much
older than the post-Fascist era, and the underlying assumptions of European
dignity have to do with grimmer matter than the great ideals of post-Fascist
reform. Indeed, the Fascists themselves contributed significantly to the
making of the honor cultures that we see in Continental Europe today.
Today, meaningful dignitary practices are being wrought in Europe, but
they are being wrought from the clay of human society, and it is coarse
matter. What is more, the clay of American society is, as I have tried to
show, different.
That does not mean that we can learn nothing from the study of places
like France and Germany. At the very least, studying the Continental
tradition does give us a somewhat richer sense of what is at stake in our
debate over the regulation of civility. After all, what is at stake? One thing
we might suppose to be at stake is the prevalence of violence in society.
Mayor Giuliani's civility campaign in particular raises the hope that better
everyday behavior will mean less violent crime. This is a hope that I have
addressed only in the briefest way in Part IX, but it deserves emphasizing
that what I have been able to say is not encouraging. Germany is indeed a
place in which there is a link between law of civility and the suppression of
violence. Elsewhere, too, there may really be a connection between rough
manners and outbreaks of violence, and it is possible that non-German legal
systems that are committed to cracking down on rough manners could also
be legal systems that succeed more broadly in limiting violence. It is
essential to recognize, though, that Germany is the product of many
centuries of conflict between state and aristocracy-and many painful
centuries at that. It is also essential to recognize that, in most societies we
know, teaching people to believe in their right to respect is likely to make
them more violent, and not less. The case of the American South, in
particular, is not encouraging. For the South, it seems, is a region where
people care about civility because they care about honor, but it is also a
region where they explode into violence because they care about honor.
Even if we could easily crack down on rough manners, we are not entitled
to assume that we would thereby make America into Germany.
What is more, even if we could simply decide to abolish rudeness, I
think this comparative study reminds us that there is something else at stake
385. KUbler, supra note 16, at 366 (emphasis added).
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that might make us hesitate to do so-something that was perhaps
obviously there all along, but that is nevertheless easily forgotten: Our
tradition of incivility is bound up with our peculiar form of egalitarianism.
The American refusal to show respect to anybody is not just, as it were, a
social refusal; it belongs to our sense of the political constitution of our
form of egalitarian society. It is important to us, as political actors in
everyday life, to refuse to show respect-to refuse to participate in what we
perceive, more strongly than Europeans do, to be the hypocrisy of manners.
In this sense we are the heirs of the great disrespecters of Antiquity, the
Cynics,386 and some of the early Christians;3' and of the Quakers, too, who
played such an important role in the formation of American social
egalitarianism."s And our free speech, to adopt a term from ancient cynic
philosophy, tends to express itself as "parrhesia" -as speech that is not just
about the sober expression of opinions, but also about the free and
aggressive display of disrespect.3"9 I think the deep association between our
incivility and our style of egalitarianism is perfectly obvious to every
American, at least outside the American South. It is an association that
somehow fails to rise to the surface, though, in our many discussions of the
civility problem.
Part of what the comparison with France and Germany can do is
underline this association between the politics of egalitarianism and the
reach of the regulation of civility. What we see in these Western European
neighbors is precisely a different political tradition of egalitarianism. France
and Germany are countries that have experienced more or less violent
386. Diogenes, of course, by masturbating in public and refusing to defer even to Alexander
the Great, is reported to have flouted rules both of decency and of civility. See A.A. Long. The
Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates and Hellenistic Ethics, in THE CYNICS 29. 33-38 (Bracht
Branham & Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazd eds., 1996) (masturbation); id. at 35 n.20 (encounter with
Alexander the Great).
387. For early Christian rejection of the values of honor and deference, see WAYNE A.
MEEKS, THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY: THE FIRST TWO CEN URES 46-47. 62-63, 86-
87, 96 (1993). For New Testament passages calling for a rejection of practices of honor in the
ancient Mediterranean world, see, for example, Matthew 5:11, 5:39 (turning the other cheek);
Matthew 23:1-12 (cultivating modesty); Mark 12:38-39 (distrusting the scribes); Like 11:43
(cursing the Pharisees); Luke 14:7-Il (taking the lowest seat at a feast); and Luke 20:.46 (avoiding
the scribes). For the contrary, see Romans 13:7, which enjoins Christians to honor the honorable.
Within Christian discourse, much of this problem is characterized under the New Testament
rubric ipoarnomiacr, "respect for persons." For this concept in the New Testament, see Acts
10:34; Romans 2:11; Colossians 3:25; James 2:1; and James 2:9.
388. For Quaker use of the "rhetoric of impoliteness," deliberately eschewing courteous
forms, as an instrument of egalitarianism, see RICHARD BAUMAN, LET YOUR WORDS BE FEW:
SYMBOLISM OF SPEAKING AND SILENCE AMONG SEVENTEENTH CENTURY QUAKERS (1983),
cited and discussed in FISCHER, supra note 302, at 474.
389. On parrhesia among the cynics, see Bracht Branham & Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazd.
Introduction to THE CYNICS, supra note 386, at 13, 17; and Long, supra note 386. at 35. For the
wider range of meaning of this and other concepts of free speech in antiquity. see Arnaldo
Momigliano, Freedom of Speech in Antiquity, in 2 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 253.
259-60 (Phillip P. Wiener ed., 1973). In the context of classical Athenian law in particular. see
Stephen Halliwell, The Uses of Laughter in Greek Culture, 41 CLASSICAL Q. 279.288-89 (1991).
2000] 1397
HeinOnline -- 109 Yale L.J. 1397 1999-2000
The Yale Law Journal
egalitarian revolutions, just as we did. They have emerged differently from
their revolutions, though. The French and German legal traditions were
formed in societies in which visible and powerful aristocracies were the
target of egalitarian movements, and they are both societies whose
egalitarianism, in different ways, has involved extending membership in the
aristocracy, in effect, to everybody. They are societies built on
revolutionary redistribution of honor. This is true not only of the law, but
also in what we may think of as the main arena of French civility
regulation-education.390 This history has laid the groundwork for French
and German hate-speech regulation, and it may yet lay the groundwork for
a French and German law of sexual harassment that is dignitary in
orientation."' We have had, all in all, no visible and powerful aristocracy of
the same kind in the United States, and our egalitarianism has taken a
different turn. This has had many consequences outside the law of civility,
my narrow topic here. But within that narrow topic it does have a
consequence we should not forget: We are not going to find it easy to
generalize respect in the United States; our incivility is not just an aspect of
a rough social life that can be casually disengaged from the political
traditions of our country. American incivility is woven into the cloth of the
American egalitarian tradition. At the very least, this makes the campaign
for more civility a difficult one.
390. Indeed, if we hoped to regulate civility through schooling, we would likely find it
difficult to imitate the French example directly.
391. See supra notes 357-359 and accompanying text.
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